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Abstract 
Ever since India’s independence large-scale government interventions have been drastically 
shaping the landscape of the food grain sector. From a famine-prone country, India has become a 
large exporter and stockholder, with stable domestic prices and several nutrition programs. At the 
same time, 15 per cent of Indian population is still undernourished. The Indian government is 
currently implementing one of the world largest food aid programs - the National Food Security 
Act (NFSA) – in the course of which it experiences many challenges and needs rigorous analysis of 
the measures and tools of managing the system. Additionally, there is a strong international 
pressure on India to liberalize its policies in the food grain sector. The present dissertation studies 
various aspects of the food grain policies in India aiming to provide their comprehensive analysis.  
We use econometric time-series techniques to ex-post evaluate the impacts of the policy 
measures on the market outcomes. Among other conclusions, we find a strong response of the 
wheat and rice production to the support prices whereas the rice consumption is mostly driven 
by the distribution of the subsidized grains. Due to protectionist trade policies, the grain export is 
so distorted that its volumes hardly correlate with the prices. We detect a clear upward trend in 
inflation adjusted fiscal costs, started in 2006-07, as a consequence of growing procurement, 
storage and distribution of wheat and rice.  
We develop a dynamic partial equilibrium model with stochastic production shocks, based on the 
econometric results mentioned above. We produce mid-term simulations of different scenarios 
with possible policy measures to comply with the NFSA obligations based on the current, in-kind, 
system. We find that the high pressure on fiscal costs and public stocks, put by the NFSA, can be 
mitigated at the cost of higher and more volatile market prices. Our simulations indicate that a 
cash-based regime, alternative to the in-kind distribution, generates lower fiscal costs while the 
total stocks remain sufficient due to the increase of the private stocks. However, the higher market 
prices and volatility characterizing this scenario may negatively affect the producers, consumers, 
and the political stability. 
Basing on household consumption data, by means of cross-sectional econometric techniques we 
analyze the consumption patterns of wheat and rice delivered through the Public Distribution 
System (PDS), targeting errors and reasons for leakage, self-selection and under-supply of staples.  
We find some serious targeting errors of the PDS: many poor households are not included in the 
system and migrant workers and female-led households are often not well covered. There is a 
negative self-selection of the richer households that results in cost savings, which would be lost 
under a cash-transfer scheme. We find that the leakage rates are in general very low for poor 
households and regions. Furthermore, we find that subsidizing increases the total consumption of 
wheat and rice. This increase, however, produces additional pressure on the prices that can have 
negative consequences for the poor excluded from the system because of the high targeting 
errors.  
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Zusammenfassung  
Seit Indiens Unabhängigkeit haben umfangreiche Interventionen der Regierung den lokalen 
Getreidesektor stark beeinflusst. Indien hat sich von einem durch Hungersnöte gezeichneten Land 
zu einem der weltweit größten Exporteure, mit stabilen lokalen Preisen und mehreren 
Ernährungsprogrammen, entwickelt. Gleichzeitig gelten rund 15 Prozent der indischen 
Bevölkerung immer noch als unterernährt, trotz der großen Anzahl an Programmen gegen Armut, 
insbesondere Nahrungsmittel- und Ernährungsprogrammen. Die aktuelle Umsetzung des 
weltweit umfangreichsten Nahrungsmittelversorgungsprogrammes, dem National Food Security 
Act (NFSA), wird von vielen Hindernissen begleitet. Daher ist es notwendig potenzielle 
Maßnahmen, mit deren Hilfe man das System verwalten kann, intensiv zu analysieren. Desweitern 
ist Indien einem erhöhten internationalen Druck ausgesetzt ihre Agrar- und Handelspolitik zu 
liberalisieren, da das Land einen sehr großen Einfluss auf die Weltagrarmärkte hat. Diese 
Dissertation analysiert diverse Aspekte des indischen Nahrungsmittelsektors und der 
Getreidepolitik, und stellt somit weitreichende Analyse der Politik, den jeweiligen Interaktionen 
und Resultaten bereit. 
Anhand einer ökonometrischen Zeitreihenanalyse untersuchen wir den Einfluss von politischen 
Maßnahmen auf die Märkte. Hier wird, unter anderem, herausgefunden, dass die Reis- und 
Weizenproduktion stark auf die vom Staat festgelegten, unterstützenden Preise reagieren, 
während der Reiskonsum hauptsächlich von der Austeilungsmenge von subventioniertem 
Getreide abhängt. Aufgrund Indiens protektionistischer Handelsregulationen sind die Exporte zu 
einem hohen Grad verzerrt und korrelieren daher kaum mit den Preisen. Seit 2006-07 gibt es 
folglich einen steigenden Trend in den inflationsbereinigten Fiskalkosten, begleitet von 
ansteigender Produktion, Lagerhaltung und Austeilungsmenge von subventioniertem Weizen und 
Reis. 
Simulationsergebnisse eines Dynamic Partial Equilibrium Models mit stochastischen 
Produktionsschocks zeigen, dass der NFSA mittelfristig einen hohen Druck auf die Fiskalkosten und 
die öffentlichen Lagermengen ausübt. Unterschiedliche Managementstrategien führen zu Trade-
offs zwischen den Marktpreisen, Fiskalkosten und der Gefahr von zu niedrigen Lagermengen. Ein 
Bargeld-basiertes Verfahren kann, verglichen mit einem Sachleistungssystem, die Fiskalkosten 
drosseln und dabei, aufgrund von stärkerer privater Lagerhaltung, aussreichend Lagermengen 
bereitstellen. Jedoch besteht in diesem Szenario die Möglichkeit, dass die hohen Marktpreise und 
Preisschwankungen einen negativen Einfluss auf Produzenten, Konsumenten, und die politische 
Stabilität haben. 
Auf der Basis von Haushaltskonsumdaten, und anhand cross-sektionaler ökonometrischer 
Techniken, analysieren wir das Konsumverhalten von Weizen und Reis, welche durch Indiens 
Public Distribution Systems (PDS) zur Verfügung gestellt werden, die Erfassungsfehler des Systems, 
Gründe für Verlustraten sowie Selbst-Selektion und Unterversorgung mit Grundnahrungsmitteln. 
Die Resultate zeigen, dass das PDS hohe Erfassungsfehler aufweist: viele arme Haushalte sind nicht 
vom System erfasst worden, ebenso wie Wanderarbeiter und weiblich geführte Haushalte. Des 
Weiteren gibt es eine Selbst-Selektion reicher Haushalte, welche in Kosteneinsparungen resultiert. 
Diese würde in einem Bargeldtransfersystem verloren gehen. Ebenso finden wir, dass Verlustraten 
im Allgemeinen sehr niedrig sind für Arme und Regionen. Des Weiteren wird festgestellt, dass die 
Subventionen den Konsum von Weizen und Reis erhöhen. Dieser Anstieg übt jedoch zusätzlichen 
Druck auf Preise aus, was negative Konsequenzen für die armen Haushalte haben kann, die nicht 
vom System erfasst worden sind aufgrund der system-inhärenten hohen Erfassungsfehler.    
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1. Introduction1 
‘…it is imperative that we look at the entire system of food production, food 
procurement and the release and distribution of food. Trying to correct one segment 
of this complicated system is likely to end in failure.’ (Basu, 2011)  
This dissertation explores the use of policies for food security in India, specifically, policies 
related to the Public Distribution System, procurement, and storage. India experiences 
persistent problems with undernourishment (United Nations, 2015), despite the large-
scale food and nutrition interventions.  Some of these interventions led to a WTO dispute 
(Brink, 2014). Further, India’s trade policies significantly influence the world prices 
because of the high share of the Indian trade in the world markets (Anderson & Jensen, 
2014). The current implementation by the Indian government of the world largest food 
aid program - the National Food Security Act (NFSA) - experiences many challenges and 
needs rigorous analysis of possible measures to manage the system. Additionally, there is 
a need to evaluate the alternative to the Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS) 
regimes. While evaluating policy measures, this study focuses on food availability, 
including public and private stocks, food consumption, domestic and international market 
prices and fiscal cost.  
1.1. Outline of the dissertation and research questions 
In this chapter, we present a brief history of the transformation of the Indian food-grain 
sector and the government interventions since the 1940s, followed by the outline and the 
critique of the current policy framework. The aim is to set up a political economy 
perspective and understand the historical roots of the current system order to further 
analyze the problems and design the reforms.  
                                                          
1 Fragments of this chapter were published as Saini, S., & Kozicka, M. (2014). Evolution and Critique of 
Buffer Stocking Policy of India. ICRIER Working Paper, 283(September) and Kozicka, M., Kalkuhl, M., Saini, 
S., & Brockhaus, J. (2015). Modelling Indian Wheat and Rice Sector Policies. ZEF-Discussion Papers on 
Development Policy, (197) and ICRIER Working Paper, 295(January). 
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In Chapter 2, the impacts of various food policies in India on market fundamentals are 
analyzed. This is a broad quantitative assessment based on time series econometric 
techniques. The research questions addressed here are:  
 How do the major food-grain policies in India affect markets and fiscal costs?  
 How can the major food-grain policies in India be modelled, i.e. are they 
endogenous or exogenous? Can they be represented by functional forms?   
The study provides new insights into the scale and channels of impact of the government 
interventions on market fundamentals, in particular, on stocks, and links them to the fiscal 
costs. The study adds to the qualitative papers and quantitative analysis of the fragments 
of the food system in India (Gaiha & Kulkarni, 2005; Gulati & Sharma, 1990; Mythili, 2008; 
Umali-Deininger & Deininger, 2001).  
In Chapter 3, a partial equilibrium model based on the results of Chapter 2, is used to 
simulate the impact of the implementation of the NFSA on market fundamentals and fiscal 
costs in the medium term – until 2020/21. These outcomes are compared across various 
policy strategies to comply with the NFSA obligations. Additionally, the policy regime 
change towards cash transfers in combination with deficiency payments is simulated. The 
research questions addressed here include:  
 What are the implications of the implementation of the NFSA for prices, stocks 
and fiscal costs under different policy measures? 
  How would prices, stocks and fiscal costs be affected by a regime change, i.e. by 
the implementation of cash transfers and deficiency payments instead of the 
physical grain procurement, storage and distribution?   
This study extends the econometric analysis presented in Chapter 2 by simulating various 
policies with equilibrium price as well as analyzing counterfactual scenarios. The model is 
tailored to the Indian economy and relies on theoretical assumptions much less than the 
literature based on rational expectations models (like Gouel, 2013). It adds to the 
literature of simulation models by evaluating the NFSA implementation and comparing 
the NFSA with cash transfers. Moreover, the existing studies (Gouel, Gautam, & Martin, 
2014; Jha, Srinivasan, & Landes, 2007) are extended by adding private stocks and taking 
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into account uncertainty coming from random production shocks. Further, it adds to the 
literature which calculates costs of the implementation of the NFSA (Kishore & 
Chakrabarti, 2015; Mishra, 2013; Pursell, 2014) by considering partial equilibrium effects.  
Finally, Chapter 4 scales the focus down to a household level in order to analyze, using the 
National Sample Survey data, the consumption patterns of the Public Distribution System 
grains. The focus is on targeting errors and reasons for leakage, self-selection and under-
supply of staples. Further, impact of the subsidy on market grain consumption is 
quantified.  
The research questions addressed in this chapter are: 
 How efficiently does the PDS cover the poor and the traditionally underprivileged 
(e.g. scheduled castes)?  
 What is the scale of under-purchase in different card type groups?  
 What are the reasons for it (supply constrains or demand reasons)?  
 What is the impact of the Public Distribution System wheat and rice subsidy on 
total wheat and rice consumption?  
The study provides a thorough quantitative analysis considering India as a whole. To our 
knowledge, this is the first empirical study of the various targeting errors and reasons for 
under-purchase on the all-India level. We add to the studies carried out on a smaller scale 
of selected states (Dhanaraj & Gade, 2012; R. Jha, Gaiha, Pandey, & Kaicker, 2013; Khera, 
2011a). We also provide new insights into analysis of leakage from a food subsidy program 
(Drèze & Khera, 2015; Mehta & Jha, 2014). The results further contribute to the growing 
evidence that the PDS crowds in consumption of wheat and rice (Kaushal & Muchomba, 
2013; Khera, 2011a; Shaw & Telidevara, 2014).  
Chapter 5 draws the main findings together and proposes policy implications and further 
research. 
This dissertation contributes to the discussion about the role of food policies in improving 
food security in India. Empirical grounding, comprehensible results and a political 
economy perspective distinguish this work. It provides a detailed and differentiated 
analysis that can be highly useful for improving the current system as well as for the design 
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of an alternative cash-based system. The relevance of our results has been recognized by 
Dr. Ashok V. Desai in his article published in the Telegraph (Desai, 2015) and cited by Sunil 
Jain in the Indian Express (Jain, 2015).  
1.2. Evolution of Indian food-grain sector 
Traces of the government intervention in providing relief to the needy in times of distress 
(famines, scarcities and crop failures) can be found in India already in the 15th century. 
The roots of the food grain policy with food grain reserve as its essential part dates back 
to the great Orissa famine of 1865-67 (Acharya, 1983). However, until about the first half 
of the 20th century, there were limited or no physical stocks of food grains maintained by 
the government. As a result, there were no government interventions in the market and 
prices of food grains were determined by the market forces. Markets, however, were 
functioning poorly. Sub-markets were weakly integrated and due to poor infrastructure, 
movement of grains from the surplus to the deficit areas was disrupted. Domestic demand 
was largely relying on imports.  Consequently, domestic prices were characterized by high 
volatility. These factors combined with a high level of undernourishment and poverty 
resulted in frequent food crises (World Bank, 1999).   
World War II affected food imports and the transportation system in the country, leading 
to the collapse of the free market system and a food crisis. Due to a drastic fall in 
production and a crippled grain market with restrictions on grain movements, more than 
two million people died of starvation in the Bengal Famine of 1942-43 (Padmanabhan, 
1973). These events led to the creation of the Food Department (December 1942) at the 
central level. The period marked the beginning of the transition from reliance on the 
private sector to one establishing complete government monopoly in the procurement, 
storage and distribution of food grains.  
The government introduced administrative controls, monopoly procurement and public 
distribution during 1943-47. The Public Distribution System (PDS), whose basic principles 
were laid in the 6th Price Control Conference held in September 1942, is regarded as one 
of the most stable elements of India’s food policy. The central objective of the system in 
the beginning was stabilization of prices, and the focus of food distribution was the urban 
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and food deficit areas. The PDS has substantially helped protect the urban poor from a 
rapid rise in food grain prices.  
The government purchased food grains from the markets at two prices. These were 
support prices and procurement prices, which differed in their levels and time of 
announcement. Support prices, declared before planting, were to provide strategic 
production incentives to producers and ensure stability in price and farm income around 
certain minimum levels. Procurement prices were declared for crops, mainly rice and 
wheat, for which the government had to undertake procurement to meet the PDS needs. 
These prices were announced at the beginning of each marketing season and maintained 
for the entire year. Such procurement was done from producers, traders and millers, more 
often on a voluntary basis but sometimes, with an element of compulsion.  
While in the 1940s, the focus of buffer stocking operations was on the urban and food-
deficit areas, in the 1950s, the focus on welfare led to the extension of these operations 
to the rural areas. The Constitution of India (1950) explicitly stated that the state “… shall 
regard the raising of the level of nutrition and the standard of living of its people, and the 
improvement of public health as among its primary duties”. Likewise, after the adoption 
of planned development in the 1950s, the idea of economic growth with social justice 
(Article 47) became the guiding principle for India’s economic policy formulation and the 
country adopted the so-called socialist pattern of society in 1955. The government 
introduced monopoly control over inter-state grain movements. State-zones were 
created and licensing was widespread to curb private trade. The Essential Commodities 
Act was passed in 1955, marking the increased regulation of the production, supply, 
distribution and trade of the essential commodities. Licenses and permits were used for 
this purpose.  
In the mid-60s policy goals focused on price stabilization, elimination of hunger, and 
government involvement in grain markets to curb speculative trade. Both the Food 
Corporation of India (FCI) and Agriculture Prices Commission (APC) were set up in 1965 to 
secure a strategic and commanding position for the public sector in food grain trade. In 
order to create a stable environment for farmers to adopt new production techniques and 
inputs, government got involved in the food grain marketing of the country. These 
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intensified government interventions in the food sector brought about the beginning of 
the Green Revolution in India the 1960s. Since the 1970s, India has never been a big 
importer of wheat. This period marked the country’s ability to link buffer stocks with local 
surplus production of food grains, unlike earlier when a buffer stock was created from 
imported grain only. It was during the Fourth Five-Year Plan that the creation of a food-
grain buffer stock of adequate size as a central feature of food policy (figure 1) was 
introduced.  
 
Figure 1 Stocks of food grains: 1951 to 1974 
Source: (Chopra, 1981) Based on Bulletin on Food Statistics 1977; ESA, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, New 
Delhi, p.33. Reprinted in Chopra (1981 p.289) 
As declaring procurement prices after sowing did not influence production decisions, the 
policy was revised and for the first time procurement prices were announced before the 
sowing period in 1978-79. This practice continues until now. Since the support prices also 
acted as procurement prices in the wake of an open-ended procurement drive, the 
distinction between support and procurement prices disappeared eventually. Until now, 
the government announces only the Minimum Support Price (MSP). The central 
government provides price support to paddy, wheat and coarse cereals through the Food 
Corporation of India (FCI) and state governments participating in the decentralized 
procurement program (DCP) and state agencies who buy all the offered-for-sale food 
grains, provided the grain conforms to prescribed specifications. As a policy, the 
procurement operations of the FCI are largely limited to rice and wheat. The procurement 
for both rice and wheat is open-ended, although there are indicative targets set before 
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each season. The producers of the grains have the option to sell their produce to the 
FCI/state agencies at the support prices or in the open market. Rice was collected by way 
of statutory levies on rice millers and rice dealers. The levy percentage varied between 
states. In October 2015, the levy program was discontinued.  
The norms and composition of the FCI stocks are evaluated under two heads: operational 
and strategic. The government fixes the buffer stock norms, prescribing the minimum 
quantities of food grains (wheat and rice) to be maintained in the central pool at the 
beginning of each quarter, namely for January, April, July and October. FCI maintains 
stocks of grains in excess of what is required for meeting operational needs, and these 
stocks are called strategic stocks. These are maintained for ensuring price stability in the 
country and for meeting any exigent grain requirements. 
As agricultural production had grown in the aftermath of the Green Revolution, the 
outreach of the PDS was extended to tribal blocks and areas with a high incidence of 
poverty in the 1970s and 1980s. Until 1992, the PDS was a general entitlement scheme 
for all consumers without any specific target. The 1991 hunger deaths in mostly the tribal 
areas in the country led to the formation of a Revamped PDS (RPDS), which propagated 
the adoption of an area approach, i.e. people living in the disadvantaged areas, mainly 
hilly, tribal, drought prone and desertified areas were identified and were designated to 
benefit from the RPDS. Both the PDS and RPDS were criticized for their failure to serve all 
the poor and the lack of transparency. Consequently, the Targeted Public Distribution 
system (TPDS) was introduced in June, 1997. Unlike the RPDS, which targeted “all in the 
poor areas”, the TPDS would target the “poor in all areas”. The new system identified the 
poor people across the country and provided them rationed quantities of essential 
commodities (mainly grain, sugar, kerosene etc.) at subsidized prices. 
The Antyodaya Anna Yojana (AAY) program was launched in December, 2000, which was 
an extension of the TPDS and aimed to reduce hunger among the poorest segments of 
the below poverty line (BPL) population. As on December 31, 2013, 24.3 million families 
had been issued AAY cards by states/union territories (UTs).  
The TPDS is operated under the joint responsibility of the Central and the State 
Governments. The Central Government, through the Food Corporation of India (FCI), is 
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responsible for procurement, storage, transportation and bulk allocation of food grains to 
the State Governments. The operational responsibility including allocation within the 
state, identification of eligible families, issue of the Ration Cards and supervision of the 
functioning of Fair Price Shops (FPSs) etc., belongs to the State Governments.  
The Government of India makes allocations of food grains to three categories of 
beneficiaries under the TPDS, namely AAY, BPL (Below Poverty-Line) and APL (Above 
Poverty Line). Thirty-six per cent of the Indian population is identified as BPL. The 
entitlements differed between these three categories of beneficiaries. Since 2002, the 
scale of issue to the APL, BPL and AAY categories has been revised and made uniform at 
35 kg/family/month for all. Grains under such schemes are released to the beneficiaries 
at highly subsidized rates called the Central Issue Price (CIP). Allocations are made to the 
BPL families at the subsidized rates of Rs. 4.15/kg for wheat and Rs. 5.65/kg for rice since 
July 25, 2000. Ever since the introduction of the AAY scheme in 2000, allocations to these 
families are made at the even more highly subsidized rates of Rs. 2/kg for wheat and 
Rs. 3/kg for rice. At the time the TPDS was introduced, the allocations to the APL families 
were made at the CIP, which was equal to the economic cost of the grains. However, the 
CIPs for the APL have been Rs. 6.10/kg for wheat and Rs. 7.95/kg for rice since July 7, 2002, 
which have been consistently lower than the associated economic costs. The CIPs have 
not been revised for the BPL and AAY families since July 25, 2000, and for APL since July 
1, 2002. 
The TPDS is one of many other food-related schemes run by the central government 
(center) and different states/Union Territories. The TPDS has the highest number of 
beneficiaries (243.7 million ration cards issued by 2014 (DFPD, 2014), with a very high 
level of grain distribution commitment (in 2012-13, close to 52 million tonnes of grains 
was allocated for distribution under TPDS). There are several other welfare schemes2 run 
by both the center and the states, which differentiate and target beneficiaries based on 
their age, levels of nutrition deprivation, etc. Moreover, amongst others the entitlements 
                                                          
2 Apart from meeting the grain needs under TPDS, the Central government also procures and distributes 
grains under other welfare schemes, like Mid-day meal scheme, Wheat-based Nutrition Scheme among 
others. There are in total 7 such schemes together addressed as Other Welfare Schemes (OWSs). 
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include cash, raw food grains, pre-cooked/hot-cooked meals and other essential 
commodities like pulses. 
1.3. The National Food Security Act 
In September 2013, the National Food Security Act (NFSA) was passed, which i.a. provides 
a legal right to highly subsidized food-grains for eligible households. The Act brought 
under its ambit many of the existing food-distributing welfare schemes run by the central 
government of the country, including TPDS. Under this, the three categories of 
beneficiaries are replaced by only two categories, namely AAY and priority. The latter is 
supposed to include the existing TPDS-BPL beneficiaries, unless they are found to have 
crossed the poverty threshold. The Act aims to provide food security to 67 per cent of the 
country’s population (75 per cent of the rural population, and 50 per cent of the urban 
population) by distributing a fixed quantity of subsidized grain to them every month - with 
an entitlement of 5 kg per person per month of food grains. The AAY households will 
receive 35 kg per household per month. The NFSA freezes the issue prices at Rs. 2/kg for 
wheat and Rs. 3/kg for rice for all identified beneficiaries for three years (Gulati & Saini, 
2014). 
Implementation of the NFSA means that 61.2 million tonnes of cereals will be distributed 
through the PDS. As a result, buffer stock norms need to be adjusted in order to feed 
increased distribution needs. As estimated by Gulati and Jain (2013), the new buffer norm 
for July 1 for rice and wheat jointly, needs to be increased to 46.7 mt from the current to 
31.9 mt. Higher stock requirements and the legal entitlement to subsidized food grains 
under the NFSA, mean that upward deviations from new norms are very expensive (as 
even fulfilling the norms results in high costs) while falling below the norms implies the 
risk of being unable to meet requirements under the act. 
Within the first year of its implementation, 11 Indian states/union territories (UTs) have 
implemented the Act. The remaining states were given several extensions and the current 
estimates suggest the full implementation by April 2016 (Das, 2015).   
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1.4. Conceptual framework 
The Minimum Support Price (MSP) — the Indian government intervention in rice and 
wheat production— is announced before rice and wheat planting starts. Grains are 
unboundedly procured from farmers with the guaranteed MSP, which covers production 
costs and a “reasonable” margin for the farmers. The procured grain is stored as buffer 
stocks—consisting of operational and strategic stocks. Grain is distributed to the poor at 
the strongly subsidized Central Issue Price (CIP) through the Targeted Public Distribution 
system (TPDS) and Other Welfare Schemes (OWS). The stock norms indicate the need for 
the system to meet the requirement of the TPDS and OWS and to stabilize supply. 
Excessive stocks can be either released to the market through the Open Market Sales 
Scheme (OMSS) or exported, with exports and imports being concessional. OMSS tenders 
are floated for bulk orders and/or an over-the-counter sale is executed for smaller 
quantities for retail traders. An ad hoc Minimum Issue Price (MIP) is set for these sales. 
The MIP, to prevent resale, is higher than the current MSP and usually covers the 
acquisition cost of grains. Most of the operations are conducted by the Food Corporation 
of India (FCI), a parastatal agency. There are also trade regulations and private stock 
limitations used on an ad hoc basis to increase domestic availability, isolate domestic 
prices from international prices or boost public procurement. 
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Figure 2 Modeling framework for the Indian Wheat and Rice Sector 
Source: Own illustration  
Note: The oval shapes indicate the endogenous variables in the system, the rectangular shapes are 
restricted for the exogenous variables and the grey shaded shapes refer to policy variables. The red arrows 
are related to the fiscal costs, the dark arrows symbolize the impact of exogenous policies of interest and 
the remaining interactions between the variables are represented by the blue arrows.  
Figure 2 shows a graphical representation of our modelling approach to the Indian wheat 
and rice sector. The main variables of interest – prices, stocks and fiscal costs – are 
influenced by several endogenous and exogenous variables and directly as well as 
indirectly by policy measures.  
Total production is shaped by expected output prices (Nerlove & Bessler, 2001), which is 
the current MSP and the upcoming marketing year market prices. Other exogenous 
factors, like weather, also play an important role in the quantity produced. International 
prices do not affect production decisions directly, but they influence domestic prices 
through the net exports, which further impact the total market availability. The net 
exports are decided by the interplay of the domestic and international prices combined 
with the trade regulations. Although it is not shown explicitly in figure 2, we distinguish 
between public and private exports, as public exports are more substantially driven by 
policy measures. Further, international prices respond to Indian net exports as India 
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contributes a significant amount to the global rice market. The public stocks, or rather 
changes in public stock levels, are shaped by inflows – that is, the public procurement; 
and outflows that include OMSS, TPDS and OWS3 off-takes and exports. Private stock 
formation follow the competitive storage model, that is, stocks are driven by price 
expectations of the private stockholders (Williams & Wright, 1991). Additionally, the stock 
levels are affected by private stock limits. We consider private and public stocks 
separately, even though they are jointly represented in figure 2.  
The part of marketable surplus sold to the government (that is, the public procurement) 
depends on the difference between the open market prices and the MSP. Additionally, it 
is affected by regulations, such as levy (Gulati & Sharma, 1990), infrastructure, and quality 
of institutions. Unfortunately, these exogenous factors are impossible to quantify or 
aggregate to the all-India level – for example access to the markets or corruption. As a 
result, in our model, procurement is a function of the production level (a proxy for the 
marketable surplus) and the difference between the MSP and the market price. OMSS off-
takes depend on the exogenous policy variable - OMSS allocation, which defines the upper 
limit of the off-take. The actual level of off-take depends on the MIP and the market price, 
as the difference between these two determines the demand for the OMSS grains.  
Because MIP is always above the MSP, the current MSP affects the OMSS sales. All the 
domestic releases (OMSS and PDS) and procurement shape the market availability of 
wheat and rice, thereby affecting their market prices. Not only is consumption of wheat 
and rice dependent on their market prices and consumers’ income levels, it is also 
affected by the quantity consumed from the PDS and the subsidy level (Deaton, 1981). 
Eventually, the fiscal costs are formed by the procurement level multiplied by the MSP 
plus some variable operational costs, costs of carrying the stock and distribution of the 
PDS grains. The revenue is generated from the sale of the PDS grains (that is, the CIP and 
the volume of the PDS distribution), and from the OMSS and public exports.              
1.5. Critique of the system 
The government’s official food subsidy bill has been rising steadily from less than 0.4 per 
cent in the early 1990s to around 0.8 per cent of the GDP in recent years (figure 3). Apart 
                                                          
3 TPDS and OWS will be jointly referred to as PDS.  
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from this direct cost borne by the government, there are additional costs, which arise 
from leakages, illegal diversion of food grains, and significant wastage due to poor storage 
and transport facilities (Shreedhar, Gupta, Pullabhotla, Ganesh-Kumar, & Gulati, 2012). 
Even though there is no consensus on the exact numbers of the leakage, the scale is 
undoubtedly high – even the lowest estimates report above 41% leakage in 2011-12 
(Drèze & Khera, 2015; Gulati & Saini, 2015). The scale of storage losses is even less known. 
Different estimates quote aggregate losses (post-harvest annual loss of grain), starting 
from 16-17 million tonnes up to 55 million tonnes, which roughly means 7 per cent to 23 
per cent of total production (Artiuch & Kornstein, 2012). FCI reports give not more than 
0.4 per cent of the average stock level in the central pool in the corresponding years. 
Extreme inefficiency of the system was revealed by the Planning Commission report, 
which stated that Government of India (GoI) spent Rs. 3.65 for every 1 rupee of benefits 
received by beneficiaries (GoI, 2005). 
 
Figure 3 Food Subsidy as paid by the Government of India 
Source: Planning Commission, GoI 
Note: Real values obtained by adjusting for the Wholesale Price Index (December of the corresponding 
year value, Dec 1990=100) 
Buffer stock of food grains, at any point in time, is determined by the interlinked factors: 
the carryover stock, the level of procurement by the central and by the state 
governments, the level of distribution, and the export and import volumes. As a result, 
stock levels are difficult to manage and they often significantly deviate from the stock 
norms and even exceed the storage capacity (figure 4). 
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
1
9
90
-9
1
1
9
91
-9
2
1
9
92
-9
3
1
9
93
-9
4
1
9
94
-9
5
1
9
95
-9
6
1
9
96
-9
7
1
9
97
-9
8
1
9
98
-9
9
1
9
99
-0
0
2
0
00
-0
1
2
0
01
-0
2
2
0
02
-0
3
2
0
03
-0
4
2
0
04
-0
5
2
0
05
-0
6
2
0
06
-0
7
2
0
07
-0
8
2
0
08
-0
9
2
0
09
-1
0
2
0
10
-1
1
2
0
11
-1
2
2
0
12
-1
3
%
G
D
P
R
s.
 b
ill
io
n
, i
n
 1
9
9
0
-9
1
 p
ri
ce
s
Food Subsidy in INR Food Subsidy as % GDP (Market Price)
14 
 
  
Figure 4 Buffer stocks of wheat and rice vs. stock capacity in India 
Source: FCI 
 
Figure 5 Buffer stocks of wheat and rice vs. stock norm in India 
Source: FCI 
The open-ended character of procurement, trade restrictions and high level of MSP led to 
a growing share of public procurement – close to 50 per cent of the marketed wheat and 
rice were procured by the government in the recent years. The absence of clear rules to 
release surplus stocks further resulted in mounting stocks (figure 5) and high food inflation 
(Gulati & Saini, 2013). The combination of high public stocks and limits to private 
stockholding under the Essential Commodities Act led to a marginalization of private 
stocks (Kozicka, Kalkuhl, Saini, & Brockhaus, 2015).  
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The current system is further criticized for skewing production towards wheat and rice 
(Banerjee, 2011; CACP, 2013), which hinders poverty alleviation (Birthal, Roy, & Negi, 
2015), as well as not accounting for consumer preferences (Muralidharan, Niehaus, & 
Sukhtankar, 2011) and skewing consumption to wheat and rice away from cheaper and 
more nutritious coarse cereals (Gulati & Saini, 2013). Tying eligibility to a single FPS also 
limits effectiveness of TPDS in providing food security to migrant workers and their 
families. 
Indian government is also actively involved in regulating international trade, for example  
by imposing selective export bans and zero import duties, which fuels international food 
price spikes and volatility (Anderson, Ivanic, & Martin, 2013; Anderson, 2013). In fact, this 
trade policy may also harm Indian farmers – the domestic price, especially of rice, has 
often been much lower than the international price, indicating a net taxation of Indian 
farmers and adding to the ‘bill’ of foregone benefits from trade (see also Anderson, 2013). 
There is an international pressure on India to reform its food sector because of its impact 
on world market prices (Mitchell, 2008). The contribution of Indian export bans on rice 
and wheat to the world food price spikes during the 2007-2008 world food crises has been 
criticized by the international community. The recent prorogation of the implementation 
of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), which limits support for farmers to 10 per 
cent of the value of production, is only a temporary solution and indicates the inevitable 
change of the political paradigm towards a more market-oriented approach (R. Kumar, 
Bagaria, & Santra, 2014).  
Domestically, given the high cost generated by the PDS and the potential benefits of 
improving the food security and nutrition by better targeting, less leakage and a change 
in consumer behavior, there is a growing support from both policy makers and 
researchers (S. Jha & Ramaswami, 2010) of reforming the system in direction of a cash 
based schemes. The High Level Committee on re-structuring of Food Corporation of India 
set up on 20th August, 2014 made a clear recommendation to deeply restructure the 
system and among other reforms, to gradually roll-in cash transfers (S. Kumar, 2015). The 
Committee argues that the agricultural landscape in India has changed dramatically since 
the 60s when the FCI was created. The goal of self-sufficiency has been achieved and the 
16 
 
current food management system “has not been able to deliver on its objectives very 
efficiently”. The proposed reform aims at reaching many targets: benefiting larger number 
of farmers and better serving the economically vulnerable consumers in a financially 
sustainable manner; and optimizing stocking policies in order to efficiently and cost 
effectively feed PDS and stabilize grain markets.  The former Chief Economic Advisor to 
India's Ministry of Finance and currently the World Bank's Chief Economist, Kaushik Basu 
in his paper on Foodgrain Management in India (Basu, 2010) criticized the current system 
for failing to provide support to neither the farmers not the consumers. He clearly speaks 
in favor of cash transfers or food coupons which would cut on leakage and inefficiencies.
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2. Quantitative assessment of food-grain policy measures on 
market fundamentals4 
This chapter attempts to unravel the major linkages between policies and markets for 
wheat and rice. It describes and analyses different fragments of the system to explain the 
endogenous components in figure 2. The policies in focus are procurement, storage and 
distribution (with market sales and exports) policies and the major variables of interest 
are stock levels, market prices and fiscal costs. As this model requires a consistent 
representation of macro-variables close to Indian reality, we focus on national aggregate 
variables from 1982 to 2013. Hence, our basic method of analysis will be a time-series 
analysis of the economy-wide variables indicated as ovals in figure 2. 
2.1. Literature review 
An analysis of the Indian rice and wheat sector policies has not received much attention 
in the last years. A few studies analyzed particular aspects or policies in isolation. For 
example, Jha et al. (2013) studied determinants of real income transfers through 
subsidized wheat, rice and sugar based on primary data collected in Andhra Pradesh, 
Maharashtra and Rajasthan. They found several inefficiencies and targeting errors of the 
TPDS and point at a high probability of exacerbation of these issues with introduction of 
the NFSA. Sharma (2012) focused on the cost of the system – the food subsidy as 
generated by the Food Corporation of India (FCI) after 1991. The results suggest that 
despite the growing cost of food subsidy, there have been improvements in the 
operational efficiency of the FCI. For example, share of administrative charges of 
procurement costs, and storage losses have declined during the last decade. An earlier 
study on FCI performance by Swaminathan (1999) also found that FCI improved its 
efficiency during the 1990s. By comparing wholesale market prices with economic costs 
of the FCI he found that in many states, the FCI was more competitive than the private 
sector. A broader policy analysis, evaluating the effects on production, productivity, 
accumulation of stocks, prices and exports, was conducted by Gaiha and Kulkarni (2005). 
                                                          
4Fragments of this chapter were published as Kozicka, M., Kalkuhl, M., Saini, S., & Brockhaus, J. (2015). 
Modelling Indian Wheat and Rice Sector Policies. ZEF-Discussion Papers on Development Policy, (197) and 
ICRIER Working Paper, 295(January).   
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This study is much more critical of governmental action. One of the findings by the authors 
was that agricultural subsidies hindered food grain productivity growth by constraining 
public investments in agriculture. They also found that minimum support prices (MSP) 
have a positive impact on procurement and stocks of wheat and rice. What is more, a 
higher MSP increases the wholesale price, which in turn leads to an increase in consumer 
prices. Umali-Deininger & Deininger (2001) studied a range of wheat and rice sector 
policies. They used aggregate and household level data to show that the system was costly 
and generated inefficiencies. The grain management costs grew between 1980 and 1999 
much faster than the volume of operations probably due to rising bureaucracy, storage 
and transportation losses. Unpredictable market intervention and overregulation 
surprised the private sector. What is more, it was not beneficial to a majority of the poor. 
They proposed several reform options within the current system, that is, without any 
significant structural changes. An earlier study by Gulati and Sharma  (1990) analyzed the 
impact of procurement price on open market prices, procurement and output. The 
authors found that procurement prices are the major factor driving market prices while 
the procurement volume was affected by the output level and the difference between 
procurement and market prices.    
There are several studies that have looked at the demand and supply response to price 
changes. Mythili (2008) used dynamic panel data model to analyze the supply response 
of major crops before and after the reforms of the early 1990s. The study revealed that 
after 1990, production response to prices (farm-gate prices were taken into 
consideration) has increased and that farmers are more elastic in their non-acreage 
inputs. Most of the food grain demand analysis in India is based on household 
consumption estimates based on the National Sample Survey (NSS) data, collected by the 
Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation. The comprehensive study of wheat 
and rice demand and supply can be found in Ganesh-Kumar et al. (2012). The demand 
model was also estimated based on the NSS data. Production was modelled in two ways 
– as aggregate with the Cobb-Douglas production function and as a product of separately 
modelled yield and acreage. In both approaches, the ratio of own price to prices of 
competing crops was one of the explanatory variables.    
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Since food inflation has been persistently high in the last few years, there have been a few 
studies that analyzed the cause of rising food prices in the context of food price stabilizing 
policies. Dasgupta et al. (2011) conducted an econometric analysis of wheat price 
formation in India. The results suggest that the domestic price is only “moderately” 
affected by international prices; in addition, public stocks have virtually no impact on 
wheat prices in India. The authors conclude that “public stocks are rarely used effectively 
to stabilize wholesale market prices of wheat in India”. Gulati and Saini (2013) found that 
the fiscal deficit, rising farm wages and international prices had a significant impact on 
food inflation in India.     
The current chapter adds to the literature by providing a comprehensive overview of all 
the major policies of the food grain sector currently used in India, along with the 
quantitative assessment of their impacts on the markets and contribution to the fiscal 
costs.     
2.2. Policies, their measures and outcomes 
2.2.1. Prices 
In order to understand what determines demand, supply and storage, we need to find out 
the prices paid to and received by different actors in the market. Regulated prices like the 
MSP, the MIP and the CIP are usually set by the center and differ only slightly at the state 
level. 5  They, however, influence market prices due to the high level of government 
involvement. The market prices include wholesale prices and retail prices. Regulated and 
market prices can be grouped as follows: the MSP, MIP and wholesale price as producer 
and trader prices and CIP and retail price as consumer prices.    
Market prices differ a lot with their levels (price time series from selected markets can be 
found in Appendix 2) due to the state specific environment (like the efficiency of 
                                                          
5Unfortunately, these state-level differences are difficult to track, especially in a historical perspective. For 
example, bonuses to the MSP are sometimes used by local governments but data on them is rarely 
available. Even bigger issues are the institutional differences between states – like the almost universal 
coverage of the TPDS in Kerala, or extremely high level of leakages in Bihar. Furthermore, the 
procurement efficiency of the FCI/state level procurement agencies is not uniform in all states across the 
country. They function relatively better in a few states (Punjab, Haryana, parts of Andhra Pradesh and in 
recent years, also in Chattisgarh) but are mostly ineffective in others (Bihar, Orissa, etc.). As the purpose 
of this study is to assess the impact of central policies on the all India aggregate outcomes, considering 
these state-wise differences would bring too much complexity to the analysis and the model would lack 
transparency.        
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procurement or state-specific bonuses to the MSP and taxes), however they clearly show 
common trends. Acharya et al. (2012) found, for both wheat and rice, integration of prices 
across different levels of marketing – wholesale, retail and primary market, as well as 
spatial integration of markets – retail, wholesale and primary market prices across 
different geographical areas. This is important for analyzing the relationships between the 
variables, as production and consumption levels in different states vary significantly. For 
the purpose of our analysis, which deals with all-India yearly aggregates, we need to 
consider a weighted price average that reflects market forces and influences the decisions 
of different actors. 
We, therefore, use commodity-specific wholesale price indices (wheat and rice 
components of the wholesale price index (WPI)), which capture the overall demand and 
supply conditions of the food market. Its components are trade-weighted average prices, 
collected from many markets and it is available on a monthly basis (see Appendix 3 for 
data sources). Based on this monthly index, we calculate average price dynamics for 
different periods, corresponding with the times when our endogenous variables are 
determined. For example, to analyze production determinants, we used averages for 
harvest months, planting months and marketing year, which are different for wheat and 
rice. Marketing year averages are also important for demand analysis.  
The disadvantage of using the components of the WPI is that they do not provide the 
actual price levels, only the price dynamics. This is not an issue for the regression 
estimation; however, to analyze differences between regulated and open market prices, 
we needed to reproduce the wholesale price level. To do so, we calculated a production 
weighted average price of wheat and rice from major markets for the last four years. Next, 
using the respective WPI components, we reproduced the price levels backwards.6 As a 
result, we obtained the monthly all-India wholesale price of wheat and rice. Then, for 
different purposes, different averages of these monthly prices were created. For 
production, the prices during the harvest, planting and marketing year were considered, 
which, in the case of rice, were weighted according to the production share in kharif and 
                                                          
6 The WPI components are less volatile than market prices from major grain-producing states (see 
Appendix 1 for comparison of price averages). 
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rabi seasons7 . For consumption, the marketing year average price was used. As the 
representative international price, the International Monetary Fund quoted prices were 
used. For wheat ‘No.1 Hard Red Winter, ordinary protein, FOB Gulf of Mexico, US$ per 
metric ton’ and for rice ‘5 per cent broken milled white rice, Thailand nominal price quote, 
US$ per metric ton’, were used. Both were converted to rupees at the current exchange 
rate. In order to obtain real prices, all nominal prices are WPI deflated.  
The comparison of the derived price time series is presented in figure 6 and figure 7. An 
interesting trend observed, both in the wheat and rice markets, is the narrowing gap 
between the MSP and wholesale prices. This came as a result of an aggressive 
procurement policy in response to the international price boom in 2007-08. At the same 
time, market prices remained stable in real terms. However, even though the gap 
between MSPs and the wholesale prices has narrowed, procurement prices remained 
clearly below market prices (with a one-year exception for wheat). This could suggest that 
MSP successfully protects the lower bound of the prices. Market price should be close to 
MSP at harvest in net producing states and rise with time and distance due to storage and 
transportation costs. However, the wholesale price used in this study is the average from 
different markets across India and so includes, for example, transportation costs. This is 
why even the harvest price has been usually well above MSP. In fact, in some states with 
ill-functioning procurement, the market price often drops below MSP (for example Patna 
prices in Appendix 2). This fact will be used in analyzing procurement level determinants 
in subsection 2.2.3.   
It is also clear that domestic prices in India were successfully protected from international 
price fluctuations, avoiding the up and down swings in the mid-1990s and during and after 
the 2007-2008 food crisis. Domestic wheat prices, except for the few years when the 
world price spiked, were above international prices, whereas domestic rice prices for most 
of the time remained below international values. For both grains, however, the difference 
between the domestic and international price was high after the export ban in 2007-08. 
This could mean that trade policies, on the one hand, protected farmers from the 
international price fluctuations, but on the other, subdued domestic prices. As a result, 
                                                          
7 Harvest months for wheat are March-May and for rice, October-December for the kharif season and 
March-June for the rabi season. 
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procurement was ample, and even excessive, with relatively low MSP. However, for the 
Indian farmers this policy measure meant foregone benefits from trade. 
 
Figure 6 Wheat producer prices 
Source: Own design based on data from RBI, DFPD, DAC, IMF and FED 
 
Figure 7 Rice producer prices 
Source: Own design based on data from RBI, DFPD, DAC, IMF and FED 
Note: For scaling factor, to convert paddy to rice, we used 0.66. International price is a corresponding 
marketing year average.  
Wheat wholesale market price (both harvest time and yearly average) changes are only 
slightly correlated with MSP changes (table 1). For rice, all three prices, i.e., the MSP, and 
the two market averages are strongly correlated, which can be attributed to better 
functioning institutions (more efficient procurement, less leakage) in the ‘rice’ states than 
in the ‘wheat’ states (Khera, 2011a, 2011b). Besides, in the case of rice, a higher share of 
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marketed surplus is procured as compared to wheat. This means that the rice market is 
actually more regulated. In both cases, MSPs are positively but weakly correlated with 
respective international prices. This is probably because one of the factors considered for 
recommending the MSP by the Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices is the 
international market situation (Saini & Kozicka, 2014). Domestic wholesale prices are 
weakly positively correlated in case of rice and weakly negatively, in case of wheat market. 
This is in line with findings of Acharya (2012) that there is no cointegration of international 
and domestic prices and there is no congruence between them.    
  Wheat  Rice 
 MSP Yearly Harvest Int. MSP Yearly Harvest Int. 
MSP 1    1    
Yearly  0.36 1   0.82 1  
 
Harvest  0.32 0.58 1  0.79 0.94 1 
 
Int. 0.2 -0.35 -0.21 1 0.31 0.35 0.17 1 
Table 1 Correlation matrix of different prices for wheat and rice 
Note: First differences of nominal prices from 1982 till 2013 were used  
Source: Own calculation based on MOSPI, DAC, DFPD 
The CIP has been very low and it has changed very rarely; therefore, the actual retail price 
of subsidized grain differs quite significantly among states. The CIP has been kept constant 
in nominal terms for below poverty line (BPL) and above poverty line (APL) cardholders 
from July 2002 and for the group of the ‘poorest of the poor’ (AAY) from the beginning of 
2001. As a result, the price in real terms has declined quite significantly.8  
The dynamics of and changing relationships between prices, especially regulated and 
market prices, as well as our particular interest in the impact of policies on market 
outcomes resulted in our decision to estimate the independent system equations 
(presented in the section 3), rather than use a simultaneous equation model. This also 
allowed us to test for the relevance of price averages for different period in farmers’ 
decision making. Endogeneity problems were solved with instrumental variables 
estimation techniques.     
                                                          
8 More details can be found in the subsection 2.2.4.  
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2.2.2. Production 
The government uses both input subsidies and output price support (MSP) to boost 
production. The MSP also serves as an instrument of income stabilization. The MSP for 
rice and wheat, “which along with other factors, takes into consideration the cost of 
various agricultural inputs and the reasonable margin for the farmers for their produce” 
(FCI web portal, 2015), is announced before each of the two sowing seasons – rabi and 
kharif.  
In 1978-79, the MSP was for the first time announced before planting time. Earlier, the 
procurement price used to be announced before at harvest time. This change must have 
strongly influenced the way the MSP shaped farmers’ price expectations. This is the major 
reason we start our estimation sample in 1982.   
Wheat and rice usually do not compete for area; they are produced in different regions – 
wheat predominantly in the north and rice in the south.9 Wheat, as compared to rice, is 
more often produced by commercial farmers, whereas rice is cultivated mostly by small-
scale farmers.10 There have been higher investments and a greater proportion of irrigated 
acreage under wheat – the proportion of irrigated acreage has risen from 81 per cent in 
1990-1991 to above 91 per cent at present. By contrast, the irrigated acreage under rice 
has increased from 45.5 per cent to 58 per cent (DAC, Ministry of Agriculture). Hence, rice 
production is highly dependent on rainfall and is characterized by greater yield variability.  
Public procurement plays a very important role in both sectors. Rice is procured directly 
from farmers in the form of paddy at the MSP (open-ended procurement) or from 
millers/traders (with obligatory levy11 ranging from 30 per cent to 75 per cent depending 
on the state) at the ‘levy’ price, which is the MSP plus milling cost. Wheat is procured 
directly from producers at the MSP. The dominant share of the government, especially in 
recent years, can be traced by the procurement levels (see figure 8 and figure 9). For both 
crops, the share of public procurement in total production has been close to or even above 
                                                          
9For wheat the major competing crops are chickpea (gram), rapeseed and mustard and for rice, mostly 
sugarcane.  
10 Indian agriculture in general is characterized by high degree of fragmentation – 80 per cent of farms are 
small or marginal.  
11 This is an indirect taxation on rice millers/traders who are required to deliver rice to the government 
agencies at the prices derived from the minimum support price of paddy, before selling the remaining rice 
in the open market. The scheme was discontinued in October 2015.  
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30 per cent. But if one takes into consideration only marketed grain, the share increases 
to around 50 per cent, which means that about half of the grain sold by farmers go to the 
FCI. 
 
Figure 8 Wheat production, marketed surplus and procurement (as a part of production) 
Source: Own design based on data from indiastat.com database 
 
Figure 9 Rice production, marketed surplus and procurement (as a part of production) 
Source: Own design based on indiastat.com database 
This strong governmental involvement, as will be further discussed, has serious 
implications for determining production: not only has the MSP the largest impact on the 
production level, it has also wiped out the market impact on farmer’s production 
decisions. Agricultural inputs are heavily subsidized and their nominal prices change very 
rarely; hence, input prices were not included in the production regression.  
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The general12 equation for describing production is given by: 
1            ln 𝑄𝑡,𝑖 = 𝛼0 + γln 𝑄𝑡−1,𝑖 + 𝛼1 ln 𝑝𝑡,𝑖
𝑀𝑆𝑃 +  𝛼2ln 𝑝𝑡,𝑖 + 𝛼3ln 𝑝𝑡,𝑗 + 𝛼4ln𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑅𝑡 +
𝜀𝑡,𝑖, 
where 𝑄𝑡,𝑖 is yearly production quantity of the i-th crop (USDA data), 𝑝𝑖
𝑀𝑆𝑃is a real MSP 
and 𝑝𝑡,𝑖 is the market price of the i-th crop. All prices are WPI deflated. The 
contemporaneous MSP is considered because farmers know the MSP before planting and 
there is little uncertainty related to receiving this price. It is an exogenous variable as it is 
set by the policymakers before the planting time. As representative of the market price, 
lagged harvest time and planting time, as well as lagged marketing year price averages 
were taken into consideration. The lagged prices are exogenous variables – prices in year 
t-1 are not affected by the production in year t. The lag structure of the market price 
reflects the assumption of naïve price expectation – the farmers expect the current year 
price to be the same as the previous year’s price (harvest time and the yearly average 
prices) or alternatively, the price they observed at planting. Later, we econometrically test 
whether they really do. We also incorporated the Nerlovian (Nerlove, 1956) price 
expectation model with adaptive expectations by including lagged production as an 
explanatory variable. Besides, cross prices 𝑝𝑡,𝑗  of the respective crops were used as 
explanatory variables – gram for wheat and maize for rice.13 t is a trend variable, R is total 
yearly (calendar year) rainfall (IMD data14).  Using the ordinary least square method and 
data for 1982-2012 gives the following results for different specifications: 
 Dependent variable: log wheat production 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Log MSP 0.652***    0.635*** 0.474*** 0.652*** 
 (4.14)    (3.55) (2.78) (4.04) 
Log trend  0.228*** 0.329*** 0.332*** 0.295*** 0.230*** 0.124** 0.223*** 
 (12.02) (8.7) (9.87) (8.01) (12.88) (2.45) (11.80) 
Lag log rain  0.348*** 0.209 0.231 0.081 0.352*** 0.408*** 0.340*** 
 (3.23) (1.65) (1.62) (0.52) (3.31) (4.76) (3.11) 
                                                          
12 This is the most general version of the equation, which combines all the nested specifications we 
estimated and discussed in tables 2 and 3. In the conceptual framework, we present only those 
specifications, which describe the phenomena the best according to our empirical analysis.   
13 Wheat and rice do not compete in production.  
14 http://www.imd.gov.in/ 
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Lag log 
wholesale 
price (yearly)  
0.298 
(0.76)      
        
Lag log 
wholesale 
price (harvest 
time)   
0.221 
(0.8)     
        
Lag log 
wholesale 
price (planting 
time)    
0.344 
(0.99) 
0.101 
(0.43)   
        
Log cross price 
(gram price at 
the time 
wheat is 
planted)      
 0.037 
(0.79) 
        
Lag log wheat     0.410*  
production      (2.01)  
_cons -0.642 0.924 0.992 1.799 -0.922 -2.008** -0.575 
  (-0.61) (0.56) (0.62) (1.09) (-0.83) (-2.37) (-0.54) 
N 31 30 30 31 31 31 31 
R² 0.95 0.9 0.9 0.89 0.95 0.96 0.95 
Table 2 Regressions for wheat production 
Note. *,**,*** indicates significance levels at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively with Newey-West standard error 
estimation. t-values are given in brackets. Error terms are stationary according to the ADF test. 
 Dependent variable: log rice production 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Log MSP 0.392***    0.413***      0.379**      0.364**  
 (2.81)    (3.11) (2.55) (2.57)  
Log trend  0.200*** 0.253*** 0.252*** 0.239*** 0.194*** 0.187*** 0.204*** 
 (10.25) (9.37) (9.47) (9.64) (9.9) (6.37) (9.60)  
Lag log rain  0.498*** 0.367** 0.367** 0.405** 0.501*** 0.516** 0.498*** 
 (2.99) (2.1) (2.09) (2.29) (2.92) (2.59) (3.02) 
Lag log 
wholesale 
price (yearly)  0.013      
  (0.09)      
Lag log 
wholesale 
price 
(harvest 
time)   -0.014     
   (-0.11)     
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Lag log 
wholesale 
price 
(planting 
time)    0.073 -0.088   
    (0.48) (-0.54)   
Log cross 
price (kharif 
planting 
maize price)       0.063 
       (0.89) 
Lag log rice 
production      0.061  
      (0.37)  
_cons -0.657 1.099 1.179 0.694 -0.46 -0.987 -0.592 
  (-0.48) (0.74) (0.82) (0.46) (-0.31) (-0.52) (-0.43) 
N  30 29 29 30 30 30 30 
R²    0.91   0.88   0.88    0.87   0.91    0.91    0.91 
Table 3 Regressions of rice production  
Note. *,**,*** indicates significance levels at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively with Newey-West standard error 
estimation. t-values are given in brackets. Error terms are stationary according to the ADF test. 
Table 2 presents our estimates of the average price elasticities of wheat production in 
India. Column 1 shows estimates where wheat production is explained by the 
contemporaneous MSP, the lagged rainfall15 and a time trend. Column 7 adds to this 
regression, the price (average at wheat planting period) of competing crop, gram 
(chickpea), which has an insignificant impact on wheat production. In both cases, the 
impact of the wheat MSP on wheat production is strong and significant, implying that on 
average, a one per cent increase in the MSP significantly increases wheat production in 
the corresponding marketing year by about 0.65 per cent. Columns 2-5 suggest that the 
wholesale market prices do not play a significant role in determining wheat production in 
India. Column 5 shows the regression with both prices – the MSP and the market price 
(wholesale price at planting – the one with the highest coefficient estimate and lowest 
standard error). When controlling for the MSP, market wholesale price seems to have 
little impact on the wheat production level – the estimated coefficient is quite low (0.1) 
and insignificant. An interesting result is reported in column 6, which expands the 
regression in column 1 with the autoregressive term, which could correspond with the 
Nerlovain adaptive price expectations. However, in this case, the price, MSP, is certain, so 
                                                          
15 Rainfall variable represents total rainfall in a calendar year; whereas sowing of wheat crops harvested in 
a calendar year t starts in October of year t-1. This is why the lagged rainfall has been used in the wheat 
regression.    
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the autoregressive term represents the inertia of wheat production – for example farmers 
make crop specific investments, which prevent them from switching to competing crops 
very easily.  The MSP coefficient estimate in this specification is significant and equal to 
0.47, which can be interpreted as the short-term production response to the increase in 
the MSP. Lagged production has a positive and significant coefficient estimate equal to 
0.41, which yields the long-term price elasticity (the long term response to a 1 per cent 
sustained increase in the MSP) of production, which is equal to 0.8. This specification has 
the highest R square of 0.96. In addition to the prices, wheat production is affected by 
rainfall and technological progress approximated by trend. 
In the case of rice (table 3), production is explained by the MSP for rice, time trend and 
the rainfall (column 1). Quantitatively, the estimated coefficient implies that on average, 
a 1 per cent increase in the MSP results in a significant increase in production of about 0.4 
per cent. The cross price of the competing crop (maize), however, turned out to be 
insignificant (column 7). The market price of rice does not show any significant influence 
on production (columns 2-5). Column 5 gives results of the regression with both prices – 
the MSP and the market price (average planting time wholesale price – the one with the 
highest coefficient estimate and lowest standard error). When controlling for MSP, the 
wholesale price seems to have little impact on the rice production level – the estimated 
coefficient is insignificant. Adding the autoregressive term to the specification 1, as 
reported in column 6, does not yield a major improvement – the lagged rice production is 
insignificant.  
The price elasticity of rice production is smaller for rice than for wheat, which can be 
explained by the big share of small-scale farmers in rice production and the more 
commercial character of wheat production. The short-term price elasticity of production 
of 65 per cent and 39 per cent for wheat and rice respectively are high relative to 
estimates of market price elasticities in other countries. For example, in the FAPRI 
database,16 the price elasticity of rice supply is usually close to 0.2, with the value of 0.25 
in Bangladesh and 0.16 in China (0.11 for open-market price in India). The same database 
shows that price elasticities of wheat area response are slightly higher, averaging for 
example to 0.33 in Australia, 0.43 in Brazil and 0.09 in China (0.29 for open-market price 
                                                          
16 http://www.fapri.iastate.edu/tools/elasticity.aspx 
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in India). The high MSP-elasticity in India might be explained by the low risk related to the 
MSP. 
Gulati and Sharma (1990) used slightly different specifications of the output equation for 
Indian wheat and rice production. They used lagged output, lagged relative wholesale 
price, rainfall and irrigation to explain wheat and rice production in India. The estimation 
was based on data from 1969 to 1986, and hence, preceded the structural change in the 
1990s. They found that market prices had a significant and strong impact, with a short-
term (one-year) elasticity of 0.28 for wheat and 0.25 for rice. The long-term (three-year) 
elasticities were 0.83 for wheat and 0.72 for rice. Mythili (2008) found lower short-run 
price (relative price) elasticity of wheat and rice supply. In the post-reform period (1990-
91 to 2004-05), the estimated short-run price elasticity of wheat supply was 0.17 and 0.16 
(with two different specifications) and that of rice supply was 0.28 and 0.18 (ibid). In this 
study, the long-run supply response was also estimated, with the long run elasticity for 
wheat equal to 0.36 (0.29 with the alternative specification) and rice 0.7 (0.51 with the 
alternative specification). Neither of these studies used the MSP as an explanatory 
variable, as the authors focused on market prices. 
2.2.3. Procurement 
The share of wheat procurement in total production has been fluctuating between 11 and 
40 per cent since the beginning of the 1980s, with a steep increase in the past few years 
(see figure 8). Rice procurement has been characterized by a more stable trend – from 
less than 11 per cent in 1982 to an average of 34 per cent in the last five years (see figure 
9). These tendencies strongly coincide with the MSP changes, especially in relation to the 
market price (see figure 6 and figure 7). 
The relationship between procurement and prices is modelled as follows: 
2                                                   
𝐷𝑡,𝑖
𝐹𝐶𝐼
𝑄𝑡,𝑖
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1
𝐷𝑡−1,𝑖
𝐹𝐶𝐼
𝑄𝑡−1,𝑖
+ 𝛼2
𝑝𝑡,𝑖
𝑝𝑡,𝑖
𝑀𝑆𝑃 + 𝛼3𝑡, 
where 𝐷𝑡,𝑖
𝐹𝐶𝐼  is the yearly procurement level of the i-th crop by the FCI and via 
decentralized procurement scheme17 (DCP) in the marketing year, 𝑄𝑡,𝑖 is total production 
                                                          
17DCP was introduced in 1997-98 and is in place in 11 states. Under the scheme, states procure, store and 
distribute food grains through the TPDS. The surplus (in excess of the TPDS) is handed over to the FCI for 
the needs of the other (deficit) states.       
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and 𝑝𝑡,𝑖
𝑀𝑆𝑃 is is the MSP of the i-th crop, 𝑝𝑡,𝑖 is the market price (marketing year average) 
of the respective crop. Thus, on the left hand side of the equation, there is the share of 
public procurement in total production and on the right hand side, there is the ratio of 
market price and the MSP and the trend. In order to control for the pre-existing 
procurement infrastructure, we add a lagged procurement share to the set of explanatory 
variables.  
Public procurement has a high share in total marketed surplus and as a result might affect 
market prices. Due to consideration of the contemporaneous market price on the right 
hand side of the equation, there might be a problem of endogeneity in this specification. 
However, the procurement is always unlimited (open-ended) and the volume of 
procurement is decided by the fixed MSP level vis-à-vis the market price, which adjusts to 
the MSP. So the market price is affected by the MSP, not the procurement volume directly. 
The production might also influence the market price. However, it is plausible to assume 
that the share of procurement in the total production, which is the dependent variable, 
does not depend on the production volume due to the infrastructural rigidities.    
Dependent variable: procurement share 
 Wheat 
1 
Wheat 
2 
Rice 
3 
Rice 
4 
Lag procurement share  0.41***  0.25*** 
 (2.99)  (2.81) 
Ratio of market price (WPI) 
to MSP 
-0.39 ***     -0.35*** -0.26 ***  -0.22*** 
(-7.79) (-7.45) (-6.87) (-6.27) 
Time trend -0.001 -0.002* 0.003*** 0.002*** 
(-1.50) (-2.01) (3.99) (3.40) 
Constant 0.77 *** 0.63*** 0.56 *** 0.45*** 
(9.67) (7.26) (8.73) (7.15) 
N 31 30 31 30 
R2  0.71 0.81 0.92 0.94 
Table 4 Procurement regression estimates 
Note. *,**,*** indicates significance levels at 10, 5 and 1 per cent, respectively with the Newey-West 
standard error estimation. In brackets t-values are given. Error terms are stationary according to the ADF 
test. 
The rise of the MSP relative to the wholesale price by 1 per cent increases the share of 
procurement in the production by 0.35 – 0.39 per cent in the case of wheat and by 0.22 - 
0.26 per cent in the case of rice; all the estimates are significant at the one per cent level 
(table 4).  Consideration of the lagged dependent variable slightly decreases the 
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coefficient estimates, however the results are robust across the specifications. A 
significant upward trend in rice procurement might be because of decreasing 
transportation costs due to better infrastructure in rice growing areas, which raises the 
incentive of farmers to sell to the FCI.  
Gulati and Sharma (1990) also estimated a similar procurement equation, allowing, 
however,  for the additive impact of production level (as opposed to the multiplicative 
specification in our study). Their results indicate a strong procurement response to 
production, with elasticity equal to 1.37 for wheat and 1.1 for rice. The relative price 
elasticity (procurement to market price ratio) was estimated 0.85 for wheat and 0.59 for 
rice. However, these numbers cannot be compared with our estimates due to differences 
in the specification of the equation. 
2.2.4. Demand and TPDS/OWS 
Rice and wheat consumption comes from the three sources – own produce (only in the 
case of the rural households), received through the TPDS or other welfare schemes (OWS) 
and bought in the market. The contribution of individual sources to total consumption 
plays an important role in the analysis of demand and its determinants (price and income 
elasticities in particular).  
There are 65.2 million BPL families in total18 (including 24.3 million AAY families) (DFPD, 
2013). They are entitled to 35 kg of food grains per family per month at a fixed price – the 
central issue price (CIP) plus a state-specific fee for BPL and APL recipients. The AAY price 
cannot be higher than the CIP (DFPD web portal). In practice, some states provide 
additional subsidy, distributing the grain at a price lower than CIP price (Saini & Kozicka, 
2014). The allocation for APL families is based on the availability of food grains in the 
central pool and past off-take.19 
The CIP has nominally declined after the introduction of the scheme and from the year 
2002, or has remained unchanged, which means a significant drop in the real price (see 
figure 10 and figure 11). OWS comprises different schemes, such as the mid-day meal 
                                                          
18The requirement of food grains and subsidy requirements are decided on the basis of poverty estimates, 
based on a survey conducted by the Planning Commission in the year 1993-94 and year 2000 population 
estimates or the number of such families actually identified and ration cards issued to them by the 
state/UT governments, whichever is less (DFPD FAQ). 
19 These allocations have been changed under the NFSA, 2013.  
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scheme and wheat-based nutrition programs and the amount allocated does not usually 
exceed 10 per cent of that for the TPDS. Special additional allocations of food grains are 
also made, depending on grain availability (based on DFPD Food Grain Bulletins for 
different years).   
 
Figure 10 Wheat CIP and wholesale price 
Source: Own design based on DFPD data 
 
Figure 11 Rice CIP and wholesale price 
Source: Own design based on DFPD data 
Leakages20 from the TPDS are a major challenge in estimating the ‘market’ consumption 
of wheat and rice. The ‘leaked’ grains are sold on the market at market price or exported 
to neighboring countries, e.g., Bangladesh. 26 per cent of total rice and over 16 per cent 
                                                          
20 Currently, the estimates for the leakage are close to 40% (Mukherjee, 2014). 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
R
s.
/q
tl
 in
 2
0
0
1
-0
2
 p
ri
ce
s
CIP wheat BPL CIP wheat APL CIP wheat AAY Market wheat price
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
R
s.
/q
tl
 in
 2
0
0
1
-0
2
 p
ri
ce
s
CIP rice BPL CIP rice APL CIP rice AAY Market rice price
34 
 
of total wheat was consumed out of the Public Distribution System (PDS) supplies in India 
in 2011/12. These numbers have grown from 22 per cent (1.2 kg/capita/month) for rice 
and 12.3 per cent (0.5 kg/capita/month) for wheat in 2009-10 and from 13.1 per cent and 
4.5 per cent respectively in 1999 (NSSA data). This can be attributed to lower leakages 
(Drèze & Khera, 2015) and increased TPDS allocations and off-take (figure 12). More 
details regarding the current subsidized wheat and rice consumption are discussed in 
Chapter 4.  
 
Figure 12 Off-take from public stocks for the TPDS and OWS 
Source: Own design based on Food Grain Bulletin data, dfpd.nic.in 
Twenty-five per cent and 37 per cent (1.2 kg and 1.5 kg per capita per month) of rice and 
wheat respectively of the total consumption of rural households came from home grown 
stock in 2009-10 and 30 per cent and 40 per cent in 2004-05, which was a drought year 
(NSS data). As discussed earlier in this paper, rice is mostly produced by small-holders, 
whereas wheat is a more commercial crop. This fact is reflected not only in the production 
function, but also in the quantity of grain retained on farm (and marketed surplus) in 
response to price changes. 
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Figure 13 Wheat price and quantity retained on farm 
Source: Own design based on http://agricoop.nic.in/agristatistics.htm and RBI data 
 
Figure 14 Rice price and quantity retained on farm 
Source: Own design based on http://agricoop.nic.in/agristatistics.htm and RBI data 
Wheat retained on farm reacts to prices more like a cash crop (figure 13) - it is sensitive 
to harvest time average wholesale price and the MSP – with the correlation equal to -0.54 
in both cases. This might mean that farmers decide to sell more in times of high market 
prices during the harvest.  
In the case of rice (figure 14), market prices do not seem to affect the amount consumed 
from own stock. Correlation with both prices (harvest and the MSP) is close to 0. This 
might be because rice is produced, for the most part, by poor smallholders, who produce 
mainly for own consumption and do not get affected by market price developments. 
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However, it is not clear then, why rice consumption from own stock fluctuates so much. 
If it was to cover the basic needs of the farmers, it should be rather stable in its volume. 
In reality, it varied significantly between 18 and 33 million tonnes. There are probably 
other factors influencing the consumption from own produce – for example, PDS supplies. 
However, with the available dataset (10 observations for rice and 8 for wheat), it is not 
possible to test this hypothesis.   
The general equation for estimating demand is given by: 
3         ln 𝐷𝑡,𝑖
𝑐𝑎𝑝 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 ln 𝑝𝑡,𝑖 + 𝛼2 ln 𝑝𝑡,𝑖
𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 + 𝛼3 ln 𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑡,𝑖
𝑐𝑎𝑝 + 𝛼4 ln 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡
𝑐𝑎𝑝 + 𝛼5 𝑡, 
where 𝐷𝑡,𝑖
𝑐𝑎𝑝 is yearly (marketing year) per capita consumption for the i-th crop (based on 
the USDA data for domestic utilization),  𝑝𝑡,𝑖  is yearly (marketing year) average of the own 
price of the i-th crop and 𝑝𝑡,𝑖
𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 is  price average of the other crop (cross price), both in 
real terms. 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡
𝑐𝑎𝑝 is disposable income per capita and 𝑡 is a time trend. The variable 
𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑡,𝑖
𝑐𝑎𝑝 is per capita off-take for the TPDS and OWS (PDS), which is treated in two 
different ways. Namely, there are two alternative specifications of the equation arising 
from the two alternative assumptions regarding the character of the substitution effect 
between the PDS and the market grains. First, it is assumed that grains from the PDS are 
imperfect substitutes for grain available in the market (due to the lower quality of the PDS 
grains sometimes and the greater difficulty in terms of access through fair price shops). In 
this case, the constant portion21 of the PDS grain is subtracted from the total consumption 
(left hand side of the equation) and the total PDS off-take used as an explanatory variable. 
Second, it is assumed that grain from the PDS is a perfect substitute for grain available in 
the market. In this case, only the total consumption is considered and 𝛼3 is set equal to 
zero.  
Because the market price is endogenous to consumption, instrumental variable (two-
stage least square estimation method) regressions were used in order to estimate 
                                                          
21This constant portion should represent the grain actually delivered through PDS and hence is equal to 
off-take minus leakage. In reality, the leakage portions fluctuate; however, this number is a controversial 
matter and differs significantly depending on the source of the data. Reliable estimates are based on the 
comparison of actually consumed grain from the PDS, based on the National Sample Survey results, and 
the off-take, as reported by the FCI (Khera, 2011b). However, the survey is not conducted yearly. In 
addition, the question on PDS consumption has been asked only in a few recent rounds; consequently, 
there are only three available observations. The amount of leaked grain used in this study is an average of 
these numbers, which is 25 per cent for rice and 61 per cent for wheat.     
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equation 3. MSP, rainfall and international prices (in years when there was no export ban) 
were used as instruments for the market price. First stage results are reported in Appendix 
4.  
Dependent variable: log wheat consumption 
 1 2 3 
Log market price own  -0.880* -1.069*** -0.820* 
 (-1.68) (-3.12) (-1.84) 
Log market price cross 0.613** 0.730*** 0.712*** 
 (2.11) (3.99) (2.76) 
Log PDS per capita off takes 
-0.085 
(-1.22) 
-0.104** 
(-1.97) 
 
Log income  -0.021  0.145*** 
 (-0.21)  (3.17) 
Log time trend 0.139*** 0.136***  
 (3.25) (4.61)  
_cons 
 
2.741*** 
 
-2.688*** 
 
3.010*** 
  (-3.52) (-3.50) (-3.74) 
N 28 30 28 
p-value of underidentification 
LM statistic 
0.03 0.08 0.09 
p-value of Hansen J statistic 0.08 0.43 0.53 
Table 5 Regressions of wheat demand 
Note. *,**,*** indicates significance levels at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively with robust standard error 
estimation. t-values are given in brackets. For column (1) and (2), PDS consumption is assumed to be an 
imperfect substitute (subtracted from the per-capita consumption); in column (3), PDS consumption is a 
perfect substitute. 
Dependent variable: log rice consumption 
 1 2 3 
Log market price own  0.260 -0.112 0.311 
 (1.14) (-0.53) (1.41) 
Log market price cross -0.170 0.02 -0.153 
 (-0.72) -0.09 (-0.70) 
Log PDS per capita off 
takes 
-0.222*** 
(-2.81) 
-0.332*** 
(-7.71) 
 
Log income  -0.113  -0.010 
 (-1.54)  (-0.42) 
Log time trend 0.092*** 0.043**  
 (2.78) (2.09)  
_cons -3.732*** -3.969*** -2.974*** 
 (-5.90) (-5.87) (-6.31) 
N 29 30 29 
p-value of 
underidentification LM 
statistic 
0.08 0.12 0.11 
p-value of Hansen J 
statistic 
0.04 0.04 0.09 
Table 6 Regressions of rice demand 
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Note. *,**,*** indicates significance levels at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively with robust standard error 
estimation. t-values are given in brackets. For column (1) and (2), PDS consumption is assumed to be an 
imperfect substitute (subtracted from the per-capita consumption); in column (3), PDS consumption is a 
perfect substitute. 
All wheat specifications have a p-value of underidentification LM statistic below 0.1, which 
means that at the 10 per cent significance level we can reject the null hypothesis (table 
5). We can conclude that the models are identified. The first specification (column 1) has 
a p-value of Hansen J statistic below 0.1, which means that that the null hypothesis 
(instruments are valid instruments) can be rejected at 10 per cent significance level. This 
casts doubt on the validity of the instruments. However, in the specifications 2 and 3 
(columns 2 and 3), we cannot reject the null hypothesis, that is, the instruments are valid. 
The rice model (table 6) only in specification 1 (column 1) is identified. Specifications 2 
and 3 have the p-values of underidentification LM statistic above 0.1, so we cannot reject 
the null hypothesis. Also in all three specifications the p-values of Hansen J statistic are 
below 0.1, which means that the instruments in this model might not be valid. 
Consequently, the results of this model estimation must be treated with reserve and 
additional demand analysis is needed (provided in chapter 4).  
In the case of wheat, market prices have a strong and significant impact on consumption 
(table 5): they are negative for own price and positive for the cross price (rice). Own price 
elasticity estimate is between -1.07 and -0.82 and cross price elasticity is between 0.61 
and 0.73. It is not clear how PDS wheat affects total wheat consumption. According to the 
second specification (column 2, table 5), PDS wheat is an imperfect substitute for the 
open-market wheat – an increase in subsidized wheat delivery by 1 per cent decreases 
market consumption only by 0.1 per cent (column 1 suggests that it does not change 
market consumption at all). Hence, if we consider the amounts consumed from the both 
sources – very little actual consumption from PDS and consumption mainly from the 
market – the conclusion is that an increase in PDS wheat delivery results in increase in 
total wheat consumption (as on the left hand side of the equation, there is wheat 
consumption net of PDS consumption). What is more, the additional consumption will be 
almost equal to additional distribution.  This small effect of PDS distribution on total 
consumption might be due to a few reasons. First, wheat distribution is quite small – 
around 60 per cent is leaked (GoI, 2005; Khera, 2011a). Second, the dependent variable is 
total wheat utilization, and hence, includes consumption for different purposes. A big 
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share of it is consumed in a ready-made form (like noodles) or outside homes (in canteens 
or restaurants). This part of consumption is not responsive to PDS deliveries. There might 
also be some positive impact of the income transfer effect (as discussed below) reflected 
in a higher total consumption of wheat.  
In the case of rice, consumption seems to be mostly driven by a trend and PDS deliveries 
(table 6). The reason for this might be that PDS is functioning much better for rice. Since 
the beginning of the millennium, there has been much more rice than wheat allocated for 
the PDS (figure 12). Also, as discussed above, leakage of rice is much lower; therefore, 
much more rice is delivered effectively through the PDS. What is more, many ‘rice 
consuming’ states provide additional subsidy for TPDS rice. For example, BPL and AAY rice 
in AP, Karnataka, Kerala and Odisha is priced at only 1 Rs./kg. And Tamil Nadu has a unique 
universal PDS, delivering rice to everyone free of cost (DFPD, 2014, p. 54)22. This massive 
subsidization of rice might have led to the distorted price and income response of 
aggregate rice demand. 
Kumar et al. (2011) and Ganesh-Kumar et al. (2012) analyzed price and expenditure 
elasticities of demand for several goods in India based on NSS household survey data. 
Their results are difficult to compare with those reported above as our dependent variable 
is total domestic utilization and, unlike NSS consumption data, includes grain bought in a 
processed form, consumed in canteens and restaurants and used for purposes other than 
consumption (e.g. feed). The average income elasticity for rice was found 0.024 and for 
wheat 0.075 in the former study and food expenditure elasticity was 0.21 for rice and -
0.13 for wheat in the latter study. The own price elasticities were estimated in Kumar, 
Kumar, Parappurathu, & Raju (2011) at -0.247 for rice and -0.340 for wheat.  
Income elasticity of wheat and rice demand are reported to be close to zero (0.024 and 
0.075 for rice and wheat respectively) on average across all income groups in India 
(Kumar, Kumar, Parappurathu, & Raju, 2011). However, it is much higher for the poorest 
– equal to 0.182 for rice and 0.102 for wheat in the 25th income percentile (ibid). So if 
PDS is properly targeted, the major subsidy should be received by the poorest part of the 
                                                          
22 Limited to 20 kg per household, and 35 kg in case of AAY cardholders 
(http://www.tncsc.tn.gov.in/html/pds.htm, accessed on Sep, 25th, 2014). 
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population and as a result, there might be a significant increase in wheat and rice 
consumption due to the income effect. 
2.2.5. Stocks, OMSS and Exports  
The public stock level (𝑋𝑡,𝑖 is end of year t stock level) is a result of the carryover stocks 
(less the deterioration rate, 𝛿 ), the grain inflow from domestic procurement (𝐷𝑡,𝑖
𝐹𝐶𝐼 ), 
imports and outflows to the TPDS/OWS, OMSS for domestic market (OMSS D) and net 
exports: 
4                           𝑋𝑡,𝑖 =  (1 − 𝛿𝑖)𝑋𝑡−1,𝑖 + 𝐷𝑡,𝑖
𝐹𝐶𝐼 −  𝑂𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑇𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑡,𝑖
𝑝𝑢𝑏. 
However, fitting the data to the above equation is difficult because of the different 
reporting periods for different data. Procurement is reported for the marketing year, 
whereas all the off-take data is for the financial year. In the case of wheat, financial year 
(April to March) and marketing year (March to February) are almost identical, but for rice, 
the difference is quite significant, as its marketing year lasts from October to September. 
Stock levels are available on a monthly basis so we used the closing stocks of financial 
years. 
 
Figure 15 Wheat stock change as estimated from equation 4 and change in actual stock 
Source: Own design based on FCI data 
Note. Stock changes were calculated between financial year closing stocks, between March values of 
consecutive years.   
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Figure 16 Rice stock change as estimated from equation 4 and change in actual stock 
Source: Own design based on FCI data 
Note. Stock changes were calculated between financial year closing stocks, between March values of 
consecutive years.   
The calculated wheat stock change from grain flow (similar to the equation 4), 𝐷𝑡,𝑖
𝐹𝐶𝐼 −
 𝑂𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑇𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑡,𝑖
𝑝𝑢𝑏 , has been fluctuating around the difference between the 
ending stocks in consecutive financial years 𝑋𝑡,𝑖 −  Xt−1,i (figure 15). In the case of rice, 
the difference between the estimated and actual stock change is large (figure 16). This 
can be attributed partially to the discrepancy in the data reporting periods; however, this 
would only result in the time series interweaving with each other (one fluctuating around 
another). In reality, except for a few years, the estimated change from the grain flow 
balance stock change has been persistently above the actual change in stock. In principle, 
the former less the deterioration rate should be equal to the latter, as in equation 4. 
Therefore, the low actual stock change might be due to high losses. Based on equation 4, 
the average wheat stock deterioration rate from 2000-01 to 2012-13 is equal to 2 per cent 
and for rice, 10 per cent. However, this number should be interpreted as the average 
unexplained change in stock level between marketing seasons as the deviations were both 
positive and negative. Unfortunately, there is a lack of reliable estimates on storage losses 
in India to compare with. Different estimates quote aggregate losses (post-harvest annual 
loss of grain), starting from 16-17 million tons up to 55 million tons, which roughly means 
7 per cent to 23 per cent of total production (Artiuch & Kornstein, 2012). FCI reports are 
much below any of these numbers – around 0.3 million tons for wheat and rice wasted in 
storage and transit in recent years (as reported on http://fciweb.nic.in/). Approximately 
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half of this amount was lost in storage, which gives not more than 0.4 per cent of the 
average stock level in the central pool in the corresponding years. 
Buffer stock norms define the amount required to meet operational and strategic stock 
needs. The open-ended character of the procurement, relatively high MSP and trade 
limitations (e.g. temporary export bans) result in very high stock levels – periodically 
exceeding the norms.  
 
Figure 17 Wheat stocks, off-take and prices 
Source: Own calculation based on from FCI, IMF and indiastat.com 
 
Figure 18 Rice stocks, off-take and prices 
Source: Own calculation based on FCI data, IMF and indiastat.com 
OMSS for wheat is mostly used to stabilize market supply and release stocks before the 
new harvest arrival (figure 17). For rice, the seasonality of supply is almost absent and the 
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OMSS was usually not used (figure 18). However, in the last years (from 2009-10), small 
amounts were allocated for the OMSS but they were mostly not absorbed by the market 
(the off-take was lower than the allocation). 
Both OMSS and export allocations are ad hoc decisions. Although they are correlated with 
stock levels and stock norms, there are no rules for this. The issue price of grain – the 
minimum issue price (MIP) – is usually based on acquisition cost23 from the previous 
marketing year (plus the freight), but sometimes, it is lower than that (however, it is never 
below the current MSP as it could lead to ‘reselling’ of grains by the traders). It is sold 
through tenders, so the actual price received is close to the market price. The amount 
actually released through these channels is not a simple outcome of difference between 
the market price and the CIP as there are several limitations – sometimes the quality of 
the released grains is low (because of poor storage facilities24 and grain is being stored for 
a few years); there are also logistical limitations (Thukral & Bhardwaj, 2013).     
The difference between the minimum issue price (MIP) and international market price 
could work in favor of exports, especially for rice. Prolonged export restrictions resulted 
in a much lower domestic rice price in comparison with the international price (figure 18). 
Export off-take has been used sometimes in order to balance the stock level (often in the 
form of humanitarian aid (non-commercial)); however, this has apparently not been 
enough in the recent years – despite the huge stock pile-up starting from 2008-2009, 
there were hardly any exports and attempts to release through the OMSS were rather 
unsuccessful. 
2.2.6. Trade 
International trade, like other activities within the wheat and rice sectors, is heavily 
controlled by government and there are several regulations on private exporters, 
including frequent export bans, tariffs and minimum export prices (figures 19 and 20).  
Before the early 1990s, India had a closed economy. Exports of common rice were banned 
until 1994 and the country was dependent on import of wheat – importing a few millions 
                                                          
23Acquisition cost consists of cost of grain, statutory taxes, storage and interest charges, etc., at 
acquisition stage. 
24Stock level is often above not only the stock norms, but also the storage capacity, which results in storing 
grain in the open (Bhardwaj, 2012).   
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of tonnes yearly. This is why we mostly restrict our analysis of wheat and rice exports to 
the period after 1990.  
It is difficult to estimate actual public exports – the reported numbers by FCI for public 
exports are in some cases higher than total exports from India of these commodities.25 
The reason for high public export values might be because they include issue of grain 
stocks for export to private parties, and these might have been partly released on the 
domestic market. The large share of public trade in total trade affects the calculation of 
the price elasticity of exports – public exports include food relief allocations, World Food 
Program contributions and other non-market based operations.  
 
Figure 19 Total wheat trade in India 
Source: Own calculation based on FCI data, DGCIS and IMF 
                                                          
25 This would result in negative values for private exports when estimated as the difference between total 
(as reported by Directorate General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics) and the FCI off-take for 
exports.  
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Figure 20 Total rice trade in India 
Source: Own calculation based on FCI data, DGCIS and IMF 
As a result, the relationship between export volume and the ratio of domestic to 
international price has become positive, which means that a rise in domestic price with 
respect to the international price can be associated with higher exports. The estimation 
results of the regression of wheat and rice exports (as a share of production) on the ratio 
of domestic to international prices and export bans confirms this hypothesis.   
The following regressions were estimated: 
6                                
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡,𝑖
𝑄𝑡,𝑖
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼2𝐵𝑡,𝑖 + 𝛼3
𝑝𝑡−1,𝑖
𝑝𝑡−1,𝑖
𝑖𝑛𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑡 
where 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡,𝑖  is total volume of exported in a financial year, 𝑄𝑡,𝑖  is production of the 
respective grain, 𝐵𝑡,𝑖  is an export ban dummy, 
𝑝𝑡−1,𝑖
𝑝𝑡−1,𝑖
𝑖𝑛𝑡  is a lagged price ratio – domestic 
wholesale to international, converted to Rs., t is a time trend. The lagged price ratios are 
due to the delay in the realization of export contracts and price expectation formation (in 
this way, we assume naïve price expectations). The estimation results are presented in 
table 7 below.  
Dependent variable (as a share of  
total production) 
Net wheat 
exports 
Wheat 
exports 
Net rice 
exports 
Rice exports 
Export ban 
-0.020 
(-1.60) 
-0.023** 
(-2.68) 
-0.021** 
(-2.39) 
-0.020** 
(-2.27) 
    
Lagged ratio of market price to 
international price 
0.065* 
(1.71) 
0.049* 
(1.95) 
-0.011 
(-0.63) 
-0.004 
(-0.25) 
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Trend 
0.002* 
(1.94) 
0.001** 
(2.12) 
0.002*** 
(3.15) 
0.002*** 
(3.09) 
    
_cons 
-0.054* -0.017 0.023 0.016 
(-1.74) (-0.81) (0.94) (0.67) 
N 31 31 31 31 
R² 0.26 0.48 0.70 0.67 
Table 7 Foreign trade regression estimates  
Note. *,**,*** indicates significance levels at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively with Newey-West standard error 
estimation. t-values are given in brackets. Most of the dependent variables, according to the ADF test, are 
non-stationary. However, inclusion of a trend variable in the explanatory variables resulted in stationary 
residuals.    
For both wheat and rice, export bans significantly influence export volume. Years with 
export bans have on average lower exports by more than two percentage points of 
production. The price ratio has a strong significant impact on wheat exports – increase in 
the domestic price relative to the international by 10 per cent can be associated with an 
increase in exports by 0.5 percentage points. The price ratio has no influence on rice 
exports. However, as discussed above, the direction of the impact of the price ratio is the 
reverse of what economic theory would suggest (Helpman & Krugman, 1989). An increase 
in the domestic price relative to the international price of wheat significantly increases 
the export volume of this crop. What is important is that neither of the regressions 
explains the variability of exports volume well – a maximum 48 per cent for wheat and 70 
per cent for rice. 
These results can be explained by the distortive character of trade policies in India. For 
example, in 2007-2009, rising international prices were not accompanied by increased 
exports and domestic prices for either wheat or rice. Skyrocketing international prices 
with stable domestic prices resulted in a widening gap between the two. However, due to 
the export bans, there were only basmati rice26 exports and no wheat exports registered. 
This phenomenon indicates high market distortion, but can be explained by Indian trade 
policies. Whenever international prices rise, the government intervenes with export 
                                                          
26 Export bans were only for non-basmati rice. In 2007 and 2011, there were also non-basmati exports 
registered despite the export bans in these years. There are a few reasons for this. First, the export ban 
periods were not identical with the financial years. In 2007, after the introduction of the export ban, 
existing export contracts could be executed and in 2011, the export ban was lifted before the end of the 
financial year for which export data is quoted. Second, there were some exemptions to the bans. For 
example, there were exports of non-Basmati rice under government-to-government contracts to 
Bangladesh, Bhutan and Sri Lanka (Dave, 2010).   
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restriction. This, in turn, leads to lower domestic prices, which drives the price ratio down 
with a simultaneous decrease in exports.27 The opposite happens when high MSPs result 
in very high public stocks and relatively high domestic prices. The government’s decision 
to release stocks for exports leads to higher exports with unchanged market availability 
(only the public stock level decreases) and market price. Consequently, we observe an 
increase both in the domestic market price and exports.  
2.2.7. Fiscal costs 
Analysis of the fiscal cost is based on data starting from 2001 because there were major 
changes in 1997, when the TPDS was introduced and in 2001, when the AAY group was 
defined and introduced.  
Fiscal costs, as we define them in our framework, are based on the amount of wheat and 
rice handled by the FCI and states under the DCP within a fiscal year.28 We use the cost 
and volume of procurement, storage and distribution as reported by the FCI. However, it 
is impossible to compare the estimated fiscal cost with the food subsidy incurred by the 
government. The food subsidy provided to FCI by the Ministry is in the form of consumer 
subsidy and buffer subsidy. For the quantity distributed, the difference between the 
acquisition cost and distribution cost incurred by FCI and the CIP realized is reimbursed as 
consumer subsidy. According to the instructions issued, three months29 average sales 
quantity is treated as operational stock. Stock over and above the operational stock is 
treated as buffer stock. For buffer stocks, the cost of holding and maintenance of the stock 
(i.e. interest, storage etc.) is reimbursed in the form of buffer subsidy’(FCI, 2014). So the 
food subsidy is calculated for grains distributed, not handled (this does not capture the 
total cost of procurement in the current year, which is claimed only after the grain is 
released). As a result, the volume of grain for which the fiscal cost and food subsidy are 
calculated is different. For further simulation purposes, we need to endogenize the fiscal 
                                                          
27The same conclusions were reached in Dasgupta et al., 2011 
28The exception is the amount of grain procured as it relates to the marketing year. In the case of wheat, 
the financial year (April to March) and marketing year (March to February) are almost identical, but for 
rice, the difference is quite significant, as its marketing year last from October to September. However, 
most of the rice is procured from October to March; so, within the financial year, the cost of residual 
procurement from the previous rice marketing year and the major part of the current rice marketing year 
is captured.  As a result, the consequence for fiscal costs is negligible in the case of wheat while in the case 
of rice, this means small deviations of the estimated cost from the actual cost.  
29The currently used definition of operational stock uses four months’ off-take (CAG, 2013). Further, we 
will be using this definition in our estimates. 
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cost and for the clarity of the procedure, we need to define the cost of operating the 
system based on procurement, stock and distribution level within the same financial year. 
The per unit cost of these operations is approximated by the numbers reported by the 
FCI.  
The formula for the fiscal costs is given below.  
7 𝐹𝐶𝑡 = ∑ ( (𝑐𝑡,𝑖
𝑝 + 𝑝𝑡,𝑖 
𝑀𝑆𝑃)𝐷𝑡,𝑖
𝐹𝐶𝐼 + 𝑐𝑡,𝑖
𝑑 𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑡,𝑖 + 𝑘𝑡𝑋𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑝𝑡,𝑖
𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑝𝑡,𝑖𝑂𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑡,𝑖 −𝑖
𝑝𝑡,𝑖
𝐸𝑋𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑡,𝑖
𝑝𝑢𝑏),  
where 𝐹𝐶𝑡 are yearly fiscal costs, (𝑐𝑡,𝑖
𝑝 + 𝑝𝑡,𝑖 
𝑀𝑆𝑃)𝐷𝑡,𝑖
𝐹𝐶𝐼 are acquisition costs30 (proportional 
to the procurement level) of the i-th crop, 𝑐𝑡,𝑖
𝑑 𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑡,𝑖 are distribution costs
31 (proportional 
to the amount distributed through the PDS and OWS) of the i-th crop, 𝑘𝑡𝑋𝑡,𝑖  buffer 
carrying cost, 𝑋𝑡,𝑖 is buffer stock (an average in the financial year stock in the central pool 
minus the operational stock) and  𝑝𝑡,𝑖
𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑡,𝑖 + 𝑝𝑡,𝑖𝑂𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑡,𝑖 + 𝑝𝑡,𝑖
𝐸𝑋𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑡,𝑖
𝑝𝑢𝑏  are the 
revenues from sales with the average CIP and market price for OMSS and net exports. 
Most of the components of the equation come from FCI reports (see table 8). 
Variable FCI Category Source Unit 
𝒄𝒕,𝒊
𝒑
 Procurement incidentals (as 
proportional to the procurement 
level) 
FCI (can be also estimated 
as 21% of the MSP)  
Rs./quintal, WPI 
deflated 
𝑫𝒕,𝒊
𝑭𝑪𝑰 Total procurement  FCI Million tonnes  
𝒑𝒕,𝒊 
𝑴𝑺𝑷 MSP FCI Rs./quintal, WPI 
deflated 
𝒄𝟏 Distribution cost FCI Rs./quintal, WPI 
deflated 
𝑷𝑫𝑺𝒕,𝒊 TPDS and OWS off-take  FCI Million tonnes 
𝒌𝒕 Annual rate of buffer carrying cost FCI Rs./quintal, WPI 
deflated 
𝑿𝒕,𝒊 Buffer stock  Estimated based on 
reported monthly stock 
positions in the central 
pool 
Million tonnes 
𝒑𝒕,𝒊
𝑷𝑫𝑺 CIP Estimated CIP  weighted 
by off-take for different 
categories (APL, BPL, AAY 
and OWS) average 
Rs./quintal, WPI 
deflated 
𝒑𝒕,𝒊 Market price Price based on the WPI 
index 
Rs./quintal, WPI 
deflated 
                                                          
30As incurred by the FCI. It consists of freight, interest, handling and storage charges, transit and storage 
losses and administrative overheads (FCI)  
31 As incurred by the FCI. It comprises freight handling expenses, storage charges for operational stock, 
interest charges, transit shortages, storage shortages, establishment charges and wage revision arrears. 
(FCI) 
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𝑶𝑴𝑺𝑺𝒕,𝒊 OMSS off-take FCI Million tonnes 
𝒑𝒕,𝒊
𝑬𝑿 Export price Estimated as international 
price 
Rs./quintal, WPI 
deflated, converted 
from the USD to the 
rupee using the 
then exchange rate  
𝑵𝑬𝑿𝒕,𝒊
𝒑𝒖𝒃
 Total net off-take for exports FCI Million tonnes 
Table 8 Categories as included in the Fiscal Cost equation  
Source: Own design 
Acquisition costs consist of the two components – the MSP plus a bonus (pooled cost of 
grain)32 and procurement incidentals. Procurement incidentals are the additional costs 
like statutory charges, transportation charges and labor charges. The rest of the cost – 
distribution costs and buffer carrying costs – are also approximated by the past cost per 
unit reported by the FCI, multiplied by the PDS off-take and stock levels.  
Total grain cost (acquisition, distribution and buffer carrying cost) in real terms have risen 
in the last seven years when compared to the period 2000-2006, mostly due to higher 
acquisition costs. They rose by around 12 per cent in real terms between 2000-2006 and 
2007-2013. Distribution costs and buffer carrying cost for both grains decreased in real 
terms, so the total grain cost increase was subdued to 4 per cent for wheat and 5.4 per 
cent for rice. After 2007-08, the total cost started rising dramatically (figure 21). This is 
due to both growing procurement levels and stock levels.   
On the revenue side, there are three components – the OMSS, the TPDS with the OWS 
and net public exports. Both the OMSS allocation quantity and the MIP are ad hoc policy 
decisions, which are difficult to model.33 However, the OMSS is sold through tenders, so 
we use the market price as a proxy for the price received for OMSS grains. Revenues from 
OMSS were estimated by multiplying (reported or estimated, if no reports available) 
quantity released by the market price. TPDS and OWS revenues were approximated by 
the off-take for different programs (income groups – APL, BPL, AAY) with the relevant CIP 
(both quantity and CIP as reported by the FCI). The difficulty is that there are usually 
additional allocations, such as for flood relief or festival allocations, sold at different 
prices. Consequently, the difference between the total PDS off-take and off-take for APL, 
                                                          
32The FCI definition of pooled cost of grain differs slightly – in their method, it is the weighted average cost 
of the opening stock at previous year’s MSP and procurement of current year’s crop at current year MSP. 
33 Even the authority making the decision has not been constant over time – sometimes it is the Ministry 
of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution and sometimes High-level Committee of the FCI 
(information obtained from the Ministry of Agriculture).  
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BPL and AAY is sold at different prices. It was assumed, that on average, this price was 
equal to the APL CIP. Finally, net export revenues were calculated based on the reported 
net export quantity and international price. However, this method will have an upward 
bias as a large share of public exports was in a form of humanitarian aid and the 
transportation cost of exports is not considered. In general, the estimate of revenue is 
based on several assumptions and is subject to errors. However, our goal is to produce a 
simple and transparent but detailed enough method for assessing the total cost of the 
implementation of the set of policy measures. 
 
Figure 21 Fiscal cost and food subsidy 
Source: Own calculation based on FCI data 
The estimated fiscal cost (the difference between the total cost and total revenue) has 
risen dramatically in real terms from the financial year 2001-02 (even more as compared 
to the value in 2002-03, which seems to be an outlier though) – by 235 per cent until 2012-
13 (figure 21). This number seems to be large as compared with the 80 per cent increase 
in the TPDS and OWS off-take in the same period. In 2001-02, the fiscal cost incurred per 
ton of distributed grain (wheat and rice on average) was Rs. 7654 and in 2012-13, it rose 
to Rs. 14204 (in Dec 2000 prices). In the same period, the average stock level in the central 
pool has increased by 35 per cent and procurement volume by 69 per cent. Food subsidy 
has also increased quite significantly – by 141 per cent in real terms.  
The estimated total fiscal cost has been usually above the food subsidy incurred by the 
FCI (figure 21). Except for the years 2002-03 and 2003-04, the fiscal cost fluctuated 
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between 13 per cent and 109 per cent above the food subsidy. This difference can be 
explained by several factors. One is the way buffer stock carrying cost is accounted for by 
the FCI. The average buffer stock, as reported by the FCI in its annual reports, has been 
always much below our estimates based on the monthly stock levels as reported by the 
FCI (figure 22). The estimate of fiscal costs with the FCI reported buffer stock slightly 
decreased the figure; however, the difference is quite small (figure 21). 
 
Figure 22 Stocks of wheat and rice 
Source: Own calculation based on FCI data 
Note: The FCI stock is own stock and held by the state governments under the DCP 
Second, the food subsidy, as reported by the FCI, related to the grain released, not 
operated, as already discussed. The procurement levels were usually higher than the total 
off-take (figure 23), especially after 2006-07, which corresponds to rising difference 
between the estimated fiscal costs and claimed food subsidy. This might mean that the 
difference between the cost of procurement and revenue realized upon distribution is 
reported in the next year, when the stocks are released. 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12
M
ill
io
n
 t
o
n
n
es
Buffer stock as reported by the FCI
Average stock in the central pool
Total stock minus 4-month requirenment for issue
52 
 
 
Figure 23 Wheat and rice procurement and total off-take* 
Source: Own calculation based on FCI data 
*For TPDS, OWS, relief and defence, OMSS and net exports 
Finally, the fiscal cost estimation method is based on many assumptions and should be 
used to analyze the dynamics and composition of the costs of operating the system rather 
than comparing it with the food subsidy.  
 
Figure 24 Composition of estimated expenditures 
Source: Own calculation based on FCI data 
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Figure 25 Composition of estimated revenues 
Source: Own calculation based on FCI data 
Note: In case net exports are negative, net export revenue also becomes negative, meaning net losses from 
trade.  
The major component of fiscal cost (figure 24) is the cost of procurement, which consists 
of the MSP and acquisition costs. The considerable share in total costs, especially in recent 
years has been the cost of carrying the buffer stock. The rising trend in costs is mostly due 
to increasing volume of grain that is procured, distributed, and stored. On the revenue 
side (figure 25), a dominant role is played by revenues from the TPDS and OWS. 
Interestingly, it has declined in real terms, even though the volume of distribution has 
increased. This is because the CIP has been constant in nominal terms, which implies a 
sharp decline in its real value. Both export revenues (except for the beginning of the 
millennium) and OMSS revenues have usually had a negligible share in total revenue.     
2.2.8. Seasonal dynamics of prices and stock inflows and outflows 
The seasonality in the production of wheat, with one production season per year, and rice, 
with two seasons – the smaller rabi and the major kharif – finds reflection in the respective 
seasonal patterns in procurement (see figure 26 and 27). Most of the procurement is done 
around the major harvesting months. In the case of wheat, most of the grain is procured 
in two months – April and May. In the case of rice, the peak month is October; however, 
supplies come throughout the year, except for July and August. On the other hand, off-
take under the TPDS and OMSS is steady throughout the year; as a result, stock levels are 
characterized by a pronounced seasonal pattern that reflects the seasonality of 
procurement. Another reason for fluctuations in the level of wheat stocks, not captured 
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in the figure 26, are OMSS releases, which usually happen, in case there are excessive 
stocks, before the arrival of the new harvest. As discussed before, OMSS does not apply 
in the case of rice. 
 
Figure 26 Seasonal pattern of wheat procurement, off-take, stocks and prices 
Source: Own calculation based on the data from various DFPD Food Grain Bulletins 
 
Figure 27 Seasonal pattern of rice procurement, off-take, stocks and prices 
Note. Seasonal dynamics based on X12-Arima RSA3 filter using Demetra Plus software. For wheat and rice 
prices: Log-transformed monthly WPI prices for 1990 to 2013 have been used; FCI stocks from 2000 to 2012; 
domestic release (i.e. sum of off-take for TPDS, welfare schemes and OMSS open tender sales) for 2000 to 
2006 (only wheat); procurement for 1998 to 2002. Differences in estimation spans stem from restricted data 
availability.  
Source: Own calculation based on the data from various DFPD Food Grain Bulletins 
The seasonality in procurement and stocks described above is reflected in the seasonal 
fluctuation in prices. Figures 26 and 27 show the normalized (to minimum value adjusted) 
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seasonal component. Along with the new harvest arrival that coincides with the lowest 
public stock level, market prices drop and later rise gradually through the year. Wheat 
prices before harvest are more than 5 per cent higher than after harvest; for rice, the gap 
is almost 4 per cent. However, these figures underestimate the seasonality as the 
underlying commodity WPI shows less fluctuation than the weighted average of 
wholesale market prices (see Appendix 1). 
2.2.9. Summary and conclusions 
The main findings of this chapter are as follows. Extensive market interventions resulted 
in a duality of the wheat and rice sectors with the coexistence of public and private sectors 
and dual prices, regulated and market prices. The regulated prices strongly influence real 
processes. Wheat and rice supply strongly and significantly respond to MSP. This result is 
robust with different specifications. In the case of wheat, price elasticity is higher, which 
might be due to the more commercial character of the crop. The price elasticities are high 
compared to acreage and yield elasticities for other countries, which can be explained by 
the low price risks due to minimum prices. Wholesale prices at planting or lagged harvest 
time prices are largely irrelevant.  
The FCI procurement volume is driven by the production level and the difference between 
the MSP and the market price. For rice, there is also an upward trend in the proportion of 
procured grain to total production. Higher share of marketed surplus of rice is procured 
as compared to wheat. The gap between MSPs and the wholesale prices has narrowed in 
the last years. 
The demand equation estimation turned out to be challenging due to the endogeneity of 
market price and because of the difficulty in accounting for the consumption from PDS 
(due do fluctuating and mostly unknown leakages from the PDS). Eventually, the 
instrumental variable regression was used to assess the impact of the market price on 
wheat and rice consumption. PDS grain was considered both as a perfect and imperfect 
substitute for market grain. The signs of the estimated price elasticities for wheat are 
significant and consistent with theory. For rice, they turned out to be insignificant. Rice 
consumption turned out to be determined mostly by the time trend and the PDS. The 
impact of the PDS on wheat consumption is ambiguous. This difference in influence of the 
PDS on consumption can be explained by the higher rice PDS off-take and lower leakage 
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and high additional subsidy (including universal public distribution) in some big rice 
consuming states. 
Public stock analysis revealed that the average unexplained change in stock level between 
marketing seasons averaged 10 per cent for rice and 2 per cent for wheat. These 
unexplained changes might be linked to the storage losses. These numbers are difficult to 
compare with other studies’ estimates of storage losses due to high variance in results 
and differences in methodology. OMSS allocations were usually made in case of wheat, 
rather than rice, due to higher seasonality of production and prices. The actual off-take 
for the OMSS was much below allocations.  
Domestic prices in India were successfully protected from international price fluctuations, 
avoiding the up and down swings in the mid-1990s and during and after the 2007-2008 
food crisis. Trade policies, on the one hand, protected farmers from the international price 
fluctuations, but on the other, subdued domestic prices. As a result, procurement was 
ample, and even excessive, with relatively low MSP. However, for the Indian farmers this 
policy measure meant foregone benefits from trade. 
In general, rice market appears to be more regulated than the wheat market. This is visible 
in higher procurement levels, higher stocks and distribution, as well as more distorted 
demand.    
The seasonal analysis of intra-year data revealed strong seasonality in procurement, in 
particular for wheat (less for rice). Off-take for the TPDS is non-seasonal. As a result, 
fluctuations in the stock level are characterized by strong seasonal patterns, which are 
accounted for in the buffer stock norms.    
Starting from 2006-07, there has been a clear upward trend in inflation adjusted fiscal 
costs associated with procurement, storage and distribution of wheat and rice. There has 
been a strong rise in expenditures coming mostly from the rising procurement volume 
and the MSP. On the other hand, revenues have declined in real terms, due to lower real 
CIP and only marginal revenues from OMSS and exports. As a result, not only have total 
fiscal costs increased, fiscal costs relative to the amount of grains released through the 
PDS have also increased.  
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Limitations of our analysis lie in a high level of aggregation. As the aim of our study was 
to assess the outcomes of the central policies, we focused on the all-India aggregates. This 
framework neglects regional differences and state-specific environments. Further 
research should be carried out on the state level data. However, a time-series estimation 
shed light to important dynamics in the food sector in India and linked policy measures 
taken on the central level to their market outcomes. A comprehensive consideration of 
all major policies and their interplay gives a broad overview of the food grain sector and 
the forces that shape it. Further, the estimation of structural parameters can be used for 
partial equilibrium analysis, which implementation is discussed in Chapter 3. 
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3. Simulation of the NFSA implementation of vs. cash transfers – 
impacts on prices, stocks and fiscal costs34 
,…if we want to think about using cash transfers instead of the Public Distribution System, 
we have to consider all of the subsequent changes, what would happen to procurement 
and storage, and what would happen to the free market prices of grains.’ (Deaton, 2015) 
This chapter analyzes current and possible future reforms of the Indian food policies of 
the two most important staple grains, wheat and rice, within a two-commodity dynamic 
partial equilibrium model with stochastic shocks. Implementation of the National Food 
Security Act (NFSA) under several policy measures with the current regime as well as two 
scenarios with a regime change – implementation of cash transfers and deficiency 
payments. Implications for market fundamentals and fiscal costs were simulated in the 
medium term – are simulated until 2020/21. 
3.1. Literature review and contributions 
Contrary to econometric analyses, the current study allows considering equilibrium 
effects on prices, price variability and private grain stocks as endogenous market 
variables. Such an equilibrium model also allows analyzing counterfactual scenarios. At 
the same time, our model builds on the empirical analysis of the Indian food grain sector. 
Most of the functional forms and parameters were derived from the econometric time 
series analysis as discussed in Chapter 2. As a result, our model allows for simulations of 
counterfactual scenarios but it is well grounded in the real processes.     
Several simulation models have been used to analyze the impact of various policies on 
rice and wheat. Krishna and Chhibber (1983) built a partial equilibrium model for the 
wheat sector to study the consequences of the dual price policy. The model was used to 
simulate output, government purchases and sales, imports, stocks and market prices of 
wheat under different scenarios. They showed a very high price sensitivity of wheat 
                                                          
34 The earlier version of this chapter has been published as proceedings of the Ecomod2015 conference as 
Kozicka, M., Kalkuhl, M., & Brockhaus, J. (2015). Food Grain Policies in India and their Implications for 
Stocks and Fiscal Costs: A Partial Equilibrium Analysis. In Ecomod 2015. Boston. The revised version of this 
chapter has been accepted for a publication in the Journal of Agricultural Economics; currently scheduled 
to appear in Volume 68.1, January, 2017. 
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production and demand. The authors also found procurement responded strongly to 
production level changes. Schiff (1993) is another important study that examined the 
impact of dual pricing of wheat, rice and sugar for producers and consumers with a partial 
equilibrium model. The author distinguished three groups of actors affected by the pricing 
policy – the urban rich, the urban poor and the farmers and two trade regimes – free trade 
and closed economy. It was found that the effect of dual pricing has, under certain 
assumptions, a negative impact on prices and harms farmers, although it has a positive 
short-run impact on the urban poor. However, as the setup of Indian economy has 
changed a lot since the publication of these two papers, their results may not be 
applicable any more.   
A series of more recent analysis of the sector policies within a partial equilibrium model 
was conducted by Jha and Srinivasan (for example  Jha & Srinivasan, 1999). The authors 
published, jointly with Landes, a report (Jha, Srinivasan, & Landes, 2007) with extensive 
sector analysis and policy recommendations. They consider reduction in MSPs and 
alternatively, introduction of deficiency payments with the combination of 
decentralization.  The authors recommended more liberal, market-oriented price policies 
with greater reliance on international markets. Our model extends their study with 
consideration of private stocks, new policy variables in the model, endogenous fiscal costs 
and different policy scenarios. Gouel, Gautam and Martin (2014) analyze welfare and cost 
implications of the current policies with a rational expectations trade-storage model for 
Indian wheat market. The authors found that significant cost savings through a 
combination of storage and trade costs could be made without any significant net loss in 
pure welfare through a less insulating trade policy implemented in conjunction with 
storage rules that are similar to, but above, competitive storage levels.  
Explicit links of policies to the market fundamentals, consideration of both crops 
simultaneously and estimation of fiscal costs, implementation of endogenous 
international prices (large country case) as well as a solid empirical grounding in actual 
processes distinguishes the current setup and makes the study an important contribution 
to the above mentioned literature. Another extension we provide is a consideration of 
uncertainty coming from random production shocks, which is reported as variability of 
endogenous variables. A new reduced-form approach to model private storage based on 
61 
 
the competitive storage model is used. It does not require solving a rational expectations 
equilibrium by numerically estimating the value function. This approach allows to closely 
re-producing historical (private) storage data. Finally, we provide, to our best knowledge, 
the first broad assessment of implications of the NFSA in an equilibrium setup. We add to 
the literature (Kishore & Chakrabarti, 2015; Mishra, 2013; Pursell, 2014) which calculates 
costs of the implementation of the NFSA by considering partial equilibrium effects. A 
further important contribution is the simulation of consequences of alternative policy 
framework in India, namely cash transfers combined with deficiency payments. 
3.2. Model description 
Our model is a dynamic partial equilibrium model with two commodities, wheat and rice, 
and stochastic harvest shocks. They are indicated by a subscript 𝑖 ∈ {𝑤, 𝑟}. A subscript t 
denotes a year and 𝑡 ∈ {2013, … ,2020}, which is a time span for simulations. All prices 
are in real terms, deflated by the wholesale price index (WPI).  
Caveats of this framework are typical for partial equilibrium models – a bigger picture is 
neglected, for example there is no link to job market and other sectors.    
3.2.1. Current policy framework 
All functional forms, except for equations for private exports and international price, are 
based on the empirical ex-post analysis in chapter 2 and for private stocks, in Kozicka, 
Kalkuhl, Saini and Brockhaus (2015) and match the current policy framework – open-
ended procurement with the MSP, distribution through the PDS and corresponding 
private and public stocks.  
The exogenous variables are: PDS – volume and price, MSP, stock norms, population and 
GDP growth rates, inflation (WPI), trade regime, acquisition, distribution and storage 
costs. Endogenous variables in the partial equilibrium model are determined with the 
following equations:    
Production 
8    𝐥𝐧 𝑸𝒕,𝒊 = 𝜶
𝒑
𝟎 + 𝜶
𝒑
𝟏 𝐥𝐧 𝒑𝒕,𝒊
𝑴𝑺𝑷+ 𝜶𝒑𝟐𝐥𝐧𝒕 + 𝜶
𝒑
𝟑𝑹𝒕 + 𝜺𝒕,𝒊, 
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where  𝑄𝑡,𝑖  is a yearly production volume of the i-th crop, 𝑝𝑖
𝑀𝑆𝑃 is the real minimum 
support price, t is a trend variable, R is total yearly rainfall (in a calendar year), 𝜀𝑡,𝑖  is 
stochastic production shock. 
Demand 
9 𝒍𝒏 𝑫𝒕,𝒊
𝒏𝒆𝒕 𝒄𝒂𝒑
= 𝜶𝒅𝟎 + 𝜶
𝒅
𝟏 𝐥𝐧 𝒑𝒕,𝒊 + 𝜶
𝒅
𝟐 𝐥𝐧 𝒑𝒕,𝒊
𝒄𝒓𝒐𝒔𝒔 + 𝜶𝒅𝟑 𝐥𝐧 𝑷𝑫𝑺𝒕,𝒊
𝒄𝒂𝒑
+ 𝜶𝒅𝟒𝐥𝐧𝒕 ,             
where  𝐷𝑡,𝑖
𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑝  is per capita yearly consumption of the i-th crop net of consumption 
through the PDS, 𝑝𝑡,𝑖 is a yearly average of the own price of the i-th crop and  𝑝𝑡,𝑖
𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 is  the 
price average of the other crop (cross price), both in real terms, 𝑡  is a time trend. The 
variable 𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑡,𝑖
𝑐𝑎𝑝 is per capita off take under the PDS. 
𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑡,𝑖
𝑐𝑎𝑝 =
𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑡,𝑖
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑡
, where 𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑡,𝑖 is a total off-take for PDS of the i-th crop in year t and 
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑡 is a population of India in year t. 
𝐷𝑡,𝑖
𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑝 =
𝐷𝑡,𝑖
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑡
−
𝜉𝑖𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑡,𝑖
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑡
= 𝐷𝑡,𝑖
𝑐𝑎𝑝 − 𝜉𝑖𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑡,𝑖
𝑐𝑎𝑝  is a relationship between net per capita 
demand, per capita demand and total demand  𝐷𝑡,𝑖. 𝜉𝑖 is an average leakage from PDS.   
Procurement  
10     
𝑫𝒕,𝒊
𝑭𝑪𝑰
𝑸𝒕,𝒊
= 𝜶𝒑𝒓𝟎 + 𝜶
𝒑𝒓
𝟏
𝒑𝒕,𝒊
𝒑𝒕,𝒊
𝑴𝑺𝑷 + 𝜶
𝒑𝒓
𝟐𝒕, 
where 𝐷𝑡,𝑖
𝐹𝐶𝐼  is the yearly procurement level of the i-th crop. Thus, on the left hand side of 
the equation, there is the share of public procurement in total production and on the right 
hand side, there is a ratio of market price to the MSP and the trend. 
Private stocks 
Private stocks are modeled using a reduced-form approach that proxies the dynamics of 
the competitive storage model with rational expectations equilibrium (Deaton & Laroque, 
1992; Williams & Wright, 2005). Brockhaus and Kalkuhl (2015) showed how this model 
can be used to derive a reduced-form equation which can approximate speculative private 
storage behavior. If domestic supply in terms of harvest and last year’s private and public 
carry-over stock are high, private stocks increase. Hence: 
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11    
𝑿𝒕,𝒊
𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒗
𝑫𝒕,𝒊
𝒕𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒅 = 𝜶
𝒔
𝟎 + 𝜶
𝒔
𝟏
𝑺𝒕,𝒊
𝑫𝒕,𝒊
𝒕𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒅 + 𝜶
𝒔
𝟐
𝑿𝒕,𝒊
𝑫𝒕,𝒊
𝒕𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒅, 
where 𝑋𝑡,𝑖
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣  is the private stock of the i-th crop in the marketing year t, 𝐷𝑡,𝑖
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 is the 
consumption trend, approximated by a linear trend for simulations, 𝑆𝑡,𝑖 is a total market 
supply calculated as 𝑆𝑡,𝑖 = 𝑄𝑡,𝑖 + 𝑋𝑡−1,𝑖
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣  and 𝑋𝑡,𝑖 is the FCI stock (public stock). 
Private exports  
Private exports and imports, unless there are government interventions in the form of e.g 
export bans, are determined by the spatial arbitrage condition35:     
12a   𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒕,𝒊  ≥ 𝟎 ⊥    − 𝒑𝒕,𝒊
𝒊𝒏𝒕 + 𝒑𝒕,𝒊 +   𝜽𝒆𝒙 + 𝝎𝒊 ≥ 𝟎 , 
12b    𝑰𝒎𝒑𝒕,𝒊  ≥ 𝟎 ⊥     𝒑𝒕,𝒊
𝒊𝒏𝒕 − 𝒑𝒕,𝒊 +   𝜽𝒊𝒎 ≥ 𝟎 , 
where 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡,𝑖 and 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑡,𝑖  are the total volume of private export and import respectively 
in a financial year, 𝑝𝑡,𝑖
𝑖𝑛𝑡 is an international price converted to Rupees, in real terms (divided 
by Indian WPI), 𝑝𝑡,𝑖 is a domestic price, 𝜃𝑒𝑥 and 𝜃𝑖𝑚 are trade costs and 𝜔𝑖 is an export 
tariff.  
Public exports  
Public exports occur in times of an excessive stock (stock above the norm), when a certain 
share, 𝜏, is released. When the stock is not sufficient to feed the PDS needs with a certain 
reserve, the required volume is imported. 𝜂 defines the operational needs, for example 
𝜂 = 0.25 would mean a 3-month PDS requirement. 
13    𝑵𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒑𝒖𝒃
𝒕,𝒊
= 𝐦𝐢𝐧(𝑿𝒕,𝒊 − 𝜼𝑷𝑫𝑺𝒕,𝒊, 𝝉(𝑿𝒕,𝒊 − 𝑵𝑿𝒕,𝒊)), 
where 𝑁𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑏
𝑡,𝑖
is the total volume of net public export in a financial year, 𝑋𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑁𝑋𝑡,𝑖 
is a public stock surplus (above the stock norm) and 𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑡,𝑖 is a PDS off-take. 
International price 
                                                          
35 ⊥ is used in the mixed complementarity condition means that the two inequalities on the both sides of 
the symbol are orthogonal, so if one equation holds as a strict inequality, the other side holds as a strict 
equality. 
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International price is determined endogenously as a deviation from a ‘base’ price, 
depending on the total net exports from India. The focus on impacts within India justifies 
the assumption that world market prices are stable apart from the influence of India’s 
exports. Non-stable world prices would add an additional stochastic component which 
makes the results depended on the specific realization but would not change the expected 
values. Hence, we are not modelling the international prices but only the impact of the 
Indian policies on them. 
14    𝒑𝒕,𝒊
𝒊𝒏𝒕=𝒑𝒊
𝒊𝒏𝒕 [𝟏 − 𝜸(𝑵𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒑𝒖𝒃
𝒕,𝒊
+ 𝑵𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒕,𝒊)], 
where 𝑝𝑡,𝑖
𝑖𝑛𝑡 is international price in rupees, Indian WPI deflated,  𝑝𝑖
𝑖𝑛𝑡  is ‘base’ 
international price(international price without trade with India), 𝛾  is a sensitivity of 
international price to Indian net exports.  
Open Market Sale Scheme (OMSS) 
Similarly to public exports equation, stock off-takes via the OMSS, 𝑂𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑡,𝑖, are calculated 
as a share 𝜅 of excessive public stocks, whenever  excess stocks are positive: 
14    𝑶𝑴𝑺𝑺𝒕,𝒊 = 𝜿 𝐦𝐚𝐱(𝟎, 𝑿𝒕,𝒊 − 𝑵𝑿𝒕,𝒊), 
MIP 
The Minimum Issue Price 𝑀𝐼𝑃𝑡,𝑖, the price at which grains are sold through the OMSS, is 
determined by 
15     𝑴𝑰𝑷𝒕,𝒊 = (𝟏 + 𝒆𝒄𝒊)𝑴𝑺𝑷𝒕,𝒊, 
where   𝑒𝑐𝑖 is the ‘economic cost’ markup representing storage and transaction costs 
borne by the FCI.  
Fiscal cost  
The fiscal costs for the government are calculated as 
16  𝑭𝑪𝒕 = ∑ (𝒂𝒄𝒕,𝒊𝑫𝒕,𝒊
𝑭𝑪𝑰 + 𝒄𝒕,𝒊
𝒅 𝑷𝑫𝑺𝒕,𝒊 + 𝒌𝒕𝑿
𝒐𝒑
𝒕,𝒊 − 𝒑𝒕,𝒊
𝑷𝑫𝑺𝑷𝑫𝑺𝒕,𝒊 − 𝑴𝑰𝑷𝒕,𝒊𝑶𝑴𝑺𝑺𝒕,𝒊 −𝒊
𝒑𝒕,𝒊
𝑬𝑿𝑵𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒑𝒖𝒃), 
where 𝐹𝐶𝑡are yearly fiscal costs, 𝑎𝑐𝑡,𝑖𝐷𝑡,𝑖
𝐹𝐶𝐼 are acquisition costs of the i-th crop, 𝑐𝑡,𝑖
𝑑 𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑡,𝑖 
are distribution costs, 𝑘𝑡𝑋
𝑜𝑝
𝑡,𝑖 is buffer carrying cost (where 𝑋
𝑜𝑝
𝑡,𝑖  is the operational 
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stock, which is buffer stock of wheat and rice in the central pool minus four month off-
take for PDS and OMSS) and 𝑝𝑡,𝑖
𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑡,𝑖 + 𝑀𝐼𝑃𝑡,𝑖𝑂𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑡,𝑖 + 𝑝𝑡,𝑖
𝐸𝑋𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑡,𝑖
𝑝𝑢𝑏  are sales 
realizations (revenues) from sales from PDS, OMSS and net export off-take. Detailed 
specification of the components of the fiscal cost equation can be found in the table 8 
(section 2.2.7). 
The dynamic equilibrium model is closed by two identity equations: 
Public stocks  
17  𝑿𝒕,𝒊 =  (𝟏 − 𝜹𝒊)𝑿𝒕−𝟏,𝒊 + 𝑫𝒕,𝒊
𝑭𝑪𝑰 −  𝑶𝑴𝑺𝑺𝒕,𝒊 − 𝑷𝑫𝑺𝒕,𝒊 − 𝑵𝑬𝒙𝒑
𝒑𝒖𝒃
𝒕,𝒊
, 
where 𝛿𝑖 is the public stock deterioration rate.  
Market clearing 
18  𝑸𝒕,𝒊 + 𝑶𝑴𝑺𝑺𝒕,𝒊 + 𝑷𝑫𝑺𝒕,𝒊 = 𝑫𝒕,𝒊 + 𝑵𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒕,𝒊 + 𝑫𝒕,𝒊
𝑭𝑪𝑰 + 𝑿𝒕,𝒊
𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒗
− (𝟏 − 𝜹𝒑𝒊)𝑿𝒕−𝟏,𝒊
𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒗
, 
where 𝛿𝑝𝑖 is the private stock deterioration rate.   
3.2.2.  Cash transfers and deficiency payments 
An alternative to state procurement and food price subsidies are deficiency payments and 
cash transfers. They are considered to provide in principle similar social benefits by 
increasing real incomes of producers and consumers while reducing market distortions 
(Blackorby & Donaldson, 1988; Esmaeili, Karami, & Najafi, 2013). 
A change from the PDS to cash transfers is modelled by adding the transfer to the 
disposable income in the demand equation and, on the government side, to fiscal costs 
while setting 𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑡,𝑖 ≡ 0.  
19        𝒍𝒏 𝑫𝒕,𝒊
𝒄𝒂𝒑
= 𝜶𝒅𝟎 + 𝜶
𝒅
𝟏 𝐥𝐧 𝒑𝒕,𝒊 + 𝜶
𝒅
𝟐 𝐥𝐧 𝒑𝒕,𝒊
𝒄𝒓𝒐𝒔𝒔 + 𝜶𝒅𝟑 𝐥𝐧(𝑰𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆𝒕
𝒄𝒂𝒑
+
𝑪𝒂𝒔𝒉𝒕
𝒄𝒂𝒑
) + 𝜶𝒅𝟒 𝐥𝐧𝒕,      
where  𝐷𝑡,𝑖
𝑐𝑎𝑝 is per capita yearly consumption of the i-th crop, and 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡
𝑐𝑎𝑝 is a yearly per 
capita cash transfer.  
In case of cash transfers, there is no need for high public stocks. Stock norms are kept low, 
only to cover the emergency reserve. As a result and contrary to equation 10, 
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procurement happens only when stocks fall below the norms, which can be presented as 
𝐷𝑡,𝑖
𝐹𝐶𝐼 = max(0, 𝑁𝑋𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑋𝑡,𝑖). 
For the grain rotation, a fraction of the stock is released through the OMSS and the rest is 
exported. In order to provide support to the farmers and incentivize production, at times 
when market price falls below the support price (equal to the former MSP), farmers are 
offered deficiency payments. This is why the production function still has the MSP instead 
of the market price as the MSP is shaping the expectations of producers. The amount of 
payment is added to the fiscal costs.  
Because our model is based on the empirics, it is useful mostly for short- and medium- 
term simulations. It needs to be noted that the introduction of cash based transfers and 
a significant reduction in public stock levels are a major change to the underlying 
assumptions of the data generating process that it naturally leads to a higher level of 
uncertainty attached to these scenarios.     
3.3. Scenarios 
Seven different scenarios projecting the exogenous variables and policy shifts over the 
next ten years until 2020-21 were simulated with the model. The baseline scenario 
assumes the implementation of the NFSA, which regulates the exogenous PDS distribution 
to 67 per cent of the Indian population with the rations defined by the Act and stock norms 
set to meet the new needs of the system. Management of the system is similar to the past 
– with growing MSP, small sales through the OMSS and exports. Other exogenous 
variables develop in a ‘likely’ way. Details are shown in table 9: 
Variable  Scenario 
MSP   2% yearly real growth 
Rainfall (R)   Moving average of past 15 observations 
Population (POP) Growth at 1.3% per year (as in the  last years) 
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PDS  off-take  For 2013-14, as estimated for the NFSA obligations (based on 
DFPD (2014 p.27) estimates for the TPDS and own estimates 
for the OWS, total wheat and rice off-take is 59.97 million 
tonnes, with 33 million tonnes related to rice and 27 million 
tonnes to wheat), in the following years 1.3% yearly growth  - 
the same as population growth  
Real disposable income   In 2013-14, 4.8% growth , 2014-15, 5.7% growth, 6.5% growth 
from 2015-16 onwards (from the OECD GDP growth estimates 
and forecasts, WEO October 2014)  
WPI  In 2014-15, 10%, equal to 6% from 2015-16 onwards (WEO 
(October 2014) projects declining CPI from 7.5% in 2015 to 6% 
in 2019) 
Trade regime  No export bans 
Acquisition costs, 
distribution cost, annual 
rate of buffer carrying 
cost  
 2% real yearly growth 
Central issue price Nominal as stated in the NFSA (2 Rs./kg for wheat and 3 Rs./kg 
for rice) 
Table 9 Projection of exogenous variables in baseline scenario  
Source: Own design  
The alternative scenarios 1-4 assume implementation of the NFSA (in terms of distribution 
and stock norms) and different policy measures to fulfil its requirements. Scenarios 5 and 
6 assume alternative policy framework with cash transfers and deficiency payments. They 
differ with the cash transfer coverage. Details are as follows: 
Scenario 1 – varying MSP scenario: In this scenario price dynamics are set to meet the 
NFSA requirements with minimal procurement and stock levels. The MSPs are used to 
minimize the excessive stock levels (keep stocks close to the norms) and curb fiscal costs. 
As a result, the MSPs and acquisition costs change with a varying growth rate between 
2013 and 2020: The  wheat MSP grows on average by 1 per cent yearly in real terms and 
the rice MSP declines by 2/3 per cent annually in real terms (which means growth 
nominally) by 2016 and grows further on. As a result the average annual growth rate is 
close to 0 per cent. The rest is the same as in the baseline scenario. 
Scenario 2 – aggressive OMSS: In this scenario OMSS is used to meet the NFSA 
requirements with ample level of procurement and high MSP growth rates. Stock levels 
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are kept close to the norms with high OMSS sales. MSP growth rates are set in real terms 
2 per cent and 3 per cent for rice and wheat accordingly, the rest as in the baseline 
scenario.  
Scenario 3 – export bans: In this scenario trade bans are used to meet the NFSA 
requirements with moderate MSPs. MSPs are set to grow with 1 per cent for rice and 2 
per cent for wheat in real terms annually and in times of insufficient stocks (below the 
stock norms) export bans are introduced. The rest as in the baseline scenario 
Scenario 4 – aggressive imports: In this scenario, farmers’ support and procurement are 
minimized while imports are used to insure functioning of the NFSA. Therefore, MSPs are 
kept constant in real terms the Public distribution system supplies are supplemented with 
public imports.  The rest is the same as in the baseline scenario. 
Scenario 5 – cash transfer and deficiency payment: The idea of an alternative way to 
ensure food security is explored in this scenario. We assume that 67 per cent of the 
population receives the equivalent of the NFSA ration (5 kg of food-grains per person per 
month against Rs. 3/2 per kg for rice/wheat) in cash. The transfer is linked to the market 
price in the model (which is endogenous). In the model, market price is in the wholesale 
level, so we add 15 per cent markup to reproduce a consumer price. The emergency 
reserve is equal to 2 mt of wheat and 3 mt of rice. MSPs are kept constant in real terms. 
If market prices fall below the MSP, 30 per cent of produced grains receive the difference 
between the two prices. 30 per cent is close to the recent procurement levels – hence the 
deficiency payment policy would not create additional fiscal costs. Implementation of the 
deficiency payments with restricting the support to the 30 per cent of the production 
might cause several problems. First, if more than 30 per cent does not receive the price 
above the MSP, how the eligible farmers should be selected? The wealth/income criterion 
would serve the purpose of transferring income to the poor farmers. However, as a 
consequence, the response to the MSP changes might be different under the new policy 
regime because the non-poor farmers face higher price risks as compared to the open-
ended procurement. For our modelling exercise, this might mean a structural change in 
the production function which corresponds to the current regime. However, it is plausible 
to assume that the volume of grains sold to the FCI (historically maximum 30 per cent of 
production) is the upper bound for the deficiency support.        
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 Scenario 6 – cash transfer for 30 per cent and deficiency payment: In this scenario, in 
order to curb fiscal costs, we assume that only those below poverty line receive consumer 
transfers, however the ration is set exogenously and is much higher than in the scenario 
5. This means that 30 per cent of the population receive Rs. 200 in 2013 prices, constant 
in real terms. Rs. 200 was an equivalent of 10.5 kg of wheat in New Delhi and 5.9 kg of 
rice in Chennai in January 2013 (FAO GIEWS retail price). To compare with, in a 
randomized control trial in Delhi, India in 2010-2011 offered Rs. 1000 in unconditional 
cash transfer per household (Gangopadhyay, Lensink, & Yadav, 2013). The rest is the same 
as in the scenario 5. 
3.4. Calibration 
Most of the functional forms and parameter values were estimated using national 
aggregates from 1982 until 2012. All parameters are reported in tables 10 and 11.  
 Demand equation 
  Wheat  Rice  
𝛼𝑑1 Own price elasticity  -1.01 -0.11 
𝛼𝑑2 Cross price elasticity  0.7 0.02 
𝛼𝑑3 PDS elasticity  -0.07 -0.33 
𝜉𝑖 
Average leakage from 
PDS 0.75 0.38 
 Production  equation 
𝛼𝑝1 MSP elasticity  0.65 0.39 
𝛼𝑝3 Rainfall elasticity  0.35 0.5 
 Procurement equation 
𝛼𝑝𝑟1 Price ratio parameter  -0.39 -0.26 
 Private stocks equation 
𝛼𝑠1 Supply parameter  0.34 0.34 
𝛼𝑠2 Public stock parameter  -0.62 -0.62 
 
Public exports equation 
𝜂 
PDS requirements 
parameter 0.3 0.3 
𝜏 
Excessive stock release 
parameter 0.1 0.1 
 OMSS equation 
κ Stock release parameter 0.2 0.2 
 Trade specification 
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𝑝𝑖
𝑖𝑛𝑡 
(Rs/t/WPI) Base export pricea 20 24 
𝛾 India export responsea,b 0.035 0.035 
𝜃𝑒𝑥, 𝜃𝑖𝑚 Export/import costs
a 2.4 2.4 
𝜔𝑖 Export tariff
a 0 2 
 MIP equation 
𝑒𝑐𝑖 MSP markup
a 0.45 0.45 
 Public stock and identity equation 
𝛿𝑝𝑖 
Public stock deterioration 
rate  0.1 0.02 
𝛿𝑖 
Private stock deterioration 
rate a 0.02 0.02 
Table 10 Estimated parameters - current policy framework 
a Calibrated 
b Jha and Srinivasan (1999) quote IFPRI's IMPACT model, which gives the percentage decrease in world rice 
price due to 1 million tonnes of additional Indian rice exports as 4.7%. We use calibrated 3% response for 
both wheat and rice markets. 
Source: Own design. Parameters, if not calibrated, are based on estimations discussed in chapter 2. 
Wheat demand is much more sensitive to market price changes than rice, whereas rice 
demand is more dependent on PDS distribution. This is probably because PDS functions 
much better for rice distribution – more rice is consumed form PDS than wheat, rice 
leakage is much smaller, and major rice consuming states provide additional subsidy and 
higher coverage than offered by the center.  For example, rice in AP, Karnataka, Kerala 
and Odisha is priced for the poor at only Rs./kg 1. Tamil Nadu has a unique universal PDS, 
delivering rice to everyone free of cost (DFPD, 2014, p. 54) 
Production strongly responds to MSP, which is probably because this price is high enough 
to cover the cost of production and there is very low risk attached to it.       
  Wheat Rice 
 Demand equation – cash
b 
𝛼𝑑1 Own price elasticity  -0.7 -0.25 
𝛼𝑑2 Cross price elasticity  0.65 0.15 
𝛼𝑑3 Income elasticity  0.18 0.02 
Table 11 Estimated parameters – policy change 
b Wheat elasticities were estimated and rice taken from (P. Kumar et al., 2011)  
3.5. Simulations 
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Our system of equations is written in the General Algebraic Modelling System (GAMS) 
programming language and solved with the Mixed Complementarity Problem (MCP) 
solver PATH. We further considered 1000 realizations of a random iid production shock 
𝜀𝑡,𝑖 ~ Ν(0, 0.05) for each scenario simulation to analyze the role of uncertainty and the 
impact of policies on price volatility. The parameters of the distribution of 𝜀𝑡,𝑖 are based 
on historical realizations of the production shocks (discussed in section 2.2.2).  
This number of simulations per scenario produces robust results. In a sample of 10 
simulations (each including 1000 realizations of random shocks) for the MSP scenario, 
maximum difference of prices (domestic and international) between means for 
consecutive simulations was less than 0.5 per cent and for fiscal costs less than 0.7 per 
cent.   
3.5.1. Model fit and selected baseline scenario results  
The model reproduces past values of major endogenous variables quite well. Wheat 
demand tends to be underestimated, which might be the reason for underestimation of 
the market price. On the contrary, rice demand is slightly overestimated, the same as rice 
prices. Supply of both crops is precisely reproduced, as all the explanatory variables are 
exogenous for the historical phase, including supply shocks, and were introduced into the 
model36.       
In the baseline scenario, production grows along with the real MSP growth in the medium 
term. In 2020, total wheat and rice production reaches 208.8 mt. Total consumption 
grows due to population growth, higher PDS distribution, as outweighed by slightly rising 
market prices. In 2020, total wheat and rice consumption reaches 199.8 mt. 
There are no export bans assumed in this scenario and, as a result, net private exports are 
between 0 mt and 0.2 mt for wheat and 4.8 mt and 7 mt for rice. The difference arises 
because Indian rice is more competitive internationally and we do assume no export 
subsidies. Wheat public net exports vary between -0.7 mt and 0.8 mt, whereas rice is 
exported at volumes between 0.9 mt and 1.4 mt. Also there are small off-takes for OMSS 
for both wheat and rice – below 1.6 mt of wheat and between 1.9 mt and 2.9 mt of rice. 
                                                          
36 In Appendix 5 we present figures with means of the simulated values for consumption, production, 
prices, procurement and stocks along with their standard deviations in the projection period. We further 
compare them with the original time series – actual levels of the variables. 
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This is a result of a rule to release excessive stocks. Prices are rather stable and steadily 
grow in real terms, by 15 per cent for wheat and 9.1 per cent for rice between 2012 and 
2020.  
Despite the drop in 2013 in the case of wheat, procurement of both crops is in an upward 
trend, feeding the growing needs of the PDS under NFSA. The major difference between 
rice and wheat due to the NFSA is that PDS off-takes for rice remain close to the previous 
level (close to 33 mt), whereas for wheat it grows from 23 mt to 27 mt (in 2013, further it 
grows along with the population growth). This is reflected in decreasing wheat stocks 
(figure 28). Higher pressure on wheat PDS and equal growth of MSPs results in growing 
rice stocks and declining wheat stocks. Stock norms under NFSA are close to 10 mt for 
wheat and 11 mt for rice, as estimated by Gulati and Jain (2013). Figure 28 illustrates how 
sensitive the public stocks are to policy changes. A growing MSP for rice can lead to 
abundant stocks and, as it will be discussed further, to high fiscal costs, whereas wheat 
stocks even fall slightly below the norms. Finally, simulated private stock is less than 1 mt 
in the baseline scenario – mostly as a result of crowding out by high public stock. In terms 
of variability, most of the outcomes (production, procurement, prices and stocks) are 
more stable for wheat.  
An alternative within the current policy framework is careful management of the MSP, 
which can minimize public stock levels and the fiscal cost. This is simulated under scenario 
1.          
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Figure 28 Ex-post and baseline scenario public stock simulation  
Note: Mean +/- std means the mean realisation plus or minus its standard deviation based on 1000 
simulations of a random production shock   
Source: Own design  
3.5.2. NFSA management policy measures 
A comparison of the implications of the NFSA implementation in 2020 under different 
policies is reported in table 12. Different strategies to deliver the NFSA commitments have 
sometimes heterogeneous effects on wheat and rice markets, however some common 
tendencies can be outlined. High subsidies in baseline and OMSS scenarios result in the 
highest fiscal costs and lowest domestic prices. Fiscal cost related to wheat is 15 per cent 
higher under the most expensive OMSS scenario, as compared to the cheapest imports 
scenario. In case of rice, fiscal costs are the highest in the Baseline scenario and 
consistently the lowest in the Imports scenario with a difference of 21 per cent. MSP and 
Imports scenarios, on the contrary, lead to the highest domestic market prices and are 
the cheapest, with the MSP scenario yielding slightly higher fiscal costs among these two. 
Domestic prices in the Imports scenario are higher by 4 per cent for wheat and equal for 
rice, as compared to the OMSS scenario. Interestingly, the Trade ban scenario, so 
managing the system with export bans results in the lowest domestic price variability 
across simulations. This means that under this scenario, prices are the least affected by 
the domestic production shocks. The reported standard deviations in the table can be also 
interpreted as the level of uncertainty related to the realization of the variable. Price 
volatility over time is discussed in the section 3.5.4.   
 High reliance on trade in the Imports scenario results in large public imports and as a 
result relatively high international price levels and variability, especially in case of wheat. 
High international prices trigger private exports of 3.1 mt for wheat and 5.5 mt for rice. 
High private exports (over 6 mt) accompanied by small public exports of rice and no 
imports of wheat in OMSS scenario lead to the lowest and in the case of wheat, most 
stable, international prices. The international rice price under OMSS as compared to the 
MSP and Imports scenarios is lower by 12 per cent. This is a result of high production 
subsidy paid by the Indian government.   
Under the NFSA the majority of consumers are covered with highly subsidized wheat and 
rice rations, with the poorest consumers receiving the substantial amount of 35 kg per 
74 
 
family. As a result, market prices affect the poor only partially. On the other hand, support 
for the producers varies between the scenarios, so in some variants, high market prices 
are desirable. Taking these circumstances under consideration, the best policy strategy 
under implementation of the NFSA is to minimize fiscal costs. This can be achieved 
through keeping MSPs low and relying more on imports to feed the public distribution 
system (Imports scenario). However, this strategy can result in very low public stock levels  
Table 12 Simulation results – means and standard deviations (STD) in 2020 for the five 
scenarios 
Note: Means and standard deviations are calculated for stochastic shocks realization; Rice prices are 
reported for milled rice (as opposed to paddy); fiscal costs are in Rs. Cr/WPI; All the aggregate volumes are 
reported in million tons (mt), prices are reported in Rs./kg in real terms (divided by WPI) 
in case of wheat, slightly mitigated by higher private stocks. If insuring sufficient public 
stocks has a high priority – e.g. for political reasons but also due to the ‘right to food’ 
approach of the NFSA, the best strategy is to adjust the MSP to meet the stock norms 
(MSP scenario). However, setting the ‘right’ MSP level can be a very difficult task. The 
solution can be to renew the procurement price institution, i.e. keeping the MSP at the 
minimum and in case of insufficient procurement levels, introducing additional 
procurement with a higher price but only until the stock norms are achieved.     
3.5.3. Cash transfers and deficiency payment scenarios 
The introduction of cash transfers instead of physical food delivery and deficiency 
payments instead of procurement of wheat and rice has various implications for the food 
system. In table 13 we present a comparison of this alternative policy framework under 
  
(1)MSP (2)OMSS (3)Trade bans (4)Imports Baseline 
  Mean  STD Mean  STD Mean  STD Mean  STD Mean  STD 
W
h
e
at
  
Domestic Price 20.2 1.2 18.2 1.5 19.6 1.0 21.0 1.1 19.0 1.1 
International price 20.4 0.9 19.6 0.7 20.7 0.9 23.4 1.1 20.3 0.8 
Private net export  0.0 0.0 0.3 0.7 0.0 0.1 3.1 0.8 0.0 0.2 
Private stocks 1.3 1.5 0.3 0.7 1.1 1.1 3.4 1.5 0.6 0.9 
Public stock 10.2 3.6 13.1 2.6 8.6 2.5 1.6 1.6 10.2 3.1 
Public net export -0.6 1.3 0.3 0.4 -1.0 1.3 -8.0 1.6 -0.5 1.2 
Fiscal cost 85.1 6.9 88.4 5.4 84.3 5.5 76.8 3.5 86.5 6.7 
R
ic
e
 
Domestic Price 24.8 2.7 21.2 2.8 23.0 1.9 24.9 2.7 21.7 2.1 
International price 31.5 2.7 27.8 2.8 30.2 2.7 31.5 2.7 28.3 2.1 
Private net export  5.9 1.2 6.2 1.9 4.3 1.6 5.5 1.2 4.8 1.3 
Private stocks 3.7 2.4 0.7 1.0 0.4 0.8 2.0 2.1 0.0 0.2 
Public stock 10.0 4.4 16.5 3.0 17.4 4.9 11.4 4.8 26.1 5.7 
Public net export -2.1 2.6 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.6 -1.7 2.5 1.5 0.6 
Fiscal cost 137.1 12.2 148.6 11.7 144.1 13.8 131.2 12.6 159.0 15.5 
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two different coverages with the MSP scenario. Results are slightly different for wheat 
and rice partly due to different coverage with these crops with the PDS and higher leakage 
in wheat distribution.   
  (1) MSP (5) Cash 67% (6) Cash 30% 
  Mean  STD Mean  STD Mean  STD 
W
h
e
at
 
Production 96.8 4.9 87.9 4.5 87.9 4.4 
Consumption 96.4 2.8 90.2 3.1 90.2 3.2 
Domestic Price 18.2 1.5 23.5 2.4 23.4 2.6 
International price 19.6 0.7 21.6 1.8 21.6 1.9 
Private stocks 1.3 1.5 3.7 1.6 3.6 1.6 
Public stock 10.2 3.6 1.9 0.0 1.9 0.0 
Fiscal cost 85.1 6.9 61.9 6.8 63.8 0.1 
R
ic
e
 
Production 108.9 5.3 107.2 5.3 107.6 5.4 
Consumption 104.6 1.0 105.5 2.1 105.5 2.2 
Domestic Price 24.8 2.7 28.5 3.9 28.4 4.3 
International price 31.5 2.7 34.1 2.3 34.0 2.4 
Private stocks 3.7 2.4 9.4 1.9 9.5 2.0 
Public stock 10.0 4.4 3.0 0.0 3.0 0.0 
Fiscal cost 137.1 12.2 89.7 12.7 65.2 2.3 
Table 13 Simulation results – means and standard deviations (STD) in 2020 
Note: Means and standard deviations are calculated for stochastic shocks realization; Rice prices are 
reported for milled rice (as opposed to paddy); fiscal costs are in Rs. Cr/WPI; All the aggregate volumes are 
reported in million tons (mt), prices are reported in real terms (divided by WPI)   
In both cash scenarios, production is lower than under the MSP scenario. This is an 
outcome of lower support prices. However, consumption is affected variously – for wheat 
it is lower and for rice, higher. Cash scenarios result in significantly higher domestic and 
international market prices and their variability except for the international rice price 
variability, which slightly declines under cash scenarios. This implies that international 
prices would be less affected by the Indian supply. Domestic market prices are higher by 
14-29 per cent under cash scenarios. Again, the standard deviation was calculated across 
the production shock realizations, so it refers both to the uncertainty of the projection 
and the sensitivity of the price to production shocks. International prices are higher by 7.8 
– 10.4 per cent in cash scenarios as compared to the MSP scenario. Public stocks are 
limited to emergency reserves in cash scenarios and, as a result, public stock levels go 
down to 1.9 mt for wheat and 3 mt for rice. This results in significantly higher private 
wheat stocks. In the Cash 67% scenario, fiscal costs for rice are reduced by over 27 per 
cent and, even more, 35 per cent for wheat.   
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Significant cost reduction can be achieved through delivering cash only to the poor, 
specifically to those, living below the poverty line. This is estimated to be 30 per cent of 
the population (according to the Rangaranjan report (Planning Commission, 2014). In this 
scenario, the cash transfer is increased to Rs. 200 per person per months, however fiscal 
costs are still dramatically lower - 42 per cent less than is the MSP scenario. However, in 
the Cash 30% scenario, between 2014 and 2020 market price of wheat grows by 29 per 
cent and of rice, by 14.4 per cent in real terms, which means a significant drop in wheat 
and rice quantity which can be bought for the transfer amount. The allowance is constant 
in real terms. On the other hand, the idea of delivering cash instead of in-kind transfers, 
assumes that the money can be spent on different goods and the average purchasing 
power of the transfer remains the same due to indexing it with inflation. Linking the 
transfer to the inflation of the poor would be a useful improvement of this policy measure. 
Finally, other problems related to cash transfers should be considered. As it was discussed 
by Birner and von Braun (2015), cash transfers are recommendable only in certain policy 
contexts.    
3.5.4. Domestic price volatility  
Excessive price volatility can have several negative implications for food security and 
macroeconomic stability (as discussed e.g. in Kalkuhl, Kornher, Kozicka, Boulanger, & 
Torero, 2013; von Braun & Tadesse, 2012). Food price instability can also have its political 
cost (Arezki & Brückner, 2011; Sidhir, 2004), which needs to be taken under consideration. 
In our simulation results, inter-annual price volatility differs quite significantly across 
scenarios, as presented in table 14.  
The highest domestic wheat price volatility under the NFSA implementation is in the 
Imports scenario. In case of rice, the highest volatility is in the MSP scenario. Introduction 
of cash transfers and deficiency payments results in even higher domestic price volatility. 
Aggressive price stabilization policies have a significant impact in the model. The lowest 
domestic price volatilities are in the Baseline and the Trade bans scenarios.  
  Wheat  Rice 
(1) MSP  
1.26 1.67 
(0.35) (0.51) 
(2) OMSS 
1.15 1.48 
(0.35) (0.45) 
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(3) Trade bans 
0.99 1.24 
(0.27) (0.34) 
(4) Imports 
1.38 1.52 
(0.37) (0.49) 
(5) Cash 67% 
2.22 1.94 
(0.56) (0.66) 
(6) Cash 30% 
3.03 2.35 
(0.77) (0.85) 
 Baseline 
0.97 1.17 
(0.27) (0.32) 
Table 14 Simulation results – inter-annual domestic price volatility  
Note: Price volatility was calculated as annual log returns standard deviation in the projection horizon, i.e. 
from 2013 to 2020. The means and standard deviations (in parenthesis) of 1000 simulations of each scenario 
are presented in the table.   
3.5.5. Stocks and fiscal costs  
The baseline scenario puts the highest pressure on the fiscal costs. High procurement, 
high stocks (37 mt) and large distribution with highly subsidized prices to a growing 
population causes the fiscal cost in our simulation to grow by 49 per cent in real terms 
between 2012 and 2020 (table 15). In terms of GDP share the number grows from 1.2 per 
cent to only 1.8 per cent, thanks to the growing economy. The OMSS scenario with slightly 
lower stock levels also results in very high fiscal cost. This is due to higher MSP levels and 
higher procurement, so effectively higher transfers for farmers. Relying on imports yields 
the lowest total stock level of 18 mt and the lowest fiscal cost of 1.5 per cent of GDP, 
among the NFSA scenarios. The Imports scenario has low fiscal cost because the MSPs are 
low, which results in low stocks. Only those grains which are necessary to feed the NFSA 
are imported if there are too low supplies in the domestic market. The MSP scenario 
results in total stock of 25 mt and still considerable cost of 1.6 per cent of GDP. 
The Cash 67% scenario brings significant savings and shrinks fiscal costs to 1.1 per cent of 
the GDP. In addition, due to higher private stocks, total stock amounts to almost 18 mt. 
This means that stable food supplies are partially carried out by the private market.   
The Cash 30% scenario is the ‘cheapest’ option causing the fiscal cost to decrease in real 
terms by 22 per cent. Under this scenario, fiscal costs amount to 0.9 per cent of GDP in 
2020. Stock levels are similar to the Cash 67% scenario.   
   
Baseline (1) 
MSP 
(2) 
OMSS 
(3) 
Trade 
bans 
(4) 
Imports 
(5) 
Cash 
67% 
(6) 
Cash 
30% 
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Total stock (public+private) 
36.9 25.3 30.5 27.6 18.3 17.9 18.0 
Total fiscal cost (in % of GDP)  
1.8 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.1 0.9 
Total fiscal cost (nominal in Rs. 
Bln) 
3002 2717 2898 2793 2543 1854 1577 
Fiscal cost growth (% 2020 over 
2012, in real terms) 
48.5 34.3 43.3 38.1 25.8 -8.3 -22.0 
Table 15 Simulation results –total stocks and fiscal costs in 2020  
Note: According to our estimates (using the same methodology as in the table), fiscal cost in  
2013 was equal to 1.2% of GDP.  
GDP data source is OECD, assumed GDP growth rate equal to the baseline scenario.    
3.6. Summary and conclusions 
This chapter provides an empirically grounded dynamic partial equilibrium model for the 
Indian rice and wheat sectors. Most of the functional forms and their parameters were 
econometrically estimated using national time series data from 1982, discussed in the 
chapter 2. Discretionary policies, like OMSS and public exports, were approximated by 
simple rules, linking stock levels to PDS requirements and stock norms. The presented 
model differs from the existing literature in explicitly linking policies to the market 
fundamentals, including endogenous international prices and domestic public and private 
grain stocks, considering wheat and rice simultaneously, as well as estimating fiscal costs. 
We also provide the first assessment of the implications of the NFSA in a consistent 
equilibrium framework. Further, for the first time, different strategies to fulfil the 
requirements of the Act are compared and an alternative policy framework consisting of 
cash transfers and deficiency payments is evaluated.  
The high degree of government involvement results in a high sensitivity of fiscal costs and 
public stock levels to policy measures. For example, small variations of the MSP strongly 
influence the production, procurement and stocks. Implementation of the NFSA under 
several policy measures within the current regime (procurement with MSP and 
distribution with PDS) as well as two scenarios with a regime change, namely cash 
transfers and deficiency payments were considered. Implications for market 
fundamentals and fiscal costs were simulated in the medium term – until 2020/21.  
The NFSA puts a high pressure on fiscal costs and public stocks. Careful management of 
MSPs to keep public stocks close to the norms can reduce the fiscal costs but only to 1.6 
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per cent of the GDP. This policy measure, however, results in high and volatile domestic 
prices while international prices are not severely affected. In this scenario, a procurement 
price should be reintroduced in order to balance stock levels, i.e. the MSP is minimized 
subject to achieving the stock norms. On the contrary, relying on imports in the NFSA 
delivery elevates means and volatility of domestic and means of international prices; 
however this is the cheapest option among the NFSA scenarios. The major advantage 
would be the farmer’s benefits from high prices while poor consumers are protected by 
PDS. 
A policy reform, which introduces cash transfers instead of the PDS and deficiency 
payments instead of physical grain procurement, could bring considerable savings, 
decreasing the fiscal costs to 1.1 per cent of GDP in 2020. Even lower cost can be reached 
with cash transfers being targeted to the poor only.  Fiscal cost then decreases to 0.9 per 
cent of GDP and yet total stocks are ample due to higher private stockholding. However, 
this scenario shows the highest domestic price variability, which can have negative effects 
on some producers and consumers. Price instability, thanks to indexed cash transfers, is 
countered by more stable incomes of the poor consumers. In this case, minimizing 
targeting errors play an important role. Impact of the price instability on producers is 
reduced through the deficiency payments. While poor farmers are protected by consumer 
transfers, deficiency payments’ main goal is to incentivize production through reducing 
price risk faced by farmers (Haile, Kalkuhl, & von Braun, 2015). Food price instability can 
also have its political cost, which needs to be taken under consideration. However, the 
recent evidence suggests that the governments should be rather concerned about high 
food prices rather that food price volatility (Bellemare, 2014). Additionally, there are 
several problems, which should be taken care of under cash transfers. For example, 
payments should be linked to local prices to maintain the purchasing power of the 
transfers. Leakages can still prevail if people involved in the cash distribution are corrupt 
but with a very transparent cash transfer system leakages are likely to be reduced, 
particularly because those occurring at the fair price shops are impeded. 
The limitations of our analysis are, as mentioned before, typical for partial equilibrium 
models – a bigger picture is neglected, for example there is no link to job market and other 
sectors. Additionally, the benefits of empirically grounded model become drawbacks in 
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case of a structural change, like a transition to the cash based system. As a consequence, 
the results should be interpreted carefully. Our analysis focuses on the domestic market 
and further research should be done to analyze impacts of supply and demand shocks on 
the world markets.    
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4. Consumption of wheat and rice – PDS vs. markets37   
This chapter explores TPDS coverage and consumption of wheat and rice – both from the 
PDS and market using household level data from the 68th round of the National Sample 
Survey. It provides analysis of targeting errors and other malfunctions of the system. The 
reasons for no take-up or under-purchase of the PDS grains on all-India level are studied. 
Further, the substitution effect between the market and the PDS grains is analyzed.   
4.1. Problem statement and literature review  
In 2011/12 26 per cent of total rice and over 16 per cent of total wheat was consumed 
out of the Public Distribution System (PDS) supplies in India. Since April 2002, the scale of 
issue to all categories, APL, BPL and AAY, has been revised and made uniform at 35 kg per 
household per month for all (DFPD, 2013). However, the actual rations differ at the state 
level. Some states, like Tamil Nadu, offer per capita ration with an upper bound per 
household. Often the APL allocation is below the centrally guaranteed ration. The AAY 
quota of 35 kg per household is rather observed in all states (Balani, 2013). There are also 
sporadically additional allocations of food grains for different cardholder groups. As a 
result, the eligible consumers, especially the APL cardholders, are often unaware of their 
ration amount, which then can be used by the Fair Price Shop (FPS) owners to sell less to 
the card-holders and divert the difference to the black market (Dhanaraj & Gade, 2012; 
Khera, 2011a). Also the subsidy level differs across the states. The Consumer End Price 
(CEP) is decided by the state authorities and it is linked to the central issue price (CIP) 
which is set by the central government. CEP can be below the CIP if the state provides 
additional subsidy or it can be slightly above it, except the AAY group, containing 
commission.   
The reasons behind the low take-up rates and low consumptions of the PDS grains are not 
fully understood. A few studies explore the problem locally, using household surveys. Jha 
et al. (2013) analyze the access issues related to the TPDS in three Indian states, Rajasthan, 
Andhra Pradesh, and Maharashtra. They found high transaction costs among the major 
                                                          
37 A modified version of this chapter has been accepted for a publication as a FOODSECURE 
(www.foodsecure.eu) discussion paper.  
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under-purchase reasons. Dhanaraj and Gade (2012) study the performance of the Tamil 
Nadu model, which is a universal PDS that covers all households. The authors found high 
diversion rates due to the recipients’ misinformation about their entitlement, which is set 
according to the household size. Low take-up was also due to non-availability of grains 
and to cheating during the weighting of grains. Consumers further complained about 
irregular opening timings and long queues, which can lead a demand driven under-
purchase. Khera (2011a) studied the reasons of under-purchase in Rajasthan. Her findings 
point at supply constraints as the main diver of under-purchase, however she emphasizes 
that the demand side also plays an important role.  
Mehta and Jha (2014) analyze drivers of pilferage in opaque food subsidy programs. In 
their theoretical model, pilferage of inferior goods can be lower or higher in poorer 
communities. This is because the poor have higher incentives to prevent leakage, however 
they usually have less power to do so. The authors found an evidence of the former effect 
dominating the latter in their case study from Philippines. Further, in theory, an impact of 
higher price subsidies on pilferage rates is also ambiguous. However, the authors did not 
find enough statistical evidence of either of the effects. Drèze and Khera (2015) further 
claim that leakage rates differ significantly between different ration card quotas, being 
the highest for APL cardholders due to the above mentioned misinformation.  
In our study, we address the issue of under-purchase on all India level. We provide an in-
depth analysis of the TPDS coverage and consumption, explaining who is coved by the PDS 
and identifying its major malfunctions. We further analyze the reasons for no take-up or 
under-purchase of the PDS grains on the all-India level. Specifically, our research 
questions are: 
 How efficiently does the PDS cover poor and traditionally underprivileged (like 
scheduled castes members) people?  
 What is the scale of under-purchase in different card type groups?  
 What are the reasons for under-purchase? Is it due to supply constrains or demand 
reasons (consumer choices)?  
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Further, in the light of the ‘cash versus in-kind transfer debate’ in India38, more evidence 
on the impact of the PDS on food consumption is needed. In general, the theory predicts 
that if the in-kind transfer is infra-marginal that is a household receiving less than it would 
consume solely from the market, the subsidy should be treated as a cash transfer. 
However, the evidence shows that this is not always true. What is even more puzzling is 
that the results are mixed across literature.  Beatty and Tuttle (2014), for example, found 
that in response to the increase in in-kind benefits (from the Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program), households increased their share of food expenditures. In case of 
India, a few studies found that there is no impact of the PDS subsidy on calorie 
consumption or nutrition, but it seems to skew grain consumption towards subsidized 
wheat and rice and away from coarse grains. Kaushal and Muchomba (2013), follow 
Kochar (2005) and use the exogenous increase in subsidy due to the transformation of the 
PDS into the TPDS to study its impact on nutrition. They found that higher food price 
subsidy shifted the consumption to the subsidized grains and sugar and away from coarse 
grains. However, the calorie, protein and fat consumption remained unchanged. 
Furthermore, no effect of the food price subsidy on nutrition (measured as calories, fat or 
protein intake) was found. Khera (2011a) similarly found that the wheat subsidy in 
Rajasthan affects the grain consumption (towards wheat, away from coarse grains) but 
does not affect the quantity of cereals consumed. Similar conclusions for the BPL 
cardholders were obtained by Shaw and Telidevara (2014).  
On the other hand, there is still little known about the effect of cash transfers on nutrition 
and food security. Impact of conditional and unconditional cash transfers on child 
nutrition was found positive, for example by Agüero, Carter, and Woolard (2007) in South 
Africa and by Behrman and Hoddinott (2005) in Mexico. Manley, Gitter, and Slavchevska 
(2012) in their comprehensive literature review found that on average cash transfer 
programs have positive but insignificant impact on child nutrition. An important insight 
from this study is that cash transfers are much more effective in improving child nutrition 
in areas with less developed health infrastructure. Household nutrition and food security 
effects are also ambiguous. For example, Haushofer and Shapiro (2013), based on an  
                                                          
38 There are several proponents and opponents of the introduction of cash transfers in India – both in 
academia and in political spheres. More details of the debate are presented in the policy implications 
section of the fifth chapter.   
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Randomized Control Trial (RCT) in Kenya, conclude that unconditional cash transfers 
improve consumption, food security and psychological well-being of the recipients. 
Hoddinott et al. (2013), who evaluate vouchers and cash transfers in four countries 
(Ecuador, Uganda, Niger, and Yemen), found that effectiveness in improving food security 
of different programs heavily depend on local conditions, including severity of food 
insecurity or thickness of markets. Additionally, they found no evidence that cash 
transfers are used for ‘undesirable’ goods (alcohol) consumption. The latter result of no 
significant impact or a significant negative impact of transfers on temptation goods was 
found to strongly dominate the literature by Evans and Popova (2014).  
In our study, we focus on wheat and rice consumption and the subsidy’s impact on market 
and total consumption of these grains on all-India level. This is a relevant question not 
only to analyze nutrition impact of the PDS on the transfer recipients, but in the light of 
the system’s high targeting errors, the total demand shifts are also important for the poor 
who are not covered by the system. So in addition to the above listed research question, 
we aim to answer: How does PDS affect the total wheat and rice consumption? More 
specifically, are PDS grains substitutes for market grains? Are they imperfect substitutes? 
And if so, what is the rate of substitution? 
Given the high cost generated by the PDS and the potential benefits of improving the food 
security and nutrition by better targeting, less leakage and a change in consumer behavior 
there are many proponents, both in academia and among policy-makers (Basu, 2010; S. 
Jha & Ramaswami, 2010) of switching to cash transfers. There were some failed attempts 
to introduce cash transfers on a local scale, for example in Puducherry. The program was 
called off mainly because of the operational problems, namely insufficient number of 
bank branches (Yadav, 2015). 
With our results, we contribute to the discussion on how to improve the functioning of 
the PDS, in case the current system is preserved, and whether to switch to cash transfers.   
4.2. Conceptual framework and methods 
4.2.1. Consumption from the PDS  
In our study, we consider a consumer who has a ration card, so can consume wheat and/or 
rice from two sources – the PDS and the market. The amount consumed from the PDS, 𝑞𝑠, 
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is constrained through the PDS entitlement, 𝑞𝑠
∗, depending on both the state and ration 
card type. However, what is often observed (based on the NSS 68th round), 𝑞𝑠 = 0 or 𝑞𝑠 <
𝑞𝑠
∗ . So there are two types of problems besides the targeting error issue: eligible 
households do not use their ration cards at all (no PDS take-up) or eligible households 
consume PDS grains, but less than their ration.  
In general, we distinguish between two types of reasons for under-purchase: demand or 
supply specific. The major difference in our analysis between the two is whether the 
quantity of wheat and rice consumed from the PDS is endogenous or exogenous, from a 
consumer perspective. Demand driven under-purchase also means that PDS grains are 
imperfect substitutes of the market grains. This in turn means that consumption form the 
PDS in not inframarginal, as market and PDS grains are perceived as different products. 
Similar argument is made by Suryanarayana (1995). He showed that implicit subsidy is 
significantly and positively correlated with the PDS dependence, which is due to the fact 
that the PDS grains are not inframarginal.  
The demand driven, so voluntary, under-purchase might be due to high transaction costs 
or consumption habits/preference for other cereals, including inferior quality of the PDS 
grains. Additionally, there might be liquidity constraints preventing a household from 
purchasing the full ration39. However, the liquidity constraint is not likely to hold for the 
AAY and BPL households as the PDS grains ae distributed at extremely low prices, 
constituting a small share of their expenditures, which will be further discussed. The first 
reason, so under-purchase due to high transaction costs, would result in positive relation 
between PDS purchases and the difference between the market price and the subsidized 
price, which is the level of subsidy. The higher the food subsidy is, the stronger the 
incentive to consume from the PDS. Similarly, in the case of inferior quality of the PDS 
grains as compared to the market grains, price subsidy should have a positive impact on 
the quantity consumed from the PDS. In this case, PDS and market grains can be analyzed 
as imperfect substitutes.  Finally, for the liquidity constrained, lower subsidized price 
should result in a higher amount purchased. PDS consumption would also depend on the 
                                                          
39 PDS beneficiaries are often not allowed to purchase their ration in instalments.  
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household characteristics (preferences etc.), excluding regional characteristics if the 
under-purchase is demand driven.  
If under-purchase is due to the supply causes, like diversion, the difference between the 
market price and the subsidized price should affect consumption from the PDS negatively 
– the higher the price difference is, the stronger the incentive for the middlemen (e.g. fair 
price shop operators) to cheat and sell the subsidized grains on the black market at the 
market price. In the areas with many poor people, the leakage rates might be lower 
because the poor have higher incentive to enforce the delivery. If regional characteristics 
are significant, it could be related to both, demand or supply side reasons.  
Finally, an important question is whether there are differences in factors influencing a 
switch from 𝑞𝑠 = 0 to 𝑞𝑠 > 0 as compared to the incremental increase in 𝑞𝑠 conditional 
on 𝑞𝑠 > 0. Most of the above mentioned reasons for under-purchase can influence both 
– a complete dropout from the scheme, as well as the scale of under-purchase. High 
leakage may result in, for example non-deliveries to the local fair price shop (𝑞𝑠 = 0), or 
it can result in underweighting of the subsidized grains (𝑞𝑠 < 𝑞𝑠
∗). Inferior quality and long 
waiting time may be a reason for better off households to avoid the PDS and consume 
solely from the market. But if the transaction costs are low and the PDS grains are of 
inferior quality, better off households may still decide to purchase some quantity of the 
subsidized grains, however less than their entitlement.  
In order to test the hypothesis regarding the primary reason for under-purchase, we study 
the impact of the subsidy on the consumption from the PDS. 
𝒅𝒔 = 𝒒𝒔(𝒑𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐, 𝕏), 
where 𝑑𝑠 can be a dummy for a PDS consumption or 𝑑𝑠 = 𝑞𝑠, 𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 is a market and fair 
price shop price ratio 
𝑝𝑚
𝑝𝑠
 and 𝕏 is a vector of other important variables.  
If the ‘demand’ hypothesis holds, then 𝑞𝑠  is a positive function of 𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 . 𝕏 comprises 
household characteristics (monthly per capita expenditure, hh size, social group, dwelling 
type and education), a share of households living below the poverty line in the FSU, and 
state dummies. If the household characteristics are significantly influencing 𝑑𝑠 , when 
controlled for the ration card type, this supports the demand hypothesis. If the other 
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hypothesis is valid, so the ‘supply’ hypothesis, then 𝑞𝑠 is a negative function of 𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜. In 
practice, there are both supply and demand factors influencing the final quantity of the 
PDS grains purchased. Separating their impacts with empirical analysis is not possible. As 
a result, our analysis focuses on the net effect, stating which factors have a deciding role.   
Additionally, by analyzing the impact of the household characteristics on 𝑞𝑠, we will better 
understand how well the TPDS covers the poor and the vulnerable households and 
whether, in the light of targeting errors, there is a negative self-selection of the richer 
households. Further, by including a share of households living below the poverty line in 
the FSU as explanatory variable, we verify the hypothesis based on the theoretical model 
in (Mehta & Jha, 2014) that pilferage of inferior goods is lower in poorer communities. We 
expect significant differences in the functioning of the PDS for wheat and for rice that is 
why we treat them separately, allowing for different coefficients if the model.  
Understanding who has access to the PDS grains, how much is consumed by whom and 
why may have serious implications for the policy makers in terms of pointing at the major 
problematic areas and pointing at the reform direction.   
4.2.2. Market consumption 
If indeed PDS grains are imperfect substitutes for market grains, the effect of the subsidy 
on wheat and rice consumption should depend on the cross-price elasticities of their 
demand and the respective ration quantity, 𝑞𝑠
∗ . Figure 29 represents the demand for 
market grains and its rationed imperfect substitute. The blue line represents the 
household specific budget line depending on the relative prices. If the utility is maximized 
at 𝑞𝑠 < 𝑞𝑠
∗ (indifference curve 𝑈1), so the ration constraint is not binding, then it is only 
the price ratio, which matters and 𝑞𝑚
′ , that is the quantity from the market, is consumed. 
However if the utility would be maximized at 𝑞𝑠 > 𝑞𝑠
∗ (indifference curve 𝑈2), then 𝑞𝑚 is 
a function of 𝑞𝑠
∗. As a result, the quantity bought on the market is a function of income, 
prices, comprising own price and prices of substitutes, PDS prices and PDS ration, a set of 
household characteristics and state specific factors.  
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Figure 29 Demand for PDS and market grains  
Source: Own design  
4.3. Data  
The estimation is based on the 68th round of the Indian National Sample Survey (NSS) on 
Household Consumer Expenditure, carried out by India’s National Sample Survey Office 
of the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation. The survey is cross-sectional 
and representative at the national level. It covers 101651 households in 7469 villages and 
5268 urban blocks. The survey was based on a multi-stage stratified design with random 
household selection. Data was collected between July 2011 and June 2012 and it covers 
demographic data and household characteristics, as well as consumption quantity and 
value, total consumption expenditure, and PDS consumption, quantity and expenditure 
(NSSO, 2013). Basic sample characteristics are reported in table 16. 
 
   Rural Urban All India 
Sex of household head (male, %) 88.0 88.0 88.0 
Mean age of household head 45 44 45 
Education of household head    
 Not literate 39.1 15.4 31.6 
 Literate without formal schooling 0.06 0.05 0.05 
 Literate with formal schooling (below primary - secondary) 51.3 49.8 50.8 
 Higher secondary and diploma / certificate course 5.4 13.8 8.0 
 Graduate 2.9 14.1 6.4 
 Postgraduate and above 0.8 6.5 2.6 
Mean household size 4.6 4.1 4.4 
Number of observations 59,693 41,967 101,660 
Table 16 Sample Characteristics of NSS Data  
Source: Own design  
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Most of the households have a male head of age 45 years on average. Over 30 per cent of 
households are illiterate, with much lower proportion in urban areas (15.4 per cent). The 
average household size is 4.4 persons, with slightly larger average households in rural 
areas. Our sample consists of almost 60,000 rural and 42,000 urban households.   
We use India’s official poverty line estimates from the Rangarajan report (Planning 
Commission, 2014), which are equal to Rs. 972 for rural areas and Rs. 1407 for urban 
areas. Mean household expenditures are well above these poverty lines (table 17), but it 
is estimated that almost 32 per cent of the households live below the poverty line, with 
proportionally more poor people living in rural areas (35 per cent). Over half of the 
average expenditure is spent on food and on average 18.2 kg of rice and 15.7 kg of wheat 
is consumed (total of market, PDS and own stock).     
    Rural Urban All India 
Mean monthly per capita expenditure (Rs.) 1414.5 2912.7 1882.7 
Poverty line (Rs.) 972 1407  
Food expenditure share (%)   53.5   44.8   51.2 
Below poverty line (%)   35.3   24.4   31.9 
Mean market consumption of cereals per household (kg)    
 Rice   19.8   14.7   18.2 
  Wheat   16.3   14.5   15.7 
Table 17 Expenditure Characteristics 
Source: Own design  
    Rural Urban All India 
Households with ration card (%) 86.0 67.3 80.1 
Type of ration card (%)    
 AAY    6.6   2.3    5.5 
 BPL  44.1 23.3  38.7 
 APL  49.3 74.4  55.9 
Households with positive PDS consumption (%)  51.8 27.8  44.3 
Mean PDS consumption per household (kg)    
 Rice     7.67   3.58    6.40 
  Wheat   3.50   1.66    2.93 
Table 18 PDS Consumption characteristics 
Source: Own design  
Over 80 per cent of the households is estimated to possess some sort of a ration card 
(table 18). The majority of them (56 per cent) have the APL card, whereas only 5.5 per 
cent have the AAY card, with slightly more AAY cards in rural areas. However, the number 
of households which actually consume any PDS wheat or rice is much lower – it is only 44 
per cent on average in India, with 51.8 per cent in rural and 27.8 per cent in urban areas. 
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As a result, mean (over all households) PDS quantity consumed is very low – 6.4 kg of rice 
and 2.93 kg of wheat.  
17 per cent of the below poverty line households did not have any ration card and around 
45 per cent of the below poverty line households did not consume any subsidized (PDS) 
grains. This number is very high, however it is comparable to the leakage estimates for 
the survey period, which are between 42 and 47 per cent (Drèze & Khera, 2015; Gulati & 
Saini, 2015). Within the ration card-holders, there are 60, 44 and 23 per cent of below the 
poverty line households (meaning that their monthly per capita expenditure is below 
poverty line) in AAY, BPL and APL respectively, which indicates significant targeting errors. 
What is interesting, the zero consumption of the PDS grains among the APL cardholders 
is proportionally similar for above and below poverty line groups.          
  Poor Non-poor 
  
Mean 
95% confidence 
interval  
Mean 
95% confidence 
interval  
Food in total exp.  56.6 56.3 56.9 48.1 47.9 48.4 
Staples in food 42.1 41.8 42.4 32.5 32.3 32.7 
Rice market in staples 37.9 37.1 38.6 35.8 35.3 36.4 
PDS rice in staples 7.3 7.0 7.6 4.0 3.8 4.1 
Wheat market in staples  21.5 20.9 22.1 22.7 22.2 23.2 
PDS wheat in staples  3.3 3.2 3.5 2.0 1.9 2.1 
Cereal substitutes in staples  0.2 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.7 
Pulses in staples  21.8 21.5 22.2 24.4 24.2 24.6 
Wheat and rice products  4.2 4.0 4.3 5.9 5.8 6.1 
Coarse cereals 3.8 3.5 4.1 4.5 4.3 4.8 
Table 19 Weights of various food groups in expenditure (%) 
Source: Own design  
Poor households spend relatively more on food than non-poor households (table 19) – on 
average almost 57 per cent, as compared to 48 per cent. Within food expenditures, the 
poor spend much more on staples – 42 per cent, whereas non-poor spend only 32.5 per 
cent of their food expenditures on staples. What is important, even within the staple food 
expenditures, non-poor spend relatively more on more nutritious coarse cereals (4.5 per 
compared to 3.8 per cent of staple expenditures) and pulses (24.4 per cent compared to 
21.8 per cent). Also the poor spend on average quite a big share of their staple food 
budget on the PDS grains – almost 11 per cent. The non-poor spend around 6 per cent on 
the PDS wheat and rice. Importantly, for both poor and non-poor, wheat and rice 
constitute the major source of staple food expenditure – 70 per cent for the poor and 65 
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per cent for the non-poor. Additionally, there are wheat and rice products (noodles, 
bread), which constitute 4.2 per cent of the staple food expenditures of the poor; and 5.9 
per cent of the non-poor.       
4.4. Results and discussion    
In the first step, we generate implicit unit values of the market-consumed goods by 
calculating the ratio of expenditure and quantity. We use an average implicit value for the 
first stage unit (FSU)40 to approximate market prices. We take FSU average prices instead 
of calculating them for individual households separately in order to avoid missing 
observations in case of non-consumption of certain goods. This method also allows us to 
decrease quality and measurement biases associated with unit values (Deaton, 1988). 
Even though, in our analysis we are considering staple foods only and their quality is 
usually rather uniform, there might be significant differences in varieties (especially in the 
case of rice) affecting the price level. This should be smoothed by taking the average in 
the FSU.   
In order to calculate subsidized prices, we use FSU and ration card type specific prices. 
This allows taking into consideration eligible households (ration card-holders) with zero 
purchase from the PDS.  
4.4.1. Consumption from the PDS  
There are probably significant differences in the importance of the PDS grains for different 
ration card type owners due to different subsidy levels - absolute and relative to the 
market price paid (figures 30 and 31) but also due to different expenditure levels in these 
groups. Also, there are probably differences in the leakage rates between these groups, 
as discussed in the introduction.  
                                                          
40 The first stage units (FSU) are the 2001 census villages (Panchayat wards in case of Kerala) in the rural 
sector and Urban Frame Survey (UFS) blocks in the urban sector. (NSSO, 2013) 
92 
 
 
Figure 30 Price subsidy (
𝒑𝒎
𝒑𝒔
) variability by ration card type and region  
Source: Own design  
 
Figure 31 Price subsidy (
𝒑𝒎
𝒑𝒔
) variability by ration card type and region  
Source: Own design  
0
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
2
5
p
ri
c
e
_
ra
ti
o
_
ri
c
e
rural urban
AAY BPL APL AAY BPL APL
excludes outside values
0
5
1
0
1
5
p
ri
c
e
_
ra
ti
o
_
w
h
e
a
t
rural urban
AAY BPL APL AAY BPL APL
excludes outside values
93 
 
Table 20 summarizes consumption by different ration card types. There are clear 
differences between them. First, most of the AAY and BPL (around 90 per cent) actually 
use their cards, whereas APL cardholders predominantly do not (74 per cent). 
Interestingly, AAY cardholders usually consume both subsidized grains, whereas BPL 
cardholders often (42 per cent) consume only one commodity Also, 37 per cent of AAY 
rice consumers and 31 per cent of AAY wheat consumers do not buy these grains on the 
market, which means they consume exclusively from the fair price shops. These numbers 
are much lower for the APL cardholders – 3.2 and 11.3 per cent respectively. This means 
that the poorest rely on the PDS much more than the non-poor.     
What is important, average consumption of wheat and rice by the AAY households who 
use their ration cards is 30.4 kg per household, which is close to the full ration (35 kg). On 
the other hand, BPL consumers utilize on average only 21.9 kg of wheat and rice out of 
the same ration quantity. Full PDS consumption, so at least 35 kg per household, is 
observed in 46 per cent of the AAY households and only 13.8 per cent of the BPL 
households. It is clear that the BPL households are much less successful than the AAY 
cardholders in obtaining their full ration. APL average consumption is 15.9 kg per 
household. However, in this group, the most striking finding is a low usage of ration cards 
and accordingly a high share of zero consumption from the PDS (74 per cent).  
In the light of these results, we need to analyze the low take-up by the APL cardholders. 
The aim is to find out the reasons behind not consuming from the PDS. Is it because of 
self-selection, so demand driven, or maybe because of high leakage and other supply side 
causes. This is important because of high targeting errors, as outlined in the data section, 
there are 23 per cent of poor households with the APL card and many of them do not 
actively participate in the scheme. Next, we need to explain the low consumption of the 
PDS wheat and rice – why do so many households buy only a fraction of their ratio? This 
is especially alarming in the BPL group. Maybe this is also because of the targeting errors, 
as there are only 44 per cent of poor households in the BPL group, according to the data. 
So it might be the case that better-off households buy only a small amount of grains from 
the PDS.  
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    AAY  BPL APL 
Households' consumption from PDS (%)  
   
 No consumption 10.5 9.6 74.0 
 Consumption of one crop only  25.8 41.6 13.7 
 Consumption of both wheat and rice 63.7 48.9 12.3 
Households consuming exclusively from the PDS (%)   
 Rice 37.0 16.8 3.2 
 Wheat 30.7 27.5 11.3 
Mean  PDS consumption per household (kg) 
   
 Rice 18.0 13.8 2.8 
 Wheat 9.3 6.0 1.4 
Mean conditional* PDS consumption per household (kg)   
 Rice 21.3 16.5 14.4 
 Wheat 13.5 10.7 7.2 
 Total wheat and rice 30.4 21.9 15.9 
Mean PDS - market price ratio (%) 
   
 Rice 21.3 24.9 34.2 
 Wheat 24.4 37.6 37.3 
Mean monthly per capita expenditure (Rs.) 1081.5 1292.2 2060.5 
Below poverty line (%) 59.6 43.7 23.2 
* Average over households with positive consumption from PDS 
Table 20 PDS Consumption by Ration Card Type   
Source: Own design  
First, cardholder groups differ with respect to their financial status (table 20). BPL 
cardholders’ expenditure is 20 per cent higher than the AAY, whereas APL cardholders 
spend on average 60 per cent more that the BPL group. Different take-up rates and 
consumption quantities may result from a lower subsidy relative to the total expenditure. 
This would support the hypothesis that their under-purchase is a result of a negative self-
selection. Second, the PDS beneficiaries may live in income and card-type clusters. This 
might influence pilferage rates (Mehta & Jha, 2014). Indeed, there are 29 per cent of the 
FSUs without any poor households and over 45 per cent of the FSUs have less than 14 per 
cent poor households in them (table 21). These are probably the rich areas. On the other 
side there are 16 per cent of the FSUs where over 60 per cent of the households live below 
the poverty line, which is a very high concentration of the poor     
Poor (%)  Percent Cumulative 
0.00 28.95 28.95 
0.13 16.04 44.98 
0.14 0.18 45.16 
0.17 0.02 45.18 
0.20 0.01 45.19 
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0.25 16.96 62.15 
0.29 0.17 62.32 
0.33 0.01 62.34 
0.38 11.46 73.79 
0.43 0.06 73.85 
0.50 10.06 83.9 
0.57 0.06 83.97 
0.60 0 83.97 
0.63 7.41 91.38 
0.71 0.04 91.43 
0.75 5.39 96.82 
0.86 0.01 96.83 
0.88 2.05 98.88 
1.00 1.12 100 
Total 100   
Table 21 Distribution of the FSUs by the share of poor households  
Note: 0 in the column Poor means there are no poor households in a FSU, 1 means everyone in a FSU is poor. 
Poor measured as expenditures below the poverty line.  
Source: Own design    
We estimate a probit model to explain the reasons for the low take-up of the APL program. 
Our dependent variable, the take-up of the APL card, is equal to 1 if there is a positive 
rice/wheat consumption by an eligible APL cardholder and zero otherwise. As it was 
mentioned in the theoretical section, we expect differences in functioning of the PDS for 
wheat and for rice. For example wheat is reported to have higher leakage than rice (Gulati 
& Saini, 2015). The results are reported in table 22.  
We find the price subsidy to have a mostly insignificant impact on the take-up. Only in 
case of rural wheat PDS take-up, there is a positive and significant impact. So there is no 
evidence of leakage having a deciding role on low take-up. But also, except for the rural 
wheat consumption, the price subsidy does not seem to positively influence the decision 
of purchasing the PDS grains. There might be an unobserved variable issue in rural areas, 
which is a transaction cost. Distance to the PDS shop in rural areas may vary substantially 
and be correlated with the market price. A higher distance to the PDS shop might be 
positively correlated with the market price – remote areas without good infrastructure 
and far from a market have higher market prices and higher chance of long distance to 
the PDS shop or worse functioning fair price shop, which means higher transaction costs, 
which we do not observe. As a result, we would obtain underestimated subsidy 
parameters for rural areas. However, the scale of the issue should be rather small. The 
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example from Bihar (Muralidharan et al., 2011), where at the time the survey was 
conducted, the TPDS was among the worst functioning in the country (Gulati & Saini, 
2015), shows that the average distance to the ration shop was similar in rural and urban 
areas. The difference lies in longer waiting times and fewer days when a ration shop is 
open in rural than in urban areas. Consumer’s response to waiting time is similar to 
response to changes in prices (Alderman, 1987). This means that transaction costs are 
indeed higher for the rural households than for the urban ones, but there is no evidence 
of correlation with the distance to the market. This might be the reason for the stronger 
reaction to the subsidy in case of rural households as compared to urban.    
Per capita expenditure and higher secondary and above education have a significant and 
negative impact on the take up rates of the APL households, which might be due to self-
selection - more affluent households drop out of the scheme. The expenditure impact is 
moderate - the probability of participating in the scheme decreases on average by 0.03-
0.04 if the monthly expenditure per capita increases by Rs. 1000 at the means of all the 
explanatory variables. Higher secondary and above education has much stronger impact 
decreasing the probability of participation in the PDS by 0.149 for wheat and 0.235 for 
rice at the means of explanatory variables. Literacy does not affect the probability of 
participation in the scheme as compared to illiterate cardholders.    
Household size has a positive and significant impact for both commodities, which might 
be that there is a higher chance that someone in the household who is available to go to 
the PDS shop in more populous households (for example children) or because there are 
higher consumption needs. This might be also an effect of per capita allocations in some 
states so there is more to gain from the participation in the PDS. However, the effect is 
rather weak – additional family member increases a probability of participation by around 
0.01 at the means.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Rice Rice Wheat Wheat 
VARIABLES 
APL 
Marginal effects 
at means 
APL 
Marginal effects 
at means 
      
Share of the poor in the FSU (%) 0.004*** 0.001*** -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Price ratio rural  0.001 0.001 0.017** 0.007** 
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 (0.008) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) 
Price ratio urban -0.007 -0.003 0.009 0.004 
 (0.007) (0.002) (0.010) (0.004) 
Monthly per capita expenditure, MRP 
('000 Rs.)  
-0.097*** -0.035*** -0.080*** -0.032*** 
 (0.018) (0.006) (0.017) (0.007) 
Household size 0.038*** 0.013*** 0.024*** 0.010*** 
 (0.011) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) 
Literate with and without formal 
schooling 
-0.087 -0.031 -0.027 -0.011 
 (0.063) (0.022) (0.049) (0.020) 
Higher secondary & above -0.662*** -0.235*** -0.374*** -0.149*** 
 (0.074) (0.026) (0.062) (0.025) 
Hired Dwelling Unit  -0.055 -0.020 -0.035 -0.014 
 (0.066) (0.024) (0.056) (0.022) 
No Dwelling Unit  2.060*** 0.309*** -2.392*** -0.512*** 
 (0.398) (0.017) (0.644) (0.022) 
Other Dwelling Unit  0.102 0.035 -0.174 -0.069 
 (0.161) (0.054) (0.109) (0.043) 
Scheduled Castes -0.078 -0.026 -0.112 -0.045 
 (0.124) (0.040) (0.116) (0.046) 
Other  Backward Classes -0.226** -0.077** -0.035 -0.014 
 (0.111) (0.036) (0.110) (0.043) 
Other social groups  -0.322*** -0.112*** -0.216** -0.086** 
 (0.111) (0.037) (0.110) (0.043) 
Urban sector -0.058 -0.021 0.075 0.030 
 (0.071) (0.026) (0.065) (0.026) 
Constant 1.096***  0.504***  
 (0.157) 
 (0.154)  
 
    
Observations 69,748 46,002 69,230 37,306 
N_sub 20147  19284  
Table 22 PDS APL consumption - probit model results  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
State region and lightning code dummy estimates are included but not reported 
Omitted social group is scheduled tribes 
Source: Own design  
There are no significant differences in the PDS participation probability between 
households living in owned, hired and other dwelling units. However, households without 
any dwelling41 significantly and strongly differ, strikingly in the opposite manner for wheat 
and rice. Households with no dwelling units and the APL cards are more probable to use 
the PDS by 0.31 in case of rice and less probable by 0.51 in case of wheat as compared to 
the households with own dwelling units. There is also a significantly higher probability of 
                                                          
41 Households are considered to be categorized as possessing “no dwelling” when found to be living more 
or less regularly under bridges, in pipes, below staircases or with temporarily built flimsy improvisations 
etc. with a liability to be removed at any moment (NSSA classification). 
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the participation in the scheme for scheduled tribes and castes42 with the APL cards as 
compared to other social groups with the APL cards. But this difference is larger in case of 
rice consumption.   This might mean that the rice consuming states are better, so the rice 
TPDS, is better in covering the underprivileged households. This should be verified for the 
other card types and the quantity consumed from the PDS. In general, PDS rice take-up 
by the APL cardholders seems to be driven by the economic and social status, whereas 
wheat consumption depends more on the subsidy level.      
Finally, there is a significant and positive effect of the poverty concentration in a district 
(FSU), measured by the share of the below poverty line households in the FSU, on the rice 
take-up and no effect on the wheat take-up.  The marginal effect for rice is moderate – 1 
per cent increase of the share of the poor in the FSU increases the probability of PDS take-
up by an APL household by 0.1 per cent. As discussed above, this dependency was found 
by Mehta and Jha (2014); the poor communities due to higher incentives are more 
successful in reducing leakage from opaque subsidy programs.     
We estimate a tobit model explaining the quantity consumed from the PDS; separately 
for wheat and rice: 
𝑞𝑠 = {
0   if 𝑞𝑠
∗ ≤ 0
𝑞𝑠
∗ if 𝑞𝑠
∗ > 0 
   ,  
𝑞𝑠
∗ =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 ∗ 𝐶𝑇 + 𝛼2𝑀𝑃𝐶𝐸 + 𝛼3𝑆 + 𝛼4ℍ + 𝛼5𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑟 , 
where 𝑞𝑠 is an observed quantity of wheat/rice consumed from the PDS by a household, 
𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 is a relative subsidy level per kg (market price of wheat/rice divided their PSD price), 
𝐶𝑇  is a card type (dummy for different card types), 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝐸  is a monthly per capita 
expenditure, S is a state region dummy, ℍ vector of household characteristics (hh size, 
social group, etc.), and Poor is a share of the poor in the FSU. We chose a tobit model 
instead of a linear regression as there is a significant portion of zero consumption of 
subsidized grains by eligible consumers, as it was shown in table 20.  
                                                          
42 Scheduled castes and tribes, as listed in the Constitution of India, comprise various historically 
disadvantaged groups of people (Bakshi & Kashyap, 2012). Even though the Constitution guaranties 
affirmative action, protective arrangements and development of the scheduled casts and tribes (ibid), 
they are persistently characterized by lower nutrition, wealth and education as compared to the 
remaining Indian population (van de Poel & Speybroeck, 2009).  
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Estimation results are reported in table 23 for rice and in table 24 for wheat43. The first 
two columns contain results for specification with the price ratio for all card types, and 
the last two columns show the price ratio interacted with card type dummies.    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Rice  Rice 
VARIABLES Rice Marginal effects Rice Marginal effects 
          
Female -737.661*** -638.990*** -935.392*** -810.286*** 
 (234.173) (202.730) (229.586) (198.671) 
Share of the poor in 
the FSU (%) 
33.379*** 28.914*** 27.284*** 23.635*** 
 (5.176) (4.480) (4.948) (4.283) 
Monthly per capita 
expenditure, MRP 
('000 Rs.) 
-1,566.391*** -1,356.869*** -1,359.872*** -1,177.993*** 
 (184.164) (158.548) (163.646) (141.015) 
Household size 1,133.894*** 982.223*** 1,158.929*** 1,003.926*** 
 (56.446) (49.019) (53.413) (46.335) 
Scheduled Castes 383.710 340.874 202.368 179.301 
 (319.369) (283.286) (315.936) (279.662) 
Other  Backward 
Classes 
-1,246.087*** -1,089.634*** -1,151.999*** -1,007.236*** 
 (306.101) (269.730) (305.530) (269.253) 
Other social groups -2,257.963*** -1,953.151*** -2,039.348*** -1,766.263*** 
 (346.230) (301.783) (345.314) (301.564) 
Is any member of 
the household a 
regular salary 
earner? 
1,201.948*** 1,041.174*** 881.571*** 763.664*** 
 (222.492) (192.926) (216.116) (187.353) 
Urban sector -2,336.023*** -1,996.900*** -1,999.714*** -1,713.038*** 
 (248.867) (209.441) (242.497) (204.915) 
Price ratio AAY   891.121*** 771.936*** 
   (46.883) (40.449) 
Price ratio BPL   328.921*** 284.928*** 
   (33.804) (29.256) 
Price ratio APL   -493.403*** -427.411*** 
   (109.815) (95.028) 
Price ratio  286.942*** 248.560***   
 (30.088) (26.022)   
Constant 2,754.351**  4,210.401***  
 (1,252.812)  (1,203.845)  
     
Observations 46,411 46,411 46,411 46,411 
Table 23 PDS rice consumption (grams per household per month) - estimation results and 
marginal effects 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
State region and lightning code dummy estimates are included but not reported 
                                                          
43 There were no significant differences in the estimated coefficients for rural and urban sector separately, 
consequently, we present results of the estimation based on the full sample.  
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Omitted social group is scheduled tribes 
Source: Own design  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Wheat  Wheat 
VARIABLES Wheat 
Marginal 
effects 
Wheat 
Marginal 
effects 
          
Female -248.380 -167.682 -323.13 -217.94 
 (224.868) (151.796) (224.64) (151.46) 
Share of the poor in the 
FSU (%) 
11.159** 7.533** 5.53 3.73 
 (5.402) (3.646) (5.25) (3.54) 
Monthly per capita 
expenditure, MRP ('000 
Rs.) 
-932.455*** -629.500*** -782.98*** -528.09*** 
 (139.022) (93.315) (123.76) (83.09) 
Household size 448.608*** 302.855*** 470.44*** 317.29*** 
 (50.068) (33.902) (48.06) (32.50) 
Scheduled Castes -175.559 -124.877 -209.93 -147.54 
 (432.917) (308.651) (429.83) (302.94) 
Other  Backward Classes -1,107.724*** -771.033*** -820.73** -568.54** 
 (415.748) (294.827) (410.26) (288.32) 
Other social groups -2,407.146*** -1,622.697*** -2,010.55*** -1,352.38*** 
 (435.480) (303.354) (433.21) (299.69) 
Is any member of the 
household a regular salary 
earner? 
881.348*** 594.997*** 522.32** 352.28** 
 (211.057) (142.230) (213.15) (143.69) 
Urban sector -1,183.693*** -788.426*** -760.80*** -508.79*** 
 (238.258) (157.261) (233.09) (155.08) 
Price ratio AAY   952.74*** 642.58*** 
   (65.97) (43.74) 
Price ratio BPL   620.20*** 418.30*** 
   (83.25) (55.91) 
Price ratio APL   -175.48* -118.35* 
   (93.19) (62.80) 
Price ratio  515.334*** 347.902***   
 (49.437) (33.193)   
Constant 9,411.196***  10,133.51***  
 (1,520.641)  (1,501.87)  
     
Observations 37,540 37,540 37,540 37,540 
Table 24 PDS wheat consumption (grams per household per month)  - estimation results 
and marginal effects  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
State region and lightning code dummy estimates are included but not reported 
Omitted social group is scheduled tribes 
Source: Own design  
Similarly to the aforementioned probit model results of the APL take-up, expenditure has 
a significant and negative impact on consumption of both PDS wheat and rice, and the 
impact is higher in case of rice. Additional thousand Rs. of expenditure decreases on 
101 
 
average household’s consumption of rice by 1.2-1.4 kg and 0.5-0.6 kg of wheat at the 
means of explanatory variables. Again, this can be interpreted as evidence for negative 
self-selection of richer households. Also household size has a positive and significant 
effect on grain consumption (wheat and rice), which again can be due to per capita 
allocations or just more household members available to reach a fair price shop. In case 
of rice, the effect of a larger household by one person is up to 1 kg and in case of wheat, 
around 0.3 kg. All the backward classes, especially scheduled castes and tribes consume 
significantly more subsidized grains. Households belonging to scheduled tribes consume 
even 2 kg of rice or 1.6 kg of wheat from the PDS as compared to other (non-backward) 
social groups. Urban households on average consume less PDS grains than rural ones.  
Interestingly, a regular salary earner in a household significantly increases the PDS 
consumption. Less than 12 per cent of rural households belong to the category of the 
regular salary earners. In urban areas, this is estimated to be over 45 per cent of the 
population. So probably the combination of the negative coefficient for the urban sector 
and the positive effect for the regular salary earner, similar in the amplitude, is the sign of 
not covering the migrant workers, which TPDS has been criticized for.  
When it comes to price subsidy, it has on average a positive and significant impact on both 
wheat and rice consumption (see columns 1 and 2 for marginal effects). This means that 
the PDS under-purchase is mostly demand driven. As a result, because the PDS grain price 
is below the market price, we can also conclude that on average, it is treated as imperfect 
substitute to the market grains. Further, this finding supports the expectation and is in 
line with the finding in (Suryanarayana, 1995) that PDS grains are not inframarginal.  
Interestingly, when the price ratio is interacted with the card type (see columns 3 and 4 
for marginal effects), there is a significant difference between its impact on the 
consumption of the PDS grains. The price subsidy has a negative and significant impact on 
both wheat and rice PDS consumption of the APL cardholders and a positive and 
significant impact for both AAY and BPL groups. This can be linked to the already discussed 
differences in the leakage rates from APL and BPL quotas, and confirms the hypothesis 
formulated by Drèze and Khera (2015). The higher price incentive has a stronger impact 
on the shop owners to leak grains in case of the APL quota and a stronger impact on the 
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consumers to buy more in case of the BPL and the AAY cards. Further, there is a significant 
positive impact of the share of the poor in the FSU (similarly to the probit model for the 
APL take-up results). This is true for both rice and wheat (except for the specification 3, 
table 24). Which is again along with the hypothesis formulated by Mehta and Jha (2014) 
that the poor communities due to higher incentives are more successful in reducing 
leakage from opaque subsidy programs.      
Another interesting result is that a female household head dummy has a negative and 
significant effect on rice PDS consumption and a negative but insignificant impact on 
wheat PDS consumption quantity. When interacted with the ration card type (table 25), 
the negative effect of the female household head is significant only for the APL 
cardholders, also to a lesser extend for the wheat PDS consumption. APL households with 
a female head consume on average 1.6 kg of PDS rice and 0.46 kg of PDS wheat less than 
their male led counterparts. This is an alarming result, as the women led household are 
usually socially more vulnerable and food insecure (ADB & FAO, 2013). Women led 
households are often households without a man, led by divorced or widowed women. 
These households are extremely marginalized (Masoodi, 2015). This malfunction of the 
PDS has not been mentioned in the literature so far and should be further analyzed. 
Higher under-purchase is probably related to the marginalization of female led 
households. This is why a ‘head of the household’ definition adopted in the National Food 
Security Act, which is the eldest woman, who is not less than eighteen years of age, is a 
very important legal provision.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Rice  Wheat 
VARIABLES Rice Marginal effects Wheat Marginal effects 
          
Female AAY -792.23 -686.32 -1,075.95 -725.73 
 (823.06) (713.00) (778.36) (524.94) 
Female BPL -231.69 -200.72 118.67 80.04 
 (312.64) (270.80) (304.01) (205.07) 
Female APL -1,836.04*** -1,590.59*** -679.37* -458.24* 
 (381.44) (330.56) (358.74) (241.96) 
Observations 46,411 46,411 37,540 37,540 
Table 25 PDS rice consumption (grams per household per month) and a household head 
– some estimation results and marginal effects   
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Exogenous variable set the same as in regressions in table 8 and 9 
Source: Own design  
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4.4.2. Market wheat and rice consumption  
Unfortunately, we do not have the exact information on the ration quantity – as it was 
discussed above, despite the official uniform 35 kg per household, some states provide 
less grains for the BPL, and even more often for the APL cardholders. Only actual 
consumption of the market grains can be observed. We can control for ration card type, 
however it is highly correlated with the subsidized price level. As a result, we estimate 
two alternative specifications – with PDS prices and with ration card types as explanatory 
variables.   
We estimate a tobit model for market consumption of wheat and rice44: 
𝑞𝑚 = {
0   if 𝑞𝑚
∗ ≤ 0
𝑞𝑚
∗  if 𝑞𝑚
∗ > 0 
   ,  
and  𝑞𝑚
∗ = 𝛼0 + 𝛼 ln 𝑃 + 𝛽1 ln 𝑚 + 𝛽2 ln
2 𝑚 + 𝛾𝕏 ,  
where 𝑞𝑚 is the observed per capita market consumption of wheat or rice, ln 𝑃 is a vector 
of logarithms of prices of staple foods, including either PDS prices or a ration card type, m 
is monthly per capita expenditure (MPCE) and 𝕏 is a vector of household characteristics 
and state dummies. Results are presented in table 26. 
From the formula above, we can calculate price and expenditure elasticities of the latent 
variable 𝑞𝑚
∗ . Expenditure elasticity of the good m consumption: 
𝜂𝑚 =
𝜕𝑞𝑚
𝜕𝑚
𝑚
𝑞𝑚
=
𝛽1 + 2𝛽2 ln 𝑚 
𝑞𝑚
 
Price elasticity of the good m consumption with respect to the price of good n:  
𝜖𝑚𝑛 =
𝜕𝑞𝑚
𝜕𝑝𝑛
𝑝𝑛
𝑞𝑚
=
𝛼𝑛
𝑞𝑚
, 
where 𝛼𝑛 is an element of a vector 𝛼, corresponding to price coefficient of the good n. 
Respective price and income elasticities for wheat and rice at the mean expenditure and 
consumption levels are presented in table 27. 
                                                          
44 There were no significant differences in the estimated coefficients based on rural and urban sample. 
Consequently, we provide the results from the estimation on the full sample.  
104 
 
For both wheat and rice, own prices have negative and significant coefficient estimates45, 
which is according to the theory. Rice consumption has a positive response to upward 
wheat price changes, however, in case of wheat the coefficients are not significant. 
Logarithms of income have positive and significant coefficients. This is again, according to 
the expectations based on the Engel’s law – consumption increases with income at a 
diminishing rate.  Further, their squared values have negative and significant coefficients. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Rice Rice Wheat Wheat 
          
ln price other cereals 804.02** 921.35*** 574.72 491.44 
 (348.74) (326.68) (437.39) (397.25) 
ln price rice -8,158.47*** -8,912.01*** 1,437.58 2,361.56** 
 (672.84) (643.09) (997.33) (919.57) 
ln price wheat 4,591.35*** 5,716.84*** -9,684.74*** -10,712.73*** 
 (893.14) (886.13) (935.96) (879.87) 
ln price cereal substitutes  -961.40*** -1,178.93*** -302.58 -577.09 
 (313.82) (314.69) (453.77) (502.66) 
ln price pulses  -2,159.85*** -2,309.89*** 1,499.31 1,162.87 
 (696.13) (684.37) (1,214.52) (1,162.31) 
ln price PDS rice -1,632.14***  1,351.21***  
 (265.20)  (331.60)  
ln price PDS wheat 2,208.38***  2,778.69***  
 (257.79)  (359.05)  
ln MPCE 3,927.38*** 2,409.50*** 8,354.47*** 7,145.97*** 
 (408.54) (399.25) (495.85) (462.51) 
ln square MPCE -722.58*** -390.55** -1,988.14*** -1,747.01*** 
 (169.93) (162.02) (214.45) (201.73) 
Household size 3,496.15*** 3,375.59*** 4,787.09*** 4,872.28*** 
 (81.55) (78.83) (124.77) (118.08) 
literate with and without 
formal schooling 
-222.52 -384.28 141.54 -406.06 
 (309.03) (290.93) (355.91) (338.63) 
Higher secondary & above -472.61 -949.75*** -493.99 -1,609.36*** 
 (352.28) (338.59) (422.37) (402.45) 
AAY card  -7,041.42***  -8,844.99*** 
  (816.32)  (845.12) 
BPL card  -5,405.57***  -5,218.16*** 
  (364.75)  (410.17) 
APL card  -1,481.48***  1,257.23*** 
  (272.10)  (317.77) 
Urban sector -767.57*** -1,084.43*** -1,964.74*** -2,253.60*** 
 (282.98) (278.67) (374.18) (364.53) 
Constant 31,435.60*** 36,780.56*** -10,760.25** 3,551.46 
 (4,093.02) (4,124.23) (5,478.14) (5,570.01) 
     
Observations 39,761 43,936 31,618 35,583 
                                                          
45 These are not elasticities as the explanatory variable is expressed in levels, not logarithms. 
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Table 26 Market rice and wheat consumption (grams per capita per month) – tobit model 
results  
Note: State and dwelling unit code dummy estimates were included but not reported  
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Exogenous variable set the same as in regressions in table 8 and 9 
Source: Own design  
  
PDS price 
elasticity 
Own price 
elasticity 
Income 
elasticity 
Rice -0.08 -0.42 0.17 
Wheat 0.13 -0.44 0.31 
Table 27 Market  consumptionprice and income elasticities – calculated from the tobit 
model results 
Note: Elasticities were calculated at means of expenditure and consumption quantities  
Source: Own design  
PDS price of rice has a significant and negative effect and PDS wheat price has a positive 
and significant effect on market rice consumption (column 1, table 26). For market wheat 
consumption, both PDS wheat and rice prices have a significant and positive impact 
(column 3, table 26). So higher subsidy (coming from a lower PDS price) for rice actually 
increases market rice consumption and decreases market wheat consumption. Lower PDS 
price for wheat decreases consumption of both market wheat and rice. In terms of price 
elasticities this means that a lower PDS rice price by one per cent increases market rice 
consumption by moderate 0.08 per cent, whereas one per cent decrease in wheat PDS 
price decreases market wheat consumption by 0.13 per cent (table 27). Interestingly, in 
case of rice, the rural AAY cardholders consume the least grains from the market and the 
consumption increases with the card type, especially between the BPL and the APL cards. 
No card means the highest market rice consumption, controlling for all the other factors. 
However, in case of wheat, APL cardholders consume slightly more than no card 
households. What is important, the highest coefficients are between around 7,000 and 
8,900, which means that the AAY households consume on average 8.9 kg of wheat or 7 kg 
rice less than no card households. In case of wheat, the average PDS consumption by the 
AAY cardholders is 9.3 kg, so it seems that the PDS slightly increases the total wheat 
consumption. In case of rice, the average PDS consumption by the AAY households is 18 
kg, so total rice consumption is significantly higher. This result is similar to the conclusions 
from the specification with the PDS prices – there is a significant and strong crowding in 
effect of rice and a small effect of wheat consumption by the PDS. We can conclude, that 
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PDS wheat and rice are substitutes (though not perfect substitutes) for market rice and 
wheat.   
4.5. Summary and conclusions 
Understanding the consumption patterns of the PDS grains, so who and how much 
consumes and why, contributes to solving a puzzle of low take up and consumption from 
the PDS in India. It has important implications for policy measures taken to improve its 
functioning. Further, impact of the subsidy on market grain consumption has several 
implications – both for covered households, through impacting their diets, and 
households not covered by the PDS, through impacting total demand and market prices. 
What we see in the data, is that the vast majority of the poorest of the poor, at least those 
with an AYY card, consumes subsidized grains and on average, they buy almost the full 
ration. However, AAY constitute only 5.5 per cent of all card owners in the country and 
there are many poor who do not buy any PDS grains. Rural coverage with the PDS is quite 
high – there were almost 52 per cent of households consuming some amount of the 
subsidized grains, on average a little above 11 kg per household. Under-purchase among 
the BPL and APL cardholders is much higher than in the case of the AAY group. 
Additionally, the APL group is characterized by the very low take-up – only 26 per cent 
bought any amount of the PDS grains. With our detailed analysis on the all India level we 
contribute to improved understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the TPDS.   
There is no evidence of leakage having a deciding role on the low take-up observed in the 
APL group, but also, except for rural wheat consumption, the price subsidy does not seem 
to positively influence the take-up rate of the PSD grains. Rice PDS seems to be better in 
covering underprivileged, backward classes and families without a dwelling unit than the 
wheat distribution. Higher income and education levels can be associated with lower 
probability of APL take-up, which is probably due to the negative selection of the more 
affluent households. A similar effect of income was found on the quantity of PDS grains 
consumed in all ration card groups. Our results further suggest that the migrant workers 
and female led households are not well covered by the TPDS- despite having a card, they 
under-purchase from the PDS. To our knowledge, this is the first empirical analysis of the 
various targeting errors on all India level.    
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There is a significant difference in impact of the price subsidy on the PDS consumption 
between the card types. The price subsidy has a negative and significant impact on both 
wheat and rice PDS consumption of the APL cardholders and a positive and significant for 
both AAY and BPL groups. This can be linked to the difference in the leakage rates from 
APL and BPL quotas. The higher price incentive has a stronger impact on the shop owners 
to leak grains in case of the APL quota and a stronger impact on the consumers to buy 
more in case of the BPL and AAY cards. This conclusion is supported by the discussed 
above lack of impact of the subsidy on the take-up rates among the APL households, which 
are mostly driven by wealth and social status. This means that those APL cardholders who 
turn to the PDS scheme are income driven and would consume more subsidized grains 
than they do if not for the leakage and diversion. With our result, we empirically confirm 
the hypothesis made by Drèze and Khera (2015). This phenomenon can be a consequence 
of the misinformation about the ration among the APL cardholders – despite the centrally 
guaranteed 35 kg per household, many states provide less to this group. There are also 
sporadically some additional allocations for the APL quota, which are not realized by the 
cardholders. As a result, it is easier for the PDS shopkeepers to divert grains from the APL 
quota compared to the other groups. Further, PDS recipients in poor areas consume 
slightly more PDS grains which might be attributed to better monitoring of the Fair Price 
Shops by these communities and consequently lower leakage. This result supports a 
theoretical model and empirical results in Mehta and Jha (2014).   
There is a significant and strong crowding in effect of total rice consumption by the PDS 
rice. In case of wheat, it is significant but much weaker. We conclude, that PDS wheat and 
rice are substitutes (though not perfect substitutes) for market rice and wheat and PDS 
consumption is not inframarginal. This result contributes to the growing evidence that the 
PDS crowds in consumption of wheat and rice and we also conclude that in the light of 
the targeting errors, higher total demand for wheat and rice might have negative 
consequences for the poor and underprivileged excluded from the system.  
To sum up, there are several issues which should be addressed if the food distribution in 
kind is continued. More diversified rations, including for example pulses, eggs and 
vegetables, could be highly beneficial for the improved nutrition of the poor. But also, 
some problems, like corruption and targeting errors can prevail even under the cash based 
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system, so certain institutional improvements must be done irrespective of the system. In 
addition to that, the benefit of the negative self-selection of the rich would disappear 
under the cash transfers, which makes precise targeting one of the crucial elements of the 
transition to cash transfers. Another one, due to a large variation in prices, is linking the 
transfer amount to the local market prices as well as local price changes. However, the 
benefits of the cash based system can be large, both fiscal and on the ground of food 
security and nutrition. The growing evidence shows that child nutrition and household’s 
food security status can be improved by cash transfers.  All this shows that there is high 
potential and urgent need to seriously discuss and consider cash transfers for the Indian 
system.        
Among the limitations of our method are lack of information about the institutional 
differences and limited information on the household characteristics and its district (like 
number of children, distance to the PDS shop and functioning of the PDS shop, distance 
to the market), which might have a significant influence on the household’s decision 
making process and the outcomes of these decisions. Another caveat is that our analysis 
is done jointly on the all India level, even though the local (regional or state) differences 
in cultures and production systems might be an important factor influencing the response 
to the policies we analyze. However, the aim of this study is to analyze the consequences 
of the central policy measures on the country as a whole, as opposed to exploring the 
regional differences in responses to various policies. Nonetheless, further research should 
be focused on confirming our results on the state scale and testing whether the omitted 
control variables significantly affect the conclusions.      
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5. Conclusions  
The main findings of this study and its limitations are discussed in detail in the preceding 
chapters. This last chapter provides a brief summary of the key findings from the analytical 
chapters and draws corresponding policy conclusions. The chapter finishes by proposing 
directions for further research.  
5.1. Summary of the findings  
Since the time of independence, India has gone through a tremendous transformation in 
terms of its food grain sector - from a food scarce country to a major rice exporter; from 
provision of a marginal support to the urban poor to the right to food act, among others. 
A history of dreadful famines and the adopted socialist approach resulted in a highly 
regulated food economy with a large procurement, stocks and distribution of wheat and 
rice. In the last years, food subsidy has grown to almost one per cent of the GDP.  Yet still, 
the country is plagued with malnutrition and hunger, and the food system is criticized for 
inefficiencies and corruption. Further, even larger system with a broader coverage is 
currently being implemented under the National Food Security Act (NFSA). This poses 
several questions that ask, for example, what can be done to improve the system and 
whether its financing is feasible in the medium or long term. It is also necessary to explore 
the alternatives and analyze their consequences.    
This dissertation studies various aspects of the food grain sector and food grain policies in 
India in order to provide a comprehensive analysis of the policies, their interactions and 
the outcomes. The study provides many new findings.  
Chapter 1 reviews a brief history of the food grain sector in India and brings the political 
economy perspective. It explains the reasons behind the current system and its roots. The 
food grain policy of a current shape was initialized after the great Bengal Famine of 1943, 
when more than two million people died of starvation due to a drastic fall in production 
and a malfunctioning grain market with restrictions on grain movements. This meant a 
shift away from reliance on the private sector to the one establishing complete 
government monopoly in the procurement, storage and distribution of food grains. These 
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intensified government interventions in the food sector initiated the Green Revolution in 
India in the 1960s. This marked the beginning of self-sufficiency in wheat and rice and high 
public stock levels.  
Next, the current system itself together with the ongoing reform – the National Food 
Security Act (NFSA), is outlined. A general problem statement in the form of a critique of 
the current policy measures and the recent developments in the food grain sector is 
brought about. Currently, Indian government unboundedly procures wheat and rice from 
the farmers with the guaranteed Minimum Support Price (MSP). The procured grain is 
stored as the buffer stocks, distributed to the poor at the heavily subsidized Central Issue 
Price (CIP) through the Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS) and Other Welfare 
Schemes (OWS)46, and released to the market through the Open Market Sales Scheme 
(OMSS) or exported. Most of the operations are conducted by the parastatal agency, the 
Food Corporation of India (FCI). There are also trade regulations and private stock 
limitations used on an ad hoc basis to increase domestic availability, isolate domestic 
prices from international prices or boost public procurement. NFSA was passed in 
September 2013 and it, among others, provides a legal right to highly subsidized food-
grains for eligible households. The Act aims to provide food security to 67 per cent of the 
country’s population by distributing a fixed quantity of highly subsidized grain every 
month. High fiscal costs, leakages, targeting errors, illegal diversion of food grains, and 
significant wastage due to poor storage and transport facilities are listed among the direct 
and indirect costs of the system. The absence of clear rules to release surplus stocks 
resulted in mounting stocks and high food inflation. The current system is further criticized 
for skewing production and consumption towards wheat and rice away from more 
nutritious coarse cereals, pulses or oil plants. Trade policies are criticized for fueling 
international price volatility and net-taxing Indian farmers by understating domestic 
prices. As a result, there is a lot of pressure both domestically and internationally to 
reform the system.    
Chapter 2 attempts to unravel the major linkages between policies and markets for wheat 
and rice. It describes and analyses different fragments of the system on a macro level, 
                                                          
46 Jointly TPDS and OWS are referred to as Public Distribution System (PDS).  
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using time series analysis of all India aggregate outcomes. The policies in focus are 
procurement, storage and distribution (with market sales and exports) policies and the 
major variables of interest are stock levels, market prices and fiscal costs. We find strong 
and particularly growing in the recent years, impacts of the policy measures on market 
outcomes. Strikingly, this strong influence is found in all the analyzed elements of the food 
system. In some cases, markets are so distorted that their fundamentals hardly respond 
to prices. For example, rice aggregate demand is mostly driven by the PDS distribution. In 
general, rice market appears to be more regulated than the wheat market. Consequently, 
starting from 2006-07, there has been a clear upward trend in inflation adjusted fiscal 
costs associated with procurement, storage and distribution of wheat and rice. Not only 
have total fiscal costs increased, fiscal costs per unit released through the PDS have also 
increased. 
Chapter 3 builds on the results from Chapter 2 in order to simulate within a two 
commodity dynamic partial equilibrium model with stochastic shocks on current and 
possible future reform outcomes. It is found that the NFSA puts a high pressure on fiscal 
costs and public stocks in the medium term.  This can be slightly mitigated with well-
designed policy measures. However, there is always a tradeoff between the fiscal costs, 
grain availability, price levels and stability. For example, relying on imports with the low 
MSPs results in a high stock-out risk and the lowest fiscal costs, but with high domestic 
price levels and volatility and high international prices. A policy strategy to manipulate 
procurement prices in order to maintain public stocks close to the norms leads to a slightly 
higher fiscal costs with lower and more stable prices and ample stocks. However, on the 
contrary to a cash-based solution, the differences in outcomes within the NFSA scenarios 
are not large. A cash-based regime can bring considerable savings and curb fiscal costs, 
particularly if targeted to the poor, and would leave ample total stocks due to higher 
private stocks. However, this scenario shows the highest market price levels and 
variability, which can have negative effects on some producers and consumers as well as 
on political stability.     
The last analytical chapter, Chapter 5, explores TPDS coverage and consumption of wheat 
and rice – both from the PDS and the market using household level data from the 68th 
round of the National Sample Survey. The vast majority of the poorest of the poor, at least 
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those with the AYY (the Poorest of the Poor) card, seem to be well covered by the PDS. In 
general, by comparison to the wheat distribution, rice PDS appears to be better in terms 
of covering the traditionally underprivileged classes and those families without dwelling 
units. We also find evidence for a negative selection of the more affluent households both 
for a take-up in the Above Poverty Line (APL) scheme and the quantity consumed from 
the PDS in all groups. This phenomenon results in cost savings, which would be lost under 
a cash-transfer scheme. Migrant workers and female led households, however, are not 
well covered by the TPDS, which is an alarming result given that these are vulnerable social 
groups. 
Further, we find evidence that there are different leakage rates from the Above Poverty 
Line (APL) and the Below Poverty Line (BPL) quotas. The higher price provides a stronger 
incentive for shop owners to leak grains in case of the APL quota and a stronger incentive 
on the consumers to buy more in case of the BPL and AAY cards. Another finding is that 
leakage from the PDS is lesser in poor communities, which is probably due to better 
monitoring of the system by the beneficiaries. PDS wheat and rice are also found to be 
imperfect substitutes of the market grains and as a result, the PDS consumption is not 
inframarginal. There is a strong crowding-in effect of rice consumption by the PDS rice. 
These findings have important implications for total demand for wheat and rice and hence 
market prices. In the light of the targeting errors, higher total demand for wheat and rice 
might have negative consequences for the poor, the underprivileged and the excluded 
from the system. 
5.2. Policy implications  
There is a growing consensus, among both proponents and opponents of the PDS, that 
deep reforms of the system are necessary. For example Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen 
(2013; 2011) advocate for a better functioning PDS with a universal distribution and 
against introduction of cash transfers in India. Their argument is that cash transfers need 
to be supported by well-functioning public services whose provision in India is too weak. 
Insufficient bank infrastructure is another obstacle to replacing Fair Price Shops with bank 
branches (Drèze, 2015). To avoid targeting errors and make use of negative self-selection 
of the rich households, they propose a universal in-kind food distribution. On the other 
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side of the debate, we find proponents of the cash system. Given the high costs generated 
by the PDS and the potential benefits of improving the food security and nutrition by less 
leakage and a change in consumer behavior, these proponents, both in academia and 
among policy-makers (Basu, 2010; S. Jha & Ramaswami, 2010) argue for switching to cash 
transfers. For example, a pre-pilot study in Bihar conducted by J-Pal South Asia 
(Muralidharan et al., 2011) gives an image of a potentially high benefits from the 
implementation of the cash based system. First, open market shops are much more 
available, especially in terms of the ‘effective access’, which is for example opening hours 
or waiting time. Second, there were fewer complaints about cheating, like 
underweighting, in open market shops as compared to the PDS shops. Also open market 
prices were found to be rather stable throughout a year and most importantly, the 
discussion group revealed a strong interest in receiving cash transfers. However, on 
average, the cash transfer had to be higher than the equivalent of the subsidy received 
through Fair Price Shops.     
The results from this dissertation might be highly useful in realization of both scenarios, 
by flagging malfunctions and inefficiencies of the system, quantifying reform 
consequences and providing inputs for further research. In fact, there are infinitely many 
scenario realizations with various combinations of in-kind and cash provisions. Clearly, 
one of the major issues that needs to be solved, regardless of the choice between the two 
policy instruments, is corruption. Although a discussion on good governance is beyond 
the scope of this dissertation, we find it necessary to emphasize the importance of the 
scale of corruption on realization of the outcomes of all the policy measures and success 
of the reforms.  In general, stronger public institutions combined with decentralized and 
participatory approaches could be more effective at delivering the antipoverty programs 
and have various benefits, including fiscal sustainability and a long-term growth (von 
Braun, Gulati, & Fan, 2005). 
The modeling exercise showed that there are various aspects which should be taken into 
consideration when deciding on the particular policy measures. For instance, even under 
the implementation of the NFSA, there are several strategies of managing the system 
which can result in different bundles of outcomes regarding price levels and stability, fiscal 
costs, or grain availability. The degree of reliance on the private sector is also an important 
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factor to consider. Delegating, for example part of the stockholding47 or distribution to 
private agents could curb costs.  Further, some degree of reliance on the world market – 
so allowing or not and to which extent, for supplementing domestic supplies with imports 
in times of low availability, is the next important issue to be considered. It has several 
implications for both fiscal costs, as well as domestic and international prices. Choices will 
depend on the risk attitude, government budget and trust in private sector. Better support 
for producers of other than wheat and rice crops in order to alleviate rural poverty and 
diversify production can be further considered. Beside the MSP measures, it is important 
to investigate - market instruments, like subsidized credit and insurance. Even larger 
changes can be brought about by moving to cash-based instruments (e.g. cash-transfers, 
deficiency payments). For example, fiscal costs can be reduced significantly but under 
higher price volatility. Food prices, however, are a very sensitive political issue in India so 
the decision should consider possible political outcomes.  
On the distribution side, policies should consider inclusion of diversified food products in 
the PDS so as to improve nutrition outcomes. Targeting errors need to be addressed for 
example through scaling up well targeted programs, like Mid-Day Meal Scheme or 
enabling more flexible use of ration shops in order to include the migrant workers. Further 
digitalization of the PDS might positively contribute to leakage eradications. In case cash 
system is introduced, the major challenge is linking it to the very heterogeneous prices 
and price changes. Innovative banking techniques – like mobile banking should be 
considered in order to enable access for the remote areas without bank outlets. Inclusion 
errors should be addressed as in the case of cash that negative self-selection of the more 
affluent households will probably disappear. A very important faze of implementation of 
the cash system is a transition time. With a big share of fragile population in the country, 
even short term failure to deliver support might result in irreversible negative 
consequences (Kalkuhl et al., 2013).          
 
 
                                                          
47 Public private partnership for stockholding has been already initiated; however, the scale of it is rather 
marginal.  
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5.3. Implications for further research  
The partial equilibrium model framework in this dissertation neglects regional differences 
and state-specific environments, as well as heterogeneity of the agents. Further research 
should be carried out on the state level data and different income groups. There are 
several research questions which could be answered with this extended framework. For 
instance, how would the poor benefit (e.g. in terms of total wheat and rice consumption) 
from the cash transfers as compared to the non-poor? Several questions regarding the 
implementation of the deficiency payments also remain open. For example, should it be 
offered to every farmer or should it be targeted to the poor? What would it mean for the 
total production level? How would it practically be implemented?   
Our analysis merely focuses on the domestic market and hence further research should 
be done to analyze impacts of supply and demand shocks in the world markets. It would 
also be particularly interesting to analyze outcomes under different trade regimes.  
Household level analysis, controlling for local and household level characteristics, should 
be conducted, and further studies worth conducting could include the impacts of the PDS 
on nutrition defined through micro- and macro-nutrients. Further, the above mentioned 
market based solutions like subsidized credit and insurance should be investigated. For 
example, would the access to financial services (which comes with cash-transfers) have 
much stronger co-benefits on the poor than the actual cash-transfer?  
Another interesting group of questions is regarding the reasons for the distinct differences 
in the functioning of the wheat vs. rice systems, which were found in this dissertation. 
Why does rice PDS seem to be functioning much better in terms of providing support to 
the underprivileged and having lesser leakage? Is it due to better institutions in the rice 
consuming states? What is the actual contribution to this phenomenon of the universal 
or semi-universal distribution in some states (most prominently Tamil Nadu)?       
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Appendix 1 – Price series construction 
In order to transform the wholesale price index component into a price time series, we 
need a conversion factor. The monthly price is calculated by assigning a weight to the 
price in a state by the most recent share of that state in total production and then 
calculating the weighted average price for all of India. This is done for four consecutive 
years. Then, the monthly conversion factor is calculated as the ratio of the monthly price 
and the WPI component. The average over four years is taken to use it as the final 
conversion factor. The stronger seasonality of production-weighted prices goes into the 
conversion factor. The fluctuations of the conversion factor are the rationale why we 
cannot use just one month to scale the WPI. 
 
 
Figure 32 Paddy WPI and major producing states production weighted price average 
Source: Own calculation based on http://www.dacnet.nic.in/ 
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Figure 33 Wheat WPI and major producing states production weighted price average 
Source: Own calculation based on http://www.dacnet.nic.in/ 
 
 
 
 
9000
10000
11000
12000
13000
14000
15000
16000
17000
4
.2
0
0
8
6
.2
0
0
8
8
.2
0
0
8
1
0
.2
0
0
8
1
2
.2
0
0
8
2
.2
0
0
9
4
.2
0
0
9
6
.2
0
0
9
8
.2
0
0
9
1
0
.2
0
0
9
1
2
.2
0
0
9
2
.2
0
1
0
4
.2
0
1
0
6
.2
0
1
0
8
.2
0
1
0
1
0
.2
0
1
0
1
2
.2
0
1
0
2
.2
0
1
1
4
.2
0
1
1
6
.2
0
1
1
8
.2
0
1
1
1
0
.2
0
1
1
1
2
.2
0
1
1
2
.2
0
1
2
R
s.
/t
o
n
n
e
Weighted avarage price WPI constructed price
127 
 
Appendix 2 – Regional heterogeneity of prices 
 
Figure 34 Wheat wholesale prices in selected markets 
Source: Own design based on the GIEWS, FAO data 
 
Figure 35 Rice wholesale prices in selected markets 
Source: Own design based on the GIEWS, FAO data 
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Appendix 3 – Data sources  
Variable Source 
Production USDA 
Consumption  USDA 
Marketed surplus Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India 
Procurement  Food Corporation of India (FCI) 
TPDS, OWS off-takes FCI 
MSP  FCI 
WPI  
Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Government of 
India 
Stocks FCI 
Rainfall India Meteorological Department, Government of India 
Personal disposable 
income 
Reserve Bank of India 
Food subsidy Ministry of Finance, Government of India 
Table 28 Data sources  
Source: Own design
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Appendix 4 – Demand estimation – IV first stage results  
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 
Log market 
wheat 
price 
(harvest) 
Log market 
wheat 
price 
(harvest) 
Log market 
wheat 
price 
(harvest) 
     
Lag log market 
wheat price 
(annual) 
0.261** 0.310*** 0.310*** 
 (0.0974) (0.0975) (0.0975) 
Log PDS per 
capita off takes 
-0.0884*** -0.112*** -0.112*** 
 (0.0286) (0.0260) (0.0260) 
Lag log income  -0.0969*   
 (0.0538)   
Log time trend 0.0835** 0.0267 0.0267 
 (0.0335) (0.0166) (0.0166) 
Log MSP wheat  0.283*** 0.174* 0.174* 
 (0.0961) (0.0927) (0.0927) 
Lag rain  -4.88e-05 -7.61e-05 -7.61e-05 
 (9.14e-05) (9.55e-05) (9.55e-05) 
Int price#export 
ban  
-0.00208 -0.00157 -0.00157 
 (0.00565) (0.00582) (0.00582) 
Constant 1.209** 1.070** 1.070** 
 (0.431) (0.429) (0.429) 
    
Observations 28 30 28 
R-squared 0.630 0.603 0.603 
Table 29 Wheat IV estimation – first stage results  
Note. *,**,*** indicates significance levels at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively with robust standard error 
estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 
Log market 
rice price 
(harvest) 
Log market 
rice price 
(harvest) 
Log market 
rice price 
(harvest) 
     
Log market rice 
price (annual) 
0.491** 0.560*** 0.655*** 
 (0.176) (0.181) (0.182) 
Lag log income  -0.318***  -0.145** 
 (0.0947)  (0.0542) 
Log PDS per 
capita off takes 
0.00667 -0.127*** -0.0234 
 (0.0601) (0.0323) (0.0560) 
Log time trend 0.114** -0.0249  
 (0.0458) (0.0169)  
Log MSP rice 0.672*** 0.341*** 0.549*** 
 (0.120) (0.0996) (0.107) 
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Int price#export 
ban  
0.00624 0.00749 0.0112** 
 (0.00617) (0.00628) (0.00540) 
Rain 2.84e-05 6.86e-05 7.71e-05 
 (6.55e-05) (8.17e-05) (6.89e-05) 
Constant 0.617 -0.162 -0.0799 
 (0.558) (0.528) (0.508) 
    
Observations 29 30 29 
R-squared 0.801 0.717 0.758 
Table 30 Rice IV estimation – first stage results  
Note. *,**,*** indicates significance levels at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively with robust standard error 
estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Appendix 5 – Model fit graphs  
 
Figure 36 Ex-post and baseline scenario total consumption simulation  
Source: Own design 
 
 
Figure 37 Ex-post and baseline scenario production simulation 
Source: Own design 
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Figure 38 Ex-post and baseline scenario price simulation  
Note: Rice price in this graph is for paddy. In the study we use 0.66 as a conversion  
factor from paddy to rice.  
Source: Own design 
   
 
Figure 39 Ex-post and baseline scenario procurement simulation  
Source: Own design 
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Figure 40 One realization of private stocks (s) and production (q) in cash scenario 
Source: Own design 
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